

**United Nations Development Assistance  
Framework Jamaica 2012-2016**

**Evaluation Report**  
December 2016

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## Acronyms

AWP	Annual Work Plan	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan	PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
CPD	Country Programme Document	PCT	Programme Coordination Team
CIP	Country Implementation Plan	PIMSEC	Public Investment Management System
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child	PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
DaO	Delivering as One	RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
ECLAC		RBM	Results-Based Management
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UN	United Nations
GoJ	Government of Jamaica	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	UNCTAD	UN Commission on Trade and Development
ILO	International Labour Organization	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistant Framework
IOM	International Organization for Migration	UN-ECLAC	Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean
JSLC	Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions	UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
MIC	Middle Income Country	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MSDF	Multi-Country Sustainable Development Framework	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
MTF	Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework	UNODC	United Nations Organization on Drugs and Crime
NGO	Non-Government Organization	UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
NHRI	National Human Rights Institution	UNWOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
NPGE	National Policy for Gender	WHO	World Health Organization
NRA	Non-Resident Agency		
NSAP	National Strategic Action Plan to Eliminate Gender-Based Violence		
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		
OHCHR	Office of the High Commission for Human Rights		
OECS	Organization of East Caribbean States		

## Acknowledgements

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This is an independent evaluation commissioned by the UNCT and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. However the sole responsibility for the content of the report and opinions lie with the Evaluation Team and does not represent the views of either the UN system in Jamaica or the Government of Jamaica.

Babar Sobhan and Stacy Rose-Richards

## **Executive Summary**

Jamaica is an upper middle-income country with the largest population in the English-speaking Caribbean. Jamaica has faced a number of development challenges, the most serious of which include negative or very low rates of economic growth; high debt (139.7% of GDP), and high levels of unemployment (16.3% in 2012).

The UN system in Jamaica, along with its partners, identified three priority areas over the period 2012-2016—Environment; Social Empowerment and Equity; and Safety, Security and Justice—supported by the three Outcomes. The projected budget for the UNDAF results was estimated at US\$37.6 million of which \$11m came from regular resources leaving \$26,5m to be mobilized.

This evaluation takes place alongside the negotiations around a new multi-country approach that brings together 18 countries under a Multi-Country Sustainable Development Framework (UN MSDF). The findings and recommendations of this Evaluation will help to shape the content of the CIP process in Jamaica.

The critical inputs to the Evaluation included a desk review of key reports, evaluations, studies and other programme monitoring information from UNCT members, key informant interviews with national informants and stakeholders and UN programme staff. In addition, a short survey was developed to supplement the findings of the report.

### **Key Findings**

#### **Relevance**

The UNDAF remain broadly relevant to the national priorities and goals under Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan. However, there seems to be very little understanding or awareness about the UNDAF or that the pillar(s) represent a commitment to delivering results jointly. More effort needs to be given to aligning the UNDAF planning cycles with the MTF cycles to ensure that the support of the UN and the MSDF remains the foundational document for the partnership between the GoJ and the UN.

#### **Efficiency**

Other than the introduction of HACT, the UN has not made sufficient progress towards using and working with and through national systems.

Basic opportunities for closer collaboration and streamlining of processes such as joint planning, work plans, common annual and financial reports that would adopt the best practices of the Joint Team on HIV/AIDS have not been taken up.

There continues to be the need for greater clarity / certainty on how and when UN processes should integrate with and work through national systems and coordination between PIOJ as the nodal body for multi-lateral partnerships and line ministries and the UN system collectively and individually needs to be made more effective.

### **Effectiveness and Sustainability**

Overall implementation rates for the UNDAF seem to average around 50-60% across the 5 Results Areas that were identified in 2015.

The UN can point to significant achievements in the Jamaica's engagements with international treaty bodies most notably the UPR that took place earlier in 2016. The agreement to create National Human Rights Institute is also a notable achievement. Important steps have also been taken on specific issues relate to Gender Equality most notably around GBV.

However, the UNDAF itself does not seem to have resulted in a more strategic level of support from the UN. Part of this stems from the fact that the UN seems to have failed to clearly define what would constitute value added for the system, either collectively—i.e. a clear organizing principle that under-pinned the UNDAF—or even within individual pillars.

Assessing the overall sustainability of UN Interventions in Jamaica is not an easy task, given the many challenges identified during the course of the Evaluation. The UN can point to a number of pilot initiatives that have been mainstreamed into national programmes. Furthermore, the technical expertise provided through the UN is in direct response to the express needs of line ministries, suggesting that the impact of the work would potentially be felt beyond the UN's involvement.

### **Lessons Learned**

The UNDAF process is only as valuable if it is perceived to be so by all participants and the lack of government engagement beyond the initial planning stage has critically undermined the overall utility of the exercise. This appears to be an ongoing challenge for the UN and the Government of Jamaica that dates back to the previous UNDAF as noted in a meta-evaluation of UNDAFs conducted in 2010.

The decision to go directly from the UNDAF to agency programmes and projects without some form of intermediate document coupled with the very limited resources mobilized by the UN created the impression of a UN that was very fragmented and not impactful. This was further reinforced by the failure of the various theme groups to meaningfully coalesce around 1-2 common results.

**It is critical the PIOJ and the UN reach a clear understanding of the scope and purpose of the CIP and in particular whether it represents the totality of the UN's work in Jamaica or just those areas where the UN will work more cooperatively using some minimal level of joint programming modality or some point in between these two poles.**

The second main lesson is that anticipated coordination structures to provide oversight and support UNDAF implementation did not function effectively and thereby undermined the overall usefulness of the UNDAF. In particular, the failure to integrate the various UNDAF bodies within the coordination architecture of Vision 2030 served to reinforce the view that the UNDAF was primarily an internal UN tool rather than as a shared vehicle for collective responsibility.

Despite the fact that the UNDAF stated the intention of developing a communication strategy as part of the implementation process, this never took place. The failure to develop a clear and coherent set of messages around the UNDAF as opposed to the specific mandates of different UN agencies served to reinforce the notion of the UN as not speaking with One Voice.

## **Key Recommendations**

### **Rethink the role of the UN in Jamaica**

The UN and GoJ need to undertake in a joint long-term visioning exercise about the role and contribution of the UN in Jamaica. The current model of engagement is grounded in a relationship that began when Jamaica was still a developing country rather than a more strategic understanding of the value-added of the UN in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The UNCT should develop a resource mobilization strategy for the CIP and make a commitment to mobilizing resources within Jamaica as the UN rather than individual agencies.

UN should move to a model that focuses on addressing long-term capacity needs of Jamaica as articulated in Vision 2030 and the SDGs anchored in a long-term understanding of Jamaica's capacity needs in 2030 and positioning the UN accordingly. Particular attention could be given to areas such as Gender Mainstreaming, Human Rights and Data Analysis where the UN has a clear comparative advantage.

Lastly, the UN should advocacy strategy around joint UN initiatives ('flagship projects') at the national level to strengthen the collective brand and identity of 'One UN'

### **Programmatic Focus**

The aim of the CIP(s) should highlight those areas where the UN has made a clear commitment to working collectively. This need not preclude agencies from providing specific bilateral support as is currently the case but would simply place the emphasis on those areas where more collaboration is possible and anticipated. Focus can take multiple forms including with a common partner(s) or in the same geographic region or around the same theme.

The joint theme groups should be tasked to identify 3-4 areas where there is scope for enhanced joint programming with clear and specific goals (in consultation with partners) and to report against achievements on an annual basis. The UN has a clear comparative advantage in a number of crosscutting areas—e.g. gender, human rights, working with adolescents and youth and data—and this need to be featured more prominently.

### **Coordination**

It is recommended that the UN in Jamaica adopt the lightest coordination structure permissible under the MSDF. In particular, more attention needs to be given to clearly defining the deliverables for the coordination structures around three main areas—planning and design (which is relatively well-coordinated), implementation and monitoring (which are not). This does not necessarily require a new architecture but rather to ensure that the current V2030—MSDF coordination structures work towards a clear purpose.

The UN should build on the decision to work through the appropriate V2030 Thematic Groups in the development of the CIP and develop a modality to jointly oversee the implementation of the MSDF interventions within the context of the sector plans.

Support the RCO and PIOJ to maintain a “who, what and where” database of UN programmes / interventions to allow for the identification of areas of convergence.

### **Monitoring the UNDAF**

PIOJ should monitor the MSDF [indicators] on an annual basis and build stronger links to the individual agency reviews. A more systematic adoption of national indicators within the CIP would help to build synergies between the various review processes.

The individual agency quarterly reviews should eventually be replaced by review of the CIP that would bring together the UN and all relevant line ministries under the auspices of the PIOJ.

PIOJ and the UN should establish a joint calendar to streamline the reporting of UN results and the sectoral reviews of the MTF and how these contribute to the achievement of national results.

Dedicated capacity in the RC Office would go a long way towards improving the overall use of data to monitor the UNDAF and also serving to provide support to agencies in much the same way the senior human rights advisor was able to provide inputs to national planning processes.



## MAIN REPORT

## Country Context

1. Jamaica is an upper middle-income country with the largest population in the English-speaking Caribbean. Jamaica has faced a number of development challenges, the most serious of which included negative or very low rates of economic growth; high debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratios, and high levels of unemployment (16.3% in 2012). Over the last 30 years, real per capita GDP increased at an average of just one percent per year, making Jamaica one of the slowest growing developing countries in the world.
2. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Country Programme Document (CPD) notes that while the macro-economic outlook has improved and Jamaica's Human Development Index (HDI) score increased 10.9% since 1980 to reach 0.719 in 2014, ranking 99th of 188<sup>1</sup> the country's social conditions remain comparatively poor. According to the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC), the population living in poverty increased from 9.9% in 2007 to 19.9% in 2012. The JSLC records a deepening of poverty between 2009 and 2010, as measured by the Poverty Gap Index, shows an increase in "the severity of poverty, indicating a worsening in the circumstances of the poor and an increase in inequality"<sup>2</sup> and concludes that more resources are required to take the poor out of poverty.
3. The high incidence of crime and violence also continues to pose a major challenge to human security and data points to an increasing incidence of violence against women. HIV and AIDS continue to threaten Jamaica's development despite some successes. Jamaica's vulnerability to natural hazards, the effect of climate change and the dependence on imported petroleum continue to be significant and costly.
4. The UNICEF CPD noted important progress and positive trends over the past decade and the critical efforts of successive Governments toward creating a child-friendly society in Jamaica. The concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on the combined third and fourth periodic report on implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of Jamaica (March 2015) recognizes, among achievements, the adoption and progressive implementation of the Child Care and Protection Act (2004); the establishment and activities of the Office of the Children's Advocate (2005); an overall decline in the general crime rate; and important gains in children's access to health care and education. However, despite progress, important gaps exist in guaranteeing a safe and healthy childhood for all children of Jamaica.
5. National child poverty data for 2014 show that approximately 25 per cent of the country's children fall below the national poverty line, estimated at just below 200,000 children. According to the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), this figure has steadily increased from 15.3 per cent in 2008. In addition, a 2011 multidimensional poverty assessment conducted by the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC) in collaboration with UNICEF reflected child poverty at 43%, with minimal difference between boys (42.8%) and girls (43.9%).

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<sup>1</sup> Human Development Report 2015, Work for Human Development. Briefing note for countries on the 2015 Human Development Report

<sup>2</sup> [Executive Summary, Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions, 2010](#)

6. Jamaica remains highly vulnerable to natural hazards particularly hurricanes, floods and droughts in addition to earthquakes. The Vision 2030 Jamaica: National Development Plan indicates the need to strengthen the policy and regulatory frameworks for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (CCM) and ensuring their full integration into the existing frameworks at the national and local levels. Additionally, DRR and climate change response are seen as government-level problems with inadequate participation from the private sector and individuals.<sup>3</sup>

The United Nations' system is comprised of the UN itself and more than 30 affiliated organizations—known as programmes, funds, and specialized agencies—with **their own membership, leadership, and budget processes**. These groups work with and through the UN to promote worldwide peace and prosperity.

**UN Programmes and Funds (UNDP, UNICEF, UN WOMEN, UNFPA, and UNEP)** are financed through voluntary contributions rather than assessed contributions.

**UN Specialized Agencies (World Bank, IMF, PAHO/WHO, UNESCO, ILO and FAO)** are autonomous organizations working with the United Nations and funded by both voluntary and assessed contributions.

## Evaluation Context

7. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012-2016 is being implemented by 11 UN Funds, Programmes and Specialised Agencies—FAO, IOM, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, PAHO/WHO, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNWOMEN, and UNEP in Jamaica—and 3 Non-Resident Agencies (NRAs)—UNHABITAT, ILO, and IAEA. UN agencies also implemented special initiatives, which fell outside the scope of the UNDAF Results Matrix and for certain specialized agencies such as PAHO and FAO, this in fact accounted for the bulk of the country programme.

## UN in Jamaica

8. It is also important to note that there are important differences in the way UN entities operate in Jamaica (and their level engagement with the UNDAF). UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, FAO and PAHO would be considered resident agencies with Jamaica-specific programmes managed and operated through a local office with a representative [though with varying capacities and in all instances with steadily decreasing resources].<sup>4</sup> UNFPA and UNESCO are also physically based in Jamaica albeit with a regional mandate and cover Jamaica through sub-regional and regional programmes respectively.<sup>5</sup> UNEP has recently opened a sub-regional office in Jamaica but has maintained a presence in the country through the

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<sup>3</sup> Extract from the UNDP Draft Country Programme Document for Jamaica (2017-2021) pg. 2

<sup>4</sup> The UNDP office is also considered a multi-country office, covering the Bahamas, Turks & Caicos Island, Cayman Island, Bermuda

<sup>5</sup> In the case of UNFPA, there has been a significant reduction in the size of the office during the course of the UNDAF.

Caribbean Environment Programme and has been an active member of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) though not directly involved with the UNDAF.<sup>6</sup>

9. OHCHR and UN Women have maintained a presence in Jamaica in the form of professional staff members but with reporting lines outside of Jamaica. In the case of UN Women, the programme is managed through the multi-country office based in Barbados. It should be noted that neither position is currently funded in the next programme cycle. In case of OHCHR, at request of the UNCT a Human Rights Advisor was deployed in 2014 as part of the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) under a UNDG/UNDOCO initiative.<sup>7</sup> The remaining UN agencies engaged with the UNDAF as non-resident agencies either based in the region or from HQ.
10. To further complicate matters, UN agencies also operate different programme cycles with UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women operating on 5 Year cycles linked to their Country Programme Documents (CPDs) and aligned with the UNDAF programme cycle. Specialized agencies such as FAO and PAHO, however, operate on a biennial programming cycles that are not directly linked to the UNDAF cycle but run parallel to it.
11. It is fair to note that these different institutional arrangements have affected the level of GOJ oversight of programmes as well as the alignment with national priorities and integration into the UNDAF. Unfortunately, the extent to which this can be addressed within the context of the new programme framework remains an open question.
12. This evaluation takes place alongside the negotiations around a new multi-country approach that brings together 18 countries—Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of Dominica, Curacao, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Maarten, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago—under a Multi-Country Sustainable Development Framework (UN MSDF). Having finalized the MSDF, each country is now putting together a Country Implementation Plan (CIP).<sup>8</sup> The findings and recommendations of this Evaluation will help to shape the content of the CIP process in Jamaica.

### Structure of the UNDAF

The UN system in Jamaica, along with its partners, identified three priority areas over the period 2012-2016—Environment; Social Empowerment and Equity; and Safety, Security and Justice—supported by the three Outcomes listed below (along with contributing agencies). The projected budget for the UNDAF results was estimated at US\$37.6 million of which \$11m came from regular resources leaving \$26.5m to be mobilized. This represented an

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<sup>6</sup> UNEP has recently opened a sub-regional office based in Jamaica, which will take over the engagement with the MSDF in the next cycle.

<sup>7</sup> The Senior Human Rights Advisor has a direct reporting line to the Resident Coordinator and is considered part of the RCO structure rather than as a representative of OHCHR in Jamaica. OHCHR is in the process of establishing a regional office [in Panama] that will also cover Jamaica.

<sup>8</sup> There will be one CIP for Barbados and OECS sub region for a total of 6 CIPs in the region corresponding to the 6 UNCTs.

increase of approximately 90 per cent over the previous UNDAF.<sup>9</sup> It should also be noted that the largest share (80%) of the total resources were to be mobilized by two agencies—UNICEF and UNDP—and for many of the other agencies, the project budget requirements and by extension, the actual contribution to the respective UNDAF pillars was more aspirational [or as part of a regional initiative that included Jamaica].

- **UNDAF Pillar 1: Environment**

UNDAF Outcome: National, local authorities and most vulnerable communities island-wide improve natural resource management and resilience to disasters (FAO, IAEA, PAHO, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO)

- **UNDAF Pillar 2: Social Empowerment and Equity**

UNDAF Outcome: Socially excluded and at-risk populations in rural/urban communities have increased access to improved quality health and education services (IAEA, PAHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNWOMEN)

- **UNDAF Pillar 3: Safety, Security and Justice**

UNDAF Outcome: Government and civil society organizations improve access to comprehensive protection, prevention, and justice systems and services for individuals and groups vulnerable to multiple safety and violence risks (IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNWOMEN)

13. Since its launch in 2012, the UNDAF has undergone two major reviews / revisions. A Mid-Term Review (MTR) was conducted in 2014 and noted among other things: “...even with the best information, it will be difficult to assess progress toward the outcomes...which are not achievable in the time period of the UNDAF.”<sup>10</sup> The report also noted that the UNDAF results matrix had major gaps with 9 of 45 indicators (20%) lacking baseline data against which to measure progress and a further 6 lacking clear targets. The review recommended the development of SMART indicators for both outputs and outcomes for more efficient M&E<sup>11</sup>; the definition of intermediate outcomes feasible for the remaining years of the UNDAF; and preparation of a M&E plan to manage the implementation of the second half of the UNDAF period.<sup>12</sup>

14. Building on these recommendations, the UNCT recruited a senior national consultant in 2015 to develop a revised Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework and Plan and tools with which to monitor the framework. The new M&E plan has been in effect for only one

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<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the Evaluation Team was not able to understand the basis for such a large increase in the projected budget especially given Jamaica’s status as an UMIC coupled with the high levels of public debt that would likely limit access to different forms of concessional finance. The largest share of the budget was allocated to Pillar 2 reflecting the big-ticket partnerships with the Ministries of Health and Education.


<sup>10</sup> The UNDAF was developed at the outcome level only and was supported by CPs and CPAPs at the agency level.

<sup>11</sup> The recommendation is consistent with the Guidelines for preparing an UNDAF.

<sup>12</sup> See report by Michael Witter (2014) available at <https://undg.org/home/country-teams/latin-america-the-caribbean/jamaica/>

year thereby making a more in-depth quantitative assessment of the UNDAF difficult due to a lack of data.<sup>13</sup> It should however be noted, that the M&E plan could act as a solid foundation for ensuring that the CIP is evaluable.

Figure 1: Relationship between V2030 and UNDAF



## Evaluation Scope and Objectives

15. The Evaluation was conducted under the auspices of the UNCT and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) who provided comments on the Terms of Reference and procurement process and was managed by the PCT. The main aim of the Evaluation was as follows:

1. To support greater learning about what works, what did not and why in the context of the UNDAF. This evaluation will provide important information for strengthening programming and results at the country level, specifically informing the planning and decision-making for the next programme cycle
2. To support greater accountability of the UNCT to UNDAF stakeholders by objectively verifying results achieved within the framework of the UNDAF and assessing the effectiveness of the strategies and interventions used, the evaluation will enable the various stakeholders in the UNDAF process, including national counterparts and donors, to hold the UNCT and other parties accountable for fulfilling their roles and commitments.

<sup>13</sup> The consultant was however, able to derive data for a number of indicators that was used to provide a sense of progress against UNDAF outcomes.

### Specific Objectives:

16. The Evaluation of the UNDAF will be used to inform an objective conclusion on:
- The progress on achieving UNDAF outcomes;
  - The contribution made by the UN to the results identified in the 2012-2016 UNDAF;
  - The factors that have affected the UN's contribution (the challenges and how they were overcome or why they were not overcome);
  - Recommendations for improving the UN's contribution for incorporation into the MSDF Country Implementation Plans.

### Scope of the Evaluation

17. The UNDAF evaluation focused on programme implementation with particular attention to UN's contributions to the implementation of programmes and against the strategic intent laid out in the UNDAF document and results framework including:
- UNDAF Programming Principles: Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA), Gender Equality, Environmental Sustainability, Results-Based Management (RBM) and Capacity Development;
  - Specific strategies included in the UNDAF to achieve outcome/output; and
  - Priorities implemented during the UNDAF cycle.
18. The TOR also specifically noted that evaluation should be limited to implementing partners of the UN agencies and for the large part, the interviews were with direct technical counterparts in line ministries and some senior managers. The Evaluation Team was not able to speak with very senior government counterparts who might have been able to provide a more strategic overview of the role of the UN. This perspective was largely and usefully provided by the PIOJ, which continues to be the nodal Government entity for the UN system in Jamaica.

### Evaluation Methodology

19. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the principles outlined in the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System and by the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation, as well as the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. Furthermore, the Evaluation takes place against the standards laid out in the 2010 UNDAF Guidelines. Interim UNDAF Guidelines were issued in 2016 and better reflect the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for 'Delivering as One' (Dao) countries along and the new SDG Agenda. In conducting the Evaluation, the following principles were followed:
- **Impartiality:** The same questions have been systematically asked to all stakeholders, both through questionnaires (for quantitative analysis) and in person interviews.
  - **Independence:** The lead evaluator has never worked in Jamaica or the region but has extensive prior experience working on UN reform issues.
  - **Confidentiality:** All information was collected with the understanding of complete confidentiality. The data from the survey and interviews was not shared beyond the evaluation team.

- **Inclusivity:** The evaluation reached out to all suggested stakeholders including civil society and international partners. Given the scope of the evaluation and the nature of the UN's work in Jamaica, it was not possible to reach out to the direct beneficiaries.

20. Ordinarily, the evaluation would adopt a summative approach that would take place at the end of a fixed period to provide information about its value and impact. However, the UNDAF has already undergone several quite detailed reviews in the past two years including a major revision of the UNDAF Results Matrix in 2015. Furthermore, the exercise has in some measure been superseded by the MSDF process, which began at the end of 2015. This required the evaluation to also adopt elements of a formative evaluation looking at the strengths and shortcomings of the current UNDAF and implications / recommendations as they apply to the roll out of the MSDF.
21. The critical inputs to the Evaluation included a desk review of key reports, evaluations, studies and other programme monitoring information from UNCT members, key informant interviews with national informants and stakeholders and UN programme staff. The semi-structured interviews centered on the four main evaluation themes but were tailored to respondents' specific interactions with the UNDAF process. In total, approximately 60 people were interviewed for the evaluation (see breakdown below):

**Table 1: Interviews by Respondent**

Category	Number	Percentage
<b>UN System</b>	22	37%
<b>Government of Jamaica</b>	27	46%
<b>Civil Society Organization</b>	9	15%
<b>IDP</b>	1	2%
<b>Total</b>	59	100%

#### Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews:

- How has the UNDAF helped to provide strategic focus to the work of the UN system in support of national priorities?
- Do you feel that the UN is now working more effectively with Government and in coordination with other donors in the country?
- Do you think that the UN system has aligned itself well against national priorities and can you point to examples in support of these priorities?
- To what extent has the UN system demonstrated a willingness to use national systems—including aid coordination mechanisms and national statistical systems—in their work?

22. It should also be noted that the consultant reached out to all the key respondents identified by the agencies but was unable to meet with all of them during the data collection period and attempts were also made to reach respondents via phone. However, the final list of respondents should not be seen to constitute a statistically representative sample.



## Inception Phase and Questionnaire Design

23. The consultant was able to visit Jamaica for an initial 10 day mission conducted between October 10 – 22nd. During the course of the mission, the Evaluation Team was able to meet a broad cross-section of national counterparts including representatives from PIOJ and line ministries in addition to civil society organizations. The Team also met with a number of key UN agencies and also held separate meetings with the Monitoring and Evaluation Group and Communication Teams. Due to the limited amount of time in Jamaica, precedence was given to setting up meetings with national counterparts that worked with more than one UN agency over those ministries that only worked bilaterally with a particular UN body.
24. It was also decided to develop a short questionnaire (see annex) that was circulated to approximately 105 respondents from the UN, Government and Civil Society. The survey was made up of 16 questions structured around the four main areas of exploration—Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability—and 4 background questions regarding the respondents' interaction with the UNDAF. A total of 50 responses were received and the results are presented in the report.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 2: Breakdown of Survey Respondents**

Category	Number	Percentage
<b>UN System</b>	25	50%
<b>Government of Jamaica</b>	17	34%
<b>Civil Society Organization</b>	8	16%
<b>Total</b>	50	100%

## Validation

25. A validation workshop was held on November 24, 2016 at the Jamaica Pegasus Hotel to discuss the findings of the draft Evaluation Report. A total of 49 persons were in attendance from UN Agencies, Government and Civil Society (see annex for list of participants). The participants reviewed the key findings of the Evaluation report before breaking into four groups to review the recommendations and propose amendments that were discussed and validated in plenary. The revised recommendations are reflected in the final draft of the report. The findings were subsequently discussed at a session during the UNCT Retreat on December 6<sup>th</sup> and as an input to the inaugural Joint Steering Committee for the MSDF

## Limitations

26. The original UNDAF was essentially un-evaluable due to the lack of a clear link between the programmes and projects of the UN and the outcomes and indicators contained in the Result Matrix. Steps have been taken to develop a more realistic M&E plan in 2015 and the

<sup>14</sup> The survey was developed and distributed using survey monkey. However, it transpired that the email invitation to respond to the survey was blocked by the firewall of both UN and Government respondents. This required the Evaluation Team to reach out to respondents directly to see if they had indeed received the email and in some instances, to re-sending an invitation. In light of this technical problem, it was decided to leave the survey open until Dec 9 to allow more responses to be collected.

UNCT (through the PCT) has committed to using this as the main monitoring tool for the UNDAF. However, it has only been in operation for 12 months and cannot be used to meaningfully report on progress against UNDAF outcomes.

27. There were difficulties triangulating information received through key informant interviews using other data sources within the time frame for the evaluation and due to the inability to meet with critical stakeholders, especially those from outside the UN for follow up discussions to confirm information.
28. The high turnover of personnel and a general lack of familiarity with the history of the UNDAF among current respondents meant that the feedback received often represented a snapshot in time rather than a more balanced perspective.
29. The questionnaire was circulated to approximately 105 key stakeholders from the UN and partners. At the time of writing we have received 50 responses - 25 UN, and 25 partners including CSOs – or around 40% so while useful, caution should be exercised and drawing broad conclusions based on the results of the survey alone.
30. The timing of the Evaluation in relation to the MSDF process has meant that many of the issues and potential findings that would be germane to the new planning processes, including questions of focus and management arrangements, have already been decided, thereby acting as an inbuilt limit to the range of options that can be explored.

## MAIN FINDINGS

31. This section of the report is structured around the four main areas of assessment—Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability—and is broken down into sub-questions that were discussed and refined with the M&E Working Group during the inception phase. The various guiding questions and evaluation criteria are included in the Annex. The in-person interviews were supplemented by a short online questionnaire that mirrored the structure and focus of the evaluation matrix and the results are included to supplement the findings from the in-person interviews and review of documents.

### Relevance

The extent to which the objectives of the UNDAF are consistent with country needs, national priorities and the country's international and regional commitments, including on human rights.

32. The [2010 UNDAF Guidelines](#) emphasize the following: *“The UN [is] required to ensure greater alignment with national priorities and country systems, harmonization among development actors, including shared analysis, simplification, transparency and accountability in aid management for development results. Supporting country capacities to manage development resources, including aid, and to deliver on development results remains one of the most important mandates of the UN system at country level. The UNCT [is] required to support national priorities and to advocate that those national priorities include governments’ international/ global commitments to the MD/MDGs and internationally agreed development goals, and their obligations under international human rights, international norms and standards, and other instruments.”*
33. It is important to note that relevance is not a static concept especially in the context of national planning and by extension, the UNDAF. This section will attempt to assess the overall relevance of the UNDAF against the criteria presented above in two distinct time frames – during the design phase and subsequently during the implementation phase. The section also tries to assess the degree to which the UNDAF engendered a more UN strategic response to national development challenges and the extent to which the UNDAF has also helped to highlight the normative principles and commitment to Human Rights and Gender Equality that are at the heart of the UNDAF process.

#### ***Are the strategies used in the UNDAF appropriate to respond to national priorities?***

34. Based on interviews with the few respondents who were involved in the actual design of the UNDAF, there appears to have been a commitment to using the UNDAF as a means of highlighting the value-added of the UN system in Jamaica. In fact, if one looks at the key lessons from the previous UNDAF, there was an understanding that there was a need to avoid the fragmentation of the past and to work towards increased harmonization and a more strategic UN.
35. The UNDAF development process involved a highly consultative exercise that began with the drafting of a full-fledged Common Country Assessment (CCA) in 2010 that included a series of trainings and orientations for both the UN and national partners. The CCA highlighted 9

critical development challenges where the UN was seen to have a comparative advantage in line with Vision 2030 Jamaica.<sup>15</sup> The UNDAF process in turn distilled these into 3 main pillars for the partnership between the UN and the GoJ and the link back to the Vision 2030 Goals and Outcomes is made explicit throughout the narrative and results framework. In that regard, the UNDAF is well aligned conceptually with national priorities and this is acknowledged across the board.

36. However, the UNDAF, while aligned to Vision 2030, does not link as well with the Medium Term Social Development Framework (MTF) which identifies the *intermediate steps for the Plan, and along with sector plans, provides the operational framework to achieve realistic, specific high priority national outcomes and targets required to move Jamaica toward longer-term goals, using a results-based management approach*. In fact, other than a brief reference in the introduction, which recognized that the new 2012-2015 MTF cycle would further shape / strengthen the degree of alignment with national priorities, there are no other references to the MTF in the UNDAF. Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that the UN used the **UNDAF** to engage with the MTF process either during the Annual Review or as part of internal UN strategizing.
37. As noted by one respondent *“A critical issue is that while there is obvious alignment .... operating within the priorities required strategically undertaken dialogue to ensure that there was precision in targeting. Often, implementers seemed to be stretching their capabilities to execute projects that were aligned in only a general way. In addition, the need for the coordinated framework to have been fully engaged cannot be overstated. This would have helped to ensure that the alignment sought was really made operational.”*
38. This appears to be due to the fact that the individual agency planning exercises were largely done through direct negotiations with the respective line ministries rather than as part of a coordinated UN exercise (and one that would have ideally been coordinated through PIOJ). As a result, there appears to have been no attempt to articulate a joint “UN” strategy for supporting critical national development priorities under each pillar beyond the individual contributions of the agencies. This was despite the fact that the CCA has laid a solid foundation through the capacity gap analyses highlighted in the UNDAF narrative. In fact, during discussions with key partners, there seems to have been very limited awareness of the notion that the UNDAF pillars represented an attempt by the UN to work more coherently.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Vision 2030 Jamaica is built on four strategic goals that are mapped into 15 National Outcomes that links to strategic programmes, projects and actions at the sector and organizational level.

<sup>16</sup> This also links back to one of the key weaknesses of the underlying coordination architecture and in particular the UNDAF results groups which appeared not to have been very effective in terms of coordinating engagement with government processes (“One Programme”) or articulating a common vision (“One Voice”).

***To what extent do the planning, design and implementation of initiatives take into account the local context?***

39. The commitment to a more strategic approach embodied in the design of the UNDAF was not sustained in the more critical phase of developing the operational plan. This is particularly important because, like many other countries working under the 2010 Guidelines, Jamaica opted to develop an Outcome-Level UNDAF but opted against developing an UNDAF Action Plan and instead moved directly to the development of individual agency specific CPDs, CPAPs and Annual Work Plans (AWPs) which did not facilitate the “joined up approach” envisaged in the guidelines. It did help to address the well-documented difficulties reconciling the individual country programmes, cooperation frameworks and other instruments used by UN funds, programmes and agencies with the UNDAF itself. However, it did so at the expense of developing an intermediary instrument that would help to provide a sense of greater cohesion to the work of the UN in Jamaica.
40. Thus, and as was noted in the 2014 Mid-Term Review, the operationalization of the UNDAF essentially became a retrofit exercise with agencies linking their results broadly to one of the three UNDAF Pillars but without a real sense of how these would contribute to the overall achievement of the UNDAF Outcomes. However, it is fair to say, that since the individual projects and programmes supported by the UN were linked to clear sectoral needs captured either at the level of the AWP or in the rolling corporate plans, the overall interventions were indeed relevant but lacked strategic direction. As one respondent noted: *“The definition of a strategic direction could have been helped with the proper use of the coordinating framework established by the GOJ. Line agencies alone, by virtue of their own narrow mandates, cannot effectively establish strategic direction given that the issues they set out to address require broad knowledge and multi-agency inputs.”*
41. This finding would be supported by the results of the questionnaire that asked respondents the extent to which the UN projects and programmes were aligned with national plans. For the most part (58%), respondents felt that the individual programmes were mostly aligned to national priorities but a full quarter of respondents felt that UN interventions were only partially aligned. This would suggest that there is still a strong supply side element to some of the partnerships between the GoJ and the UN in particular those anchored in regional initiatives. In the case of the latter in particular, it was noted that there was lack of adequate information sharing and that it was often difficult to disaggregate Jamaica specific information from these interventions, which served to limit their overall usefulness.




Chart 1: How well aligned are UN projects and programmes with national or sectoral plans and priorities in the Medium Term Framework (MTF) 2012-2015 and 2015-18?

***How well is the UNDAF aligned with international agreed frameworks and commitments and standards that guide UN Agencies (ex: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights conventions)?***

42. Jamaica's problems with violence and extra-judicial killings has been documented in the reports of independent experts and human rights NGOs and has created a certain level of hostility and suspicion of the language of rights. There is a general lack of understanding of key human rights principles in Jamaica and the subject is not systematically included in the curricula of schools or State institutions. This has, among other things, led to some equating human rights with LGBT rights or those of criminals among the general public and not being in line with national cultural norms. This overall weakness of protection systems is noted in both the introduction to the UNDAF and more explicitly under Pillar 3
43. The UNDAF is framed in the language of rights and HRBA principles but does not actually make many specific references to various Treaties and Conventions to which Jamaica is a party or to the specific recommendations of, for example, the Committee(s) on the Rights of the Child or CEDAW.<sup>17</sup> There is a more specific reference to the Human Rights Council report of 2010 under Pillar 3 of the UNDAF to justify interventions under the broad rubric of justice and security.
44. Having said that, the UNDAF does a much better job of operationalizing key elements of the human rights based approach. Though it is not explicit nor consistent across all three pillars, it is clear that there has been some attempt to analyze challenges and interventions using an HRBA lens that looked at the enabling environment—policies and legislation—the

<sup>17</sup> The possible exception to this would be the justification provided for the work on social protection that was pitched in aspirational terms grounded in various Conventions.

capacities of duty bearers (albeit somewhat focused on trainings rather than concrete results) and lastly, an attempt to focus on the most marginalized communities using an equity lens. The narrative for Pillar 2 explicitly references clear capacity gaps that need to be addressed drawing on the analysis in the CCA and there is evidence of this approach in the other pillars though not as clearly stated. The UNDAF also identifies Gender and Capacity Development as key crosscutting elements across all pillars but the actual application remains uneven. This is echoed by the responses to the questionnaire when just over 50% felt that the UNDAF made clear references to critical Human Rights commitments and recommendations in the design phase.




Chart 2: How well did the UNDAF reflect international Human Rights standards and obligations

***Has the UNDAF been able to accommodate new developments based on data or emerging trends?***

45. Unfortunately, there is very little evidence to suggest that the UNDAF has remained a relevant document for either the UN or its partners the further one gets from the design phase. The 2014 Mid Term Review noted that UNDAF results were generally framed at a high level of abstraction and [most] were not even achievable within the planning cycle of the UNDAF. It also noted a host of capacity constraints on both the part of the UN and GoJ that had either delayed or otherwise hampered UNDAF implementation. For specialized agencies, many of whom had only a small part of their country programme within the UNDAF, the relevance and engagement was even less. This is echoed by the findings of the survey which noted that adjustments were made only in relation to specific requests or not at all in over 50% of the case with only limited evidence to suggest that it was through a well-structured process of engagement between the UN system and the GoJ (either through PIOJ or line ministries).

46. There is also no real evidence that the UN system collectively engaged with the roll out of the new MTF, either internally or as part of the PIOJ-led national consultation process.<sup>18</sup> Here, it is important to note that the Evaluation is making a distinction between the UN system and the engagement of individual agencies, most of whom participated in at least one or more of the stakeholder consultations organized by PIOJ. The overall perception is that agency programmes and projects are generally well aligned with sectoral priorities and that adjustments have been made primarily at the level of the work plan. For example, UNDP was able to support the Commission of Inquiry project based on data collected by ECLAC 'Report of the Macro socioeconomic effect in western Kingston area.' Similarly, UNICEF made a number of adjustments to the intermediate programme results (outputs) on the basis of an MTR conducted in 2014. However, there is no evidence that these changes were reflected in the UNDAF itself calls its on-going relevance into question.




Chart 3: Has the UNDAF been able to accommodate new developments in the new MTF 2015-2018

47. The key point of note is that while the UN can reasonably claim to be aligned and relevant to the very broad ambitions of Vision 2030, the failure to actively engage with and align with the three year cycles of the MTFs seriously undermines the overall utility of the UNDAF especially during implementation. If one looks at the MTF results structure, there is scope at the level of both of national and strategic priorities for the UN to usefully come together around a common set of results. Instead, the alignment with the MTF takes place at the level of priority area that tends to favour bilateral relationships.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> It should also be noted that main results and themes remained largely unchanged between the MTF periods.

<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, having undertaken a significant revamp of the UNDAF results framework in 2015, the UN should have given serious consideration to extending the life of the current UNDAF through 2018 to bring it to full alignment with the new MTF cycle rather than embarking on a new programme process that will potentially have to be revisited within the next 12 months as the new 2018-2021 MTF is developed.




## Efficiency

The extent to which the UNDAF has promoted greater synergies, reduced duplication between UN agencies and reduced transaction costs for the Government of Jamaica. This section will attempt to assess the extent to which UNDAF processes specifically and the UN system more generally has achieved this using two main lens. The first will focus on operational efficiencies and looks in particular at how the UN has worked with [a] common implementing partners. The second lens will explore the extent to which the UNDAF coordination architecture complements and is integrated with the national planning architecture for Vision 2030.

### ***Is the current approach to UNDAF management and implementation leading to operational synergies and optimization of resources?***

48. It should be noted that Jamaica only officially became a DaO country in 2015—i.e. with less than one year remaining of the current UNDAF cycle—so it is fair to point out that many of the decisions that were taken were in line with the flexibility permitted to UNCTs under the 2010 Guidelines. However, that said, one of the key expectations of the UNDAF [process] is that the UN will attempt to exercise clear efficiency gains through a greater emphasis on the adoption of more joint programming norms.<sup>20</sup> Here the overall performance of the UN has been weak both in terms of its use of national systems and in the reduction of transaction costs of doing business with the UN as can be seen from the feedback from the questionnaire. Over 60% of respondents felt that the current approach to UN coordination was either making a slight or no contribution to the simplification of work processes.



**Chart 4: How useful were the UNDAF Steering Committee, Annual Reviews and other coordination mechanisms**

<sup>20</sup> Here it is important to note the distinction between joint programmes which are defined as a pooled funding mechanism supporting a set of activities contained in a joint work plan and budget, involving two or more UN organizations. Joint programming refers to a less formal set of arrangements where two or more UN agencies work in close coordination and collaboration while generally maintaining separate financial modalities.

49. There is an urgent need for the UN to take some very basic steps to streamline processes and promote operational synergies. Most notably, there needs to be a clear commitment among UN agencies to work through joint work plans with common partners. The evaluation found numerous instances, including with civil society organizations, of partners having to manage multiple work plans and produce multiple written reports to the UN system. In exploring this point further, it should be noted that with the exception of the CSO partners, there was not a specific request on the part of counterparts for joint work plans and the point about multiple work plans and reports came out only when probed.
50. Even where the UN system appears to have made progress such as in the introduction of HACT which is now being rolled out across a number of ministries, this has not led to a significant reduction in the overall reporting burden since agencies still require individual financial reports for internal audit purposes—and here it should be noted that this is a corporate requirement that is beyond the control of country offices. This takes on even more significance when one looks at the overall resources mobilized by the UN system compared to the amount of time spent “servicing” those funds. More than one respondent also noted that there appeared to be a very strong emphasis on maintaining disbursement rates even if there were capacity or other constraints that limited the ability of the Ministry to fully absorb the funds.
51. The lack of a strong emphasis on operational synergies was also felt when it came to the proposed UNDAF coordination structures that envisaged three results groups working under the overall guidance of a Joint Steering Committee.<sup>21</sup> However, the Joint Steering Committee was only able to meet twice during the UNDAF cycle and the results group never gained traction and was subsequently replaced by the Programme Coordination Team that took over the internal oversight of the UNDAF and other joint processes under the leadership of a Head of Agency (UNDP) directly accountable to the UNCT. To a large extent, the UN coordination structures was seen as a forum to exchange information and less as a vehicle for enhanced joint programming or increased accountability and therefore not seen to add value to the work of the UN.
52. The two notable exceptions were the Joint Team on HIV / AIDS and the Working Group on Human Rights and Gender which were repeatedly cited as examples of how the UN could in fact work effectively. The Joint Team represents a global best practice for how the UN can work effectively with a clear set of obligations and accountabilities that allowed for a clear focus and concrete deliverables and in the context of Jamaica, can point to an impressive list of accomplishments. However, in the context of the UNDAF Evaluation, the work of the Human Rights and Gender group is perhaps a more organic achievement and resulted, among other notable achievements, in the creation of joint programme to combat Gender-Based Violence (GBV).

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<sup>21</sup> The absence of a Joint Steering Committee was one of the key lessons from the last UNDAF Evaluation. However, a second recommendation, namely that there was a need for government and civil society participation in the UNDAF theme was not followed and at partially explained why the initial “results” group did not function effectively and were eventually disbanded having only really come together around the Annual Reviews to pull together the limited available data.

### Use of National Systems

53. As noted in the previous section, the introduction of HACT that allows the UN to channel resources through national financial systems has been the one notable step forward with regard to the use of national systems. However, the overall picture is less positive and there is limited evidence to suggest that the UN has made best use of existing national coordination architecture for UNDAF oversight and monitoring.




Chart 5: How well did the UN utilize national coordination processes for the UNDAF

54. According to those who responded to the survey, only around 1/3 felt that the UN had worked well with national structures with the majority feeling that the primary focus was on the UN programme and not on how the UN's work was contributing to the achievement of national priorities. This sense was partly reinforced by the fact that the UN, unlike an increasing number of donors, continues to work through a project modality rather than through direct budget support. This requires an additional level of tracking and reporting over and above what the department would normally be required to produce for national monitoring purposes.
55. The Evaluation was unable to find a clear link between the UNDAF review and the processes for reviewing Vision 2030. Based on the documentation provided by the RCO, the UN held an Annual Review in 2014 that tied to the Witter report and this appears to have been the sole attempt at a joint UN-GoJ exercise. Furthermore, the 2015 M&E review noted that while the UNDAF results were aligned to national results at the level of Outcomes and Impact, the PIOJ itself did not in fact monitor UNDAF indicators but had developed a framework to monitor UNICEF's work and held bilateral annual reviews for other agencies including UNDP. The report also noted that the lack of ownership by the part of key ministries who already participated in quarterly sector and partner reviews and therefore did not see the value of the stand-alone Steering Committee (Geddes report pg. 9). The anomaly here appears to be the fact that PIOJ had no formal oversight responsibility for the UNDAF (as opposed to the work of individual agencies) and thus there has been a lack of real national ownership over the UNDAF results (and indicators).

56. The absence of a well articulated monitoring framework for the UNDAF further complicated the task of integration with national systems since for all intents and purposes, monitoring could only take place at the project level. The development of a revised M&E plan in 2015 helped to partially address this problem and the identification of intermediary results to better link agency results to UNDAF outcomes has certainly helped to bring focus to the work of the UN. There have been clear attempts to link the new results groups that have been convened as part of the CIP and MSDF process to the Vision 2030 Thematic Groups and it remains to be seen how effective these prove in bringing the monitoring of Vision 2030 and the CIP under one consolidated process.
57. However, the fact that UNDP and UNICEF have their own CPD and UNFPA has a regional programme document alongside the biennial country frameworks for the specialized agencies suggests that the MSDF will run into the same challenge faced with the UNDAF of essentially setting up a double reporting burden for PIOJ where more attention is likely to be given to the individual programme instruments at the expense of the MSDF. Furthermore, given that the CIP planning process is supposed to take place on an annual basis, there is a significant risk that this will increase rather than streamline the engagement between the UN and the GoJ

***Did the UNDAF adequately use Results Based Management to ensure a logical chain of results?***

58. The 2014 review very clearly documented the fact that the use of RBM in the original design of the UNDAF was weak. The report noted among other things: *"...even with the best information, it will be difficult to assess progress toward the outcomes...which are not achievable in the time period of the UNDAF."*<sup>22</sup> The report also noted that the UNDAF results matrix had major gaps with 9 of 45 indicators (20%) lacking baseline data against which to measure progress and a further 6 lacked clear targets.
59. Furthermore, since the process of developing specific programmes and projects took place largely in isolation, the specific contribution of the UN system to the achievement of national goals was not very clear. Attribution for results was limited primarily to the level of the completion of activities but more could be done to have framed these in the language of the acquiring specific skills or knowledge or addresses specific bottlenecks.
60. The review of M&E systems noted that UN agencies have corporate regional or national M&E systems for reporting on achievements against agency-specific strategic frameworks such as CPDs and CPFs. Examples of the M&E systems include the UNDP's IWP (Integrated Work Plan) and Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR), PAHO's American Region Planning and Evaluation System (AMPES) and UNICEF's Results Assessment Module (RAM). The existing M&E systems however are not integrated across agencies and are not structured to monitor either the UNDAF outcomes or outputs. Further, the database and reporting formats as well as reporting frequency differ across agencies.

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<sup>22</sup> The UNDAF was developed at the outcome level only and was supported by CPs and CPAPs at the agency level.

61. These challenges were exacerbated by the fact that there was an absence of clear direction and oversight until the belated creation of the M&E working group to support the PCT. Prior to that point, the responsibility of coordinating the collection of data and information for monitoring purposes fell to the RC Office in lieu of the outcome groups with uneven results. This responsibility has now fallen to the M&E group which is playing a much more active role and is tasked with reporting against the revised M&E plan. However, it appears that the initial attempts to update the results in 2016 have not yet borne fruit which suggests that the UN will continue to struggle with the monitoring of the UNDAF / MSDF unless there is dedicated M&E capacity at a senior level attached to the RCO with the sole responsibility of tracking progress against MSDF results and a genuine commitment on the part of the UN and the GoJ to meaningfully track progress against the CIP indicators.

## Effectiveness

The evaluation will assess the extent to which the UNDAF's objectives have been achieved, compared to the overall purpose. In evaluating effectiveness it is useful to consider: 1) if the planning activities were coherent with the overall objectives and purpose; 2) the analysis of principal factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives.

### ***To what extent has the UNDAF been implemented as planned?***

62. As noted, given the absence of a robust and well-defined monitoring framework it is difficult to properly track implementation of the UNDAF over the full four years. However, in 2015, a revised M&E framework was developed to address some of the gaps identified in the 2014 MTR. The consultant was able to develop a revised set of intermediate results and indicators that aimed to capture common results across all three pillars. More important, the proposed result areas (listed below) actually represent a much closer articulation of the core competencies of the UN in an UMIC such as Jamaica. The focus on policies grounded in human rights principles and legal framework maps well to work on the enabling environment. Results areas 2-4 all fall within the broad rubric of building the capacities of duty bearers and Area 5 would help to address one of the key HRBA principles of equity and working with the most marginalized.

Result Area 1:	Development cooperation in human rights based national policies, strategic action plans and/or legal frameworks (50%)
Result Area 2:	Development cooperation in institutional development and strengthening (75%)
Result Area 3:	Development cooperation in capacity building through provision of training and related materials/tools (69%)
Result Area 4:	Development cooperation in provision of strategic pilot or demonstration interventions (52%)
Result Area 5:	Development cooperation in strengthening national data and management information systems (61%)

63. Using this albeit imperfect rubric, it is possible to report limited progress against the revised outcomes based on an initial analysis conducted in 2015. Across the five key results areas, implementation rates were in the range of 50-75% with the majority being on the lower end of the scale. Given the unevenness of resource mobilization efforts, this is not an unimpressive achievement. However, caution should also be exercised about presuming that therefore the UN made a significant contribution to the achievement of national priorities.<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that this finding is slightly at odds with the feedback from the survey where the most common response across all three pillars was that the UNDAF programmes and projects were only partially implemented with a slightly lower percentage of the view that the UNDAF was mostly implemented. Again, however, it should be noted that caution should be taken in interpreting this data given that the Evaluation found that most national partners had only a very limited knowledge of UN work beyond their immediate project as evidenced by the large number of “don’t know” responses.

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<sup>23</sup> It goes without saying that this data should be seen as the baseline for the new UN programme




Chart 6: To what extent has the UNDAF been implemented as planned?

***Has the UNDAF implementation resulted in increased strategic programme planning and implementation at the UN agency and inter-agency levels?***

64. There is limited evidence to suggest that the UNDAF implementation facilitated what would be considered a more strategic approach to planning and implementation. As documented elsewhere, even in those instances where more than one UN agency was working with common partners, there was no attempt to streamline work processes.
65. However, perhaps of greater concern was the fact that with a couple of exceptions, the UNDAF itself does not seem to have resulted in a more strategic level of support from the UN in Jamaica. Part of this stems from the fact that the UN seems to have failed to clearly define what would constitute value added for the UN [system], either collectively—i.e. a clear organizing principle that under-pinned the UNDAF—or even within individual pillars.




Chart 7: Has the UNDAF (2012–2016) resulted in a more cohesive, focused and impactful UN system in Jamaica?

66. This lack of clarity, has unfortunately been carried forward during the implementation with little evidence that results groups were ever able to clearly identify short and medium term goals for the UN under each pillar. This point was explored further in the key person interviews and in most instances the respondents were not able to articulate a common thread to UN interventions under each relevant pillar. For the large part, the impact was seen primarily at the level of the individual agency mandates with some areas where the UN has been able to highlight important common issues.
67. The UNDAF and the individual pillars lack a well-articulated and defined Theory of Change for how the UN sees the pathways to progress. Thus, while the UNDAF adopts the Vision 2030 tagline: *“Jamaica, the place of choice to live work raise families and do business”* it fails to articulate how the UN sees its particular role in supporting that broader national vision. The UNDAF makes a very common mistake which is to have defined the comparative advantage of the UN in very general terms that noted that the *“.... UNCT is recognised and valued as honest brokers capable of influencing policy at the national, regional and international level. UN comparative advantage in Jamaica also includes capacity to mobilise and leverage resources from a diversity of sources. Moreover, the UN system has a global reach with respect to expertise and knowledge brokering.”* This definition not only fails to articulate how precisely the UN sees the role of honest broker can help strengthen the achievement of Vision 2030 but in the case of the second point, creates the incorrect impression of the UN as a financial donor (rather than as a source of non-financial resources which one presumes was the actual intention).
68. The UNDAF also fails to take on board Jamaica’s status as an Upper Middle Income Country and its impact on the way the UN works. The UNDAF introduction notes that Jamaica graduated from the ranks of lower to upper middle-income status but its implications are not discussed in the context of the UN’s comparative advantage or in the strategic considerations for the development of the UNDAF. There is also insufficient recognition of the very different ways that participating UN agencies worked in Jamaica and the potential impact this would have on the UNDAF. The 2016 interim guidelines now require UNCTs to conduct a visioning exercise and to develop a clear Theory of Change for the UNDAF and the UN would be well advised to consider such an exercise for the MSDF/CIP.
69. This lack of a clear vision or organizing principle is further carried forward into the different pillars, which, as noted previously, represent an amalgamation of different UN interventions. Thus, the Environment pillar aims to address climate change, natural resource management, disaster risk reduction and energy efficiency through a range of interventions but there is no common theme – e.g. a particular focus on marginalized communities – that clearly indicates how the UN would add-value over and above the contributions of individual agencies. Similarly, Pillar Two, while framed in terms of the equity dimension, is in reality a catch-all area for work being done in health (including HIV/AIDS), education and social protection. Pillar 3 pulls together a range of work in the area of justice and security with interventions looking at domestic violence, violence against children, policing and access to justice. Here it could be argued that the key organizing principle is the commitment to human rights and human security but there is very little evidence to suggest that the UNDAF itself engendered a more strategic approach that clearly anchored the work of the UN in international human rights principles other than a brief reference to the Universal Periodic Review conducted in 2010.



***To what extent did the UNDAF make use of and promote human rights and gender equality standards and principles (e.g. participation, non-discrimination, accountability, etc.) to achieve its goal***

70. The UN has been able to make some notable advances in terms of the promotion of human rights in Jamaica largely through the efforts of the Human Rights Advisor attached to the RCO. It is fair to say that the UN has clearly been able to make strides and create space for more constructive dialogue and understanding around key human rights instruments though, as was noted by one respondent, there is scope to broaden the engagement to be with the GoJ and not only line agencies. Jamaica is a party to seven of the nine human rights conventions and engaged increasingly with a variety of international mechanisms mostly recently (October 2016) with the Human Rights Committee in October 2016 and prior to that the Committee on the Rights of the Child reviewed Jamaica's State Report (2011) in 2015. The UN supported actively both Committee dialogues. More important, Jamaica also underwent its second Universal Periodic Review in May 2015 before the Human Rights Council. A State report was provided and 8 submissions from other stakeholders including an independent submission by the UNCT alongside the State Report. This is a very good example how the UN system as a whole could and should be able to coalesce around critical issues and as an advocate for normative principles as an integral part of the MSDF.
71. The recruitment of a senior Human Rights Advisor to support the Resident Coordinator, though not explicitly referenced in the UNDAF did anchor an impressive set of achievements primarily under Pillar 3.<sup>24</sup> The HRA also played a critical role in the main coordination structures supporting the RCO including active participation in the various theme groups that aimed to support implementation of the UNDAF as well as the on-going discussions around the MSDF. This participation has seen a much stronger understanding and articulation of key HRBA principles and more awareness around specific recommendations from treaty bodies. A number of agencies have also requested specific HRBA trainings as part of their country programme development process. Lastly, the HR Advisor has also been able to forge important partnerships with among others the Chief Justice's Office and the Office of the Public Defender along with the Ministry of Justice.
72. The establishment of an independent National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) in Jamaica has long been advocated for by civil society organizations and was recommended by international mechanisms for over 10 years. Recent events including the establishment in 2014 of a Commission of Inquiry into the West Kingston killings of 2010 further highlighted the need for an independent body. The UN has been able to provide critical advice on the establishment of such an institution to the Government of Jamaica working closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Public Defender. The MoJ will now prepare the groundwork for a Cabinet submission in 2017 and continues to receive support from the Commonwealth Secretariat and UNDP. The new institution will complement the existing network of entities with a human rights protection mandate, such as INDECOM and the Children's Advocate.

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<sup>24</sup> OHCHR had funds to deploy 29 HR Advisors globally and additional funding was secured to keep the Advisor for a third year. The funding is due to run out in June 2017 and at this point there is no plans to replace the position.

73. The UNDAF was somewhat less successful in terms of another important dimension relating to the application HRBA approach, namely the extent to which it was able to work with and impact on marginal and disadvantaged communities. As can be seen from the results from the survey, the UN was only moderately successful in work with marginalized communities. However, it should be noted that the relatively poor performance under the Environment pillar reflects the upstream nature of the support whereas Pillar 2 has a more explicit equity dimension. This is not unusual in an UMIC where the UN is supposed to engage more with upstream policy processes and have fewer direct programmatic interventions that would specifically target marginalized communities.




Chart 8: To what extent did the UNDAF target poor and marginalized communities?

### Supporting Gender Equality

74. Gender inequality has long been identified as a critical hindrance to human development in Jamaica and is an area where a number of UN agencies have programmes. The UNDAF also highlights the importance of gender equality and gender mainstreaming as a priority under each outcome albeit in general terms. Particular emphasis was given to supporting the National Policy for Gender Equality (NPGE). However, overall the treatment of gender issues across the UNDAF was uneven and the opportunity for the UN to work collaboratively on the issue was not well articulated.<sup>25</sup> This may well also reflect a lack of prominence given to gender equality within the national planning and limited awareness across Government as well though this is now changing in a number of ministries such as National Security and Education

<sup>25</sup> UNDP conducted an internal review of its programmes using the gender marker criteria and the report painted a very mixed picture of the extent to which the various programmes and project supported had helped to meaningfully advance gender equality with the majority noting it as a concern but not specifically targeting women. This was primarily due to the fact most of the work would fall broadly under the realm of policy and / or legal frameworks that did not explicitly lend themselves to the assessment criteria. In addition, it should be noted that this was an expectation that post-dated the development of the current UNDP programmes which did not have such explicit gender goals.

75. The UN has also advocated and worked intensively on sexual and reproductive health rights, key populations in HIV prevention and treatment as well as participation of women (see for instance report: Where are the women?) The UN also went to Parliament with its own submission on the reform of the Sexual Offences Act advocating for recognition of marital rape, and gender neutral definitions of sexual crimes.




Chart 9: To what extent did the UNDAF promote Gender Equality?

76. During the course of the UNDAF, the UN has been able to make some progress working together on Gender-Based Violence. The UN has been able to develop an important working relationship with the Bureau of Women's Affairs around gender mainstreaming and gender based violence and the support was aligned with the National Policy on Gender Equality. In particular, the UN has provided important support to the National Strategic Action Plan to Eliminate Gender-Based Violence (NSAP) in Jamaica and supported its M&E framework, the harmonization of data collection and the creation of a national tracking system. However, it is not clear the extent to which the Bureau yet possesses the capacity to be able to make a significant impact across government. Given that the UN works with a range of critical ministries all of whom are expected to speak to the policy, there would be scope for a more coordinated approach to help advance gender equality goals across Government. In this regard, the UN designed in 2014/15 a joint programming framework to support coordination and the implementation of the NSAP, intent that was frustrated by the delay/slow progress of it to be approved by Cabinet which will only happen in the coming months.

77. The UN has also worked with a number of civil society organizations that work on gender issues. And while noting that the UN continues to be an important advocate for gender equality the need for a more long-term engagement with national CSOs was seen to be important. The perception was that the UN's engagement with civil society was increasingly tied to specific events such as the 16 Days of Activism and International Women's Day. There was a general sense that the UN could be much more proactive in Jamaica using its neutrality and convening power to be able to raise awareness about the country's commitments and obligations under CEDAW and other international human rights conventions.

### Working with Civil Society

78. The UN has also worked with a range of civil society organizations during the course of the UNDAF both directly and indirectly and this partnership reflects the relative maturity of the NGO sector especially in the areas of child rights and community development. As noted above, the UN was seen to have done a decent job of involving and reaching out to civil society including their participation in consultations around the UNDAF and MSDF. However, especially in the case of the latter, there was a perception that the participation was somewhat instrumental and lacked a clear focus on how to better involve civil society in the work of the UN and Government on a regular and on-going basis. Civil society organizations as a whole had a strong appreciation of the normative role that the UN has played in Jamaica and sees this as being a vital contribution to creating space for local advocacy and action.




Chart 10: Has the UNDAF created stronger partnerships with civil society in Jamaica ?

***What factors contributed to or hindered the efficient implementation of the UNDAF?***

79. A number of factors can be seen to have contributed to the overall effectiveness of the UNDAF not all of which lie within the control of the UN in Jamaica. It is worth noting for the record that as long as the different UN agencies are accountable to separate Executive Boards or Membership Bodies each operating under individual strategic plans, the ability of the UN to coalesce at the country level remains limited. Nonetheless, the Evaluation was able to identify a number of very specific factors that have hindered the efficient implementation of the UNDAF in Jamaica.
80. The notable achievements during the UNDAF period can be traced directly to the increased capacity within the RCO in the form of a senior Human Rights Advisor. The Advisor chaired the Human Rights and Gender Group that worked under the guidance of the PCT and on the basis of a clearly articulated work plan and deliverables has been able to point to a number of concrete examples of what the UNDAF guidelines used to described as a “joint up approach” including coordinating the UNCT submission to the UPR and developing a joint programme on GBV.
81. The biggest hindrance to efficient implementation was the failure to develop a common platform for the achievement of joint results that can be traced to the decision not to develop an UNDAF Action Plan. The continued use of individual programme instruments often in bilateral partnership with individual ministries limited the ultimate effectiveness and utility of the UNDAF and UNDAF processes.
82. The inability of the UN to fully mobilize the anticipated budgets either collectively or individually across a number of areas led to a number of projects either being scaled back, delayed or in some instances cancelled altogether. The fact that the original projected resource requirements to fund the UNDAF were significantly higher than the previous cycle and less than a quarter funded also suggested that the exercise was not taken seriously and thus obviated the need for the UN to prioritize its interventions (collectively and in some cases perhaps individually).<sup>26</sup> It is also the case that the Government of Jamaica has faced its own constraints that have impacted on the efficient implementation of projects.<sup>27</sup> Inadequate fiscal space to implement projects as planned has been a real challenge for Jamaica as it has worked under the terms of an IMF loan package. Slow delivery also continues to be a problem across a number of ministries.

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<sup>26</sup> Here it should be noted that it was not possible to get a total picture—either by agency or by pillar—of the total funding shortfall for the UNDAF period because this information is not collected or tracked by the UN RCO and appears not to have been discussed by the PCT or more broadly as part of the review of progress against the UNDAF. The failure to track financial information speaks volumes to the fact that the UNDAF RRF and budget estimates were never taken seriously.

<sup>27</sup> For example, despite discussions dating back many years, the Government of Jamaica has not yet been able to provide the UN with a premise or “UN House”. As a result, a number of agencies are obliged to spend a significant amount of resources on rent that comes directly out of the programme budgets.

83. The second major obstacle was poor coordination. This has two dimensions—internal coordination within the UN and coordination with external partners. As was noted earlier, the initial coordination architecture of the UNDAF lacked focus and cohesion and to a large extent existed on paper only. The creation of the PCT under the direct management of an HOA has been a significant improvement and has met on a much more regular basis since its creation at the end of 2013. It was instrumental in coordinating the response to the 2014 MTR and convened the M&E working group that oversaw the development of the 2015 M&E plan and monitoring framework and most recently the MSDF process and UNDAF Evaluation.
84. Externally, there are a number of coordination challenges and not all of them lie within the UN's capacity to address. This speaks in part to the current institutional arrangements that govern the UN's work in Jamaica that does not always lend itself to the smooth implementation of projects and programmes or to cross-sectoral collaboration of the type envisaged by the UNDAF. The Planning Institute of Jamaica continues to be the nodal body for the UN agency and all other multilateral development partners. PIOJ is also the secretariat for the Vision 2030 National Development Plan and therefore occupies a critical role within the GoJ development architecture. At the same time, the individual programmes and projects supported by the UN are implemented directly with line ministries with whom individual UN agencies often have relationships that date back 40 years or since the time of Jamaica becoming a member nation and who themselves tend to work vertically or in silos and outside the overall coordinating framework.
85. There is clearly frustration on all sides about the effectiveness of the arrangements overseeing the implementation of the UNDAF. PIOJ have rightly noted that the UN needs to do a much better job of working through and in support of existing government coordination structures. Equally, the UN has pointed out that agencies are often approached by line ministries directly without going through PIOJ placing the UN in a very difficult situation of wanting to be seen to be responsive to specific needs on the one hand, while needing to be mindful of working through formal channels and in particular PIOJ.
86. The net result has been the perception of a UN that continues to be very fragmented and requiring a disproportionate amount of time from a government infrastructure that faces significant human resource constraints. For example, despite the fact that Jamaica became a DaO country in 2015, PIOJ continues to have to review a multitude of individual plans rather than the UNDAF and an UNDAF Action Plan and pointed to the recent CPD processes for the Ex Com agencies that required three separate review processes rather than one joint exercise. This will partially be addressed through the CIP process that will bring much of the UN programme under one framework and in the case of UNDP and UNICEF, the CIP will become the instrument against which financial expenditures are made. However, the fact remains that the Jamaica is yet to see the full benefits of becoming a DaO on the ground in terms of a more streamlined UN working through a set of common instruments and this will continue to be a major challenge during the initial years of the MSDF / CIP.
87. It is also clear that PIOJ and the UN are still not on the same page with regard to the expectations around the development of the CIP. There have been delays in sharing of information and convening 3 out of 4 of the CIP groups which points to a lack of real clarity on how the CIP will support the achievement of national priorities and the role of different

stakeholders. The disconnect between the MSDF and national development coordination structures is likely to be impacted by the new Public Investment Management System (PIMSEC) under the Ministry of Finance which will now review and clear all projects (including those supported by the UN) submitted to them by the relevant Ministry Department and Agency and it remains to be seen how this will impact the UN and more specifically, MSDF implementation.

88. It was also felt that the lack of predictability with regard to resources from the UN often led to a very small window for expenditure that the Government had not planned or budgeted for. This is largely due to the UN agencies method of mobilizing financing from donors who have their own stipulation on when the resources can be accessed and spent which are not always in line with the Government's own protocols and procedures.
89. Overall, it is fair to say that both GoJ and UN have not always fully engaged with the UNDAF process during implementation and this has impacted programme delivery. More should be done to balance the partnership and to move it to a new footing that recognizes the role of the UN in Jamaica that is much more valuable than the [limited] financial resources that are mobilized through the UNDAF / MSDF.
90. The other main factor that hindered the effectiveness of the UNDAF (if not directly the individual actions taken under its umbrella) was the fact that there seemed to be very poor awareness of the UNDAF and what it represented.<sup>28</sup> Part of this stems from the fact that the UN was never really asked to articulate a clear vision for its work in Jamaica beyond its support for national priorities. And here it should be noted that there was no requirement to do so even though evidence from successful UNDAF process (cf. Cambodia 2009) suggested that having a central message to the UNDAF helped to keep the document alive and relevant. However, the absence of a clear unifying theme beyond support for national priorities served to reinforce the impression of the UN as the sum of its parts.<sup>29</sup> Again, it should be noted that the development of the UNDAF was a very consultative process involving numerous briefings for national counterparts on expectations (and it should be noted that a similar level of engagement has also taken place around the MSDF). However, due perhaps to the movement of key persons within Government and the UN, there was very little knowledge about the UNDAF and, some would argue, a failure to make best use of the information available.
91. The Evaluation Team was able to hold a meeting with the Communications Group who noted that UN in fact had a very successful record of collaborative work around key UN points in the UN Calendar –International Women's Day, World Aids Days and the 16 Days of Activism and the International Human Rights Day being the best known. It was felt that these days and partnerships with civil society and government made a significant difference

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<sup>28</sup> This was particularly true for national counterparts to the extent that the Evaluation Team had to take time to explaining the UNDAF including its structure and the underlying concepts and frequently had to frame questions using the term "the UN as a whole" instead of the UNDAF.

<sup>29</sup> In contrast, the 2016 interim guidelines specifically require the UN to undertake a Visioning exercise that would help engender a more long-term perspective to the UN's work. It also notes that Vision exercise could present an opportunity for effective advocacy and communication activities.

in terms of raising the profile of the UN and its work in Jamaica. However, the Group also acknowledged that engagement around the UNDAF was, by contrast, poor to non-existent but mostly due to the fact that there had been no specific request to do so from either the PCT or the UNCT.

## Sustainability

Sustainability is defined as the extent to which the benefits from a development intervention have continued or are likely to continue, after it has been completed. Assessing the overall sustainability of UN Interventions in Jamaica is not an easy task given the many of the challenges identified during the course of the Evaluation. The issue of sustainability was explored during the key informant interviews as well as through the survey but did not strictly mirror the areas mapped out in the evaluation matrix due to the lack of available data to assess progress.<sup>30</sup>

### ***What initiatives, if any, were incorporated into national programmes?***

92. It was difficult for the Evaluation to isolate specific initiatives that are clearly going to be carried forward or have been mainstreamed into national programmes given the somewhat disparate nature of UN projects and programmes. Overall, the perception was that there was a low to moderate chance that UN programmes would be sustainable beyond the UNDAF cycle. There are a number of points to note with regard to the sustainability of UN interventions in Jamaica.
93. The first has to do with the on-going fiscal challenges faced by Jamaica over the course of the UNDAF cycle. The limited “fiscal space” impacted the ability of the line ministries to fully implement existing programmes being funded under the current UNDAF but with economic prospects for Jamaica looking more promising, it is likely that a greater number of UN supported interventions might be taken up fully by national programmes. However, this needs to take place as part of more strategic engagement that is in line with the GOJ protocols of working through the PIOJ and having implementing entities submit proposed projects to PIMSEC to ensure the required fiscal space.<sup>31</sup>
94. The second point relates to how the UN has worked in Jamaica and in particular, the sense that the UN both collectively and individually is perhaps spread too thin and is doing too many small-scale interventions that do not necessarily add up in a way that would meaningfully impact key human development indicators. Part of this stems from the nature of supporting pilot projects—only some of which will actually be in a position to scale up and fewer still that are funded and actually scaled up—as well as the perception of the UN

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<sup>30</sup> The evaluation methodology had proposed reviewing relevant sector plans as part of an attempt to see what percentage of UN supported programmes were subsequently mainstreamed into national programmes but was not feasible given the lack of access to the specific sector corporate rolling plans. It would, however, considering running this exercise in conjunction with the next revision of the MTF currently scheduled for 2017-18.

<sup>31</sup> *“The mere fact that a UN agency has identified funding to support a projects and works with an MDA to develop [a] project does not automatically mean that the country wants the project or that it can be taken on at the time that is often being stipulated by the UN Agency due to conditions from the donor of the funding.”*



as a source of specific technical advice. Both of these can result in a somewhat ad hoc approach to programming that does not lend itself to sustainability.

95. That said, the notable achievements during the UNDAF period in human rights and gender have already been documented elsewhere in this report but bear repeating. The support provided to Jamaica to engage with the International Human Rights system has so far been highly positive and there is no reason to think that this engagement will not continue into the future. In the area of Gender, as noted previously, the partnership with the Bureau of Women's Affairs is part of a longer-term engagement to increase the capacity for gender mainstreaming in Government. The Joint Team in HIV/AIDS Secretariat has also been able to build a wide range of partnerships with civil society and line ministries and has an impressive number of achievements is firmly in line with national policies and will continue in the next cycle. Similarly, the UN's advocacy and technical support in favour of the establishment of an NHRI appears to have borne fruit and will lead to a UNDP supported projected with the Ministry of Justice in the next programme cycle.
96. The Evaluation also identified with a number of other more micro initiatives that have been mainstreamed into government. The successful replication of rain-water harvesting projects across a range of government agencies working in the sector as one example of where the UN was able to use its access to international best practice as a means of building national capacities.<sup>32</sup> UNDP's work with the Ministry of Justice on justice sector reform and Trafficking In Persons (TIP), the latter of which has seen UNDP support baseline studies and the creation of a national database (which still remains to be populated) to enable the Ministry to develop policy responses based on clear data and evidence. UNICEF has also developed important partnerships with the Office of Children Registrar on improving the overall quality of data on violence against children and will continue to work with other first responders to improve the understanding of the scope of the challenge.
97. The Evaluation also asked respondents to look forward to the next [MSDF] cycle and to rank a number of different attributes / focus of the UN system in Jamaica. What is perhaps most significant is that by far the most important attribute of the UN is as a source of technical expertise and advice (tied it has to be said to individual mandates). Interestingly, however, the second most important attribute was a focus on delivering joint results followed by resource mobilization and engagement with the international system.<sup>33</sup> What makes this result particularly noteworthy is that there seems to be clear and continued value to the myriad forms of technical advice being provided by the different parts of the UN system but at the same time, a sense that the UN could and should be working more collaboratively. Reconciling these two seemingly opposing expectations is at the heart of the challenge facing the UN in the next programme cycle.

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<sup>32</sup> An attempt by the UN to develop a joint programme that pulled together the various rain-water harvesting projects unfortunately was unable to secure funding so did not progress beyond the planning phase which should act as a note of caution about the extent to which even good ideas can be carried forward in the absence of external support.

<sup>33</sup> Somewhat surprisingly given the emphasis on joint results, the least important priority was the need for greater operational simplification that would be part and parcel of the delivering joint results but this might reflect possible confusion arising from poor wording of the question and options.

## Lessons Learned

98. The next section of the report looks at some of the key lessons that have emerged during the course of the last UNDAF cycle. However, it is worth noting that many if not all of the lessons that were identified in the 2010 Evaluation and outlined in the current UNDAF on page 7 are still applicable to a large extent in 2016 and unfortunately, could well be true for the new MSDF cycle unless some important steps are taken.
99. The UNDAF process is only as valuable if it is perceived to be so by all participants and the lack of government engagement beyond the initial planning stage has critically undermined the overall utility of the exercise. This appears to be an ongoing challenge for the UN and the Government of Jamaica that dates back to the previous UNDAF as noted in a meta-evaluation of UNDAFs conducted in 2010.<sup>34</sup> However, it is also very clear that this lack of ownership of the UNDAF during implementation is equally true for many if not all of the UN agencies. There is no question that the agencies were much focused on their own CPDs and made little reference to the UNDAF after it was developed. As one respondent noted “....it is not the norm for GOJ to push the IDPs to use their own instruments. ....”.
100. There are a number of reasons why the current UNDAF only partially achieved its aim of supporting a more coherent and unified UN system in Jamaica.
101. The decision to go directly from the UNDAF to agency programmes and projects without some form of intermediate document coupled with the very limited resources mobilized by the UN created the impression of a UN that was very fragmented and not impactful. This was further reinforced by the failure of the various theme groups to meaningfully coalesce around 1-2 common results.
102. There was and continues to be a lack of consensus among UN agencies and between the UN and the Government of Jamaica (and in particular PIOJ) about what being a DaO country actually means in the context of Jamaica. Based on the experience of the last UNDAF and the current one, it would seem clear that the expectation that the UNDAF / MSDF / CIP will capture the bulk of UN activities in Jamaica needs to be re-visited.
103. For the PIOJ and UN Funds and Programmes—primarily UNICEF and UNDP and to a lesser extent, UNFPA—the UNDAF (and moving forward, the MSDF) is expected to be the foundational document against which the agency works and there is a clear expectation that the majority of programme activities would be contained therein. However, for specialized agencies and their partner ministries, this is clearly not the case. Primacy is given to the country cooperation frameworks and will likely remain so given that the

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<sup>34</sup> “Despite the fact that the UNDAF is perceived as relevant by most actors, the ownership of the UNDAF by the Government—and other actors—seems to be very limited. A number of interviewees stressed this issue as a key problem. The Government and national entities were involved in the UNDAF preparation process ... The UNDAF results matrix has set forth the mobilization of a number of ministries towards specific outputs, as well as CSOs and NGOs, it should be noted, however, that the Government does not seem to be sufficiently involved in the implementation and monitoring of the UNDAF.” in Balugan, 2010

pillars of the CIP have already been agreed upon at a regional level and do not lend themselves to the priorities of all UN agencies working in Jamaica.

104. **It is critical the PIOJ and the UN reach a clear understanding of the scope and purpose of the CIP and in particular whether it represents the totality of the UN's work in Jamaica or just those areas where the UN will work more cooperatively using some minimal level of joint programming modality or some point in between these two poles.**
105. The second main lesson is that anticipated coordination structures to provide oversight and support UNDAF implementation did not function effectively and thereby undermined the overall usefulness of the UNDAF. In particular, the failure to integrate the various UNDAF bodies within the coordination architecture of Vision 2030 served to reinforce the view that the UNDAF was primarily an internal UN tool rather than as a shared vehicle for collective responsibility.
106. The relationship between the UNDAF (internal) theme groups and the Vision 2030 Thematic Groups was never established and it seems that for all intents and purposes, these run in parallel rather than as complements and this resulted in a lack of meaningful engagement on the part of national counterparts in the UNDAF [review] processes.
107. This last point has been specifically addressed by working through existing Vision 2030 Thematic Groups co-chaired by the GoJ and UN HOA to develop the CIP for each pillar of the MSDF. However, in order to avoid repeating the same mistake, it is critical that the UN articulate a process that clearly demonstrates how the CIP processes will complement and feed into national review processes including giving consideration to merging these over the course of the next programme cycle.

#### **Effective Communication: Speaking With One Voice**

108. Despite the fact that the UNDAF stated the intention of developing a communication strategy as part of the implementation process, this never took place. The failure to develop a clear and coherent set of messages around the UNDAF as opposed to the specific mandates of different UN agencies served to reinforce the notion of the UN as not speaking with One Voice.<sup>35</sup>
109. More could have been done to highlight why the UN had made the choices that it did building on the analysis in the CCA. The role of the UN (and the UNDAF) as a champion for the most marginalized communities is hinted at various points in the UNDAF narrative but almost as an after thought rather than as clear statement of where the UN could add value in Jamaica. Equally, the UNDAF could have been used as a vehicle to highlight important cross-cutting themes such as Gender or Youth which end up making up an important focus for the UN but one that is not articulated very clearly in the narrative,

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<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that this could have been achieved without necessarily reducing the overall number of programmes and projects supported by the UN [though that would also be advisable].

## Recommendations

110. Recommendations are provided in line with the main findings outlined in the report and bearing in mind that the regional UNDG LAC has already committed the UN to the development of a multi-country UNDAF or UNMSDF. The MSDF is an attempt to respond to the request of Governments in the region for a UN that is more focused and better able to leverage regional resources as part of an integrated and coherent UN system aligned to the new SDG agenda for 2030.

## Rethink the role of the UN in Jamaica

111. The UN and GoJ need to undertake a joint long-term visioning exercise about the role and contribution of the UN in Jamaica. The current model of engagement is grounded in a relationship that began when Jamaica was still a developing country with a focus on individual project and programmes rather than a more strategic understanding of the value-added of the UN in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

112. The UN should plan on the basis of available resources including the non-financial resources that the UN mobilizes in tandem with government cost-sharing. The UNCT should develop a resource mobilization strategy for the CIP and make a commitment to mobilizing resources within Jamaica as the UN rather than individual agencies.

113. UN should move to a model that focuses on addressing long-term capacity needs of Jamaica as articulated in Vision 2030 and the SDGs anchored in a long-term understanding of Jamaica's capacity needs in 2030 and positioning the UN accordingly. Particular attention could be given to areas such as Gender Mainstreaming, Human Rights and Data Analysis where the UN has a clear comparative advantage.

114. Provide more in-depth specialist support to countries—longer and/or more targeted visits by specialist technical advisors—rather than the current reliance on short-term trainings and workshops that seem much less effective.

115. Lastly, the UN should develop an advocacy strategy around joint UN initiatives ('flagship projects') at the national level to strengthen the collective brand and identity of 'One UN'

## Programmatic Focus

116. As noted earlier, the UN system needs to have a much more refined vision of its role in Jamaica beyond the sum of the individual mandates of the agencies. Therefore, the aim of the CIP(s) should highlight those areas where the UN has made a clear commitment to working collectively. This need not preclude agencies from providing specific bilateral support as is currently the case but would simply place the emphasis on those areas where more collaboration is possible and anticipated. Focus can take multiple forms including with a common partner(s) or in the same geographic region or around the same theme.

117. The joint theme groups should be tasked to identify 3-4 areas where there is scope for enhanced joint programming with clear and specific goals (in consultation with partners) and to report against achievements on an annual basis. The UN has a clear comparative advantage in a number of crosscutting areas—e.g. gender, human rights, working with adolescents and youth and data—and this need to be featured more prominently.

## Coordination

118. The MSDF recommends the DaO SOP model of a Joint Steering Committee supported by a Programme Management Team and as appropriate Results Groups with the full involvement of both the UN and Government at all levels. However, given the well-documented problems mobilizing participants, it is recommended that the UN in Jamaica adopt the lightest coordination structure permissible under the MSDF. The UN has a clear comparative advantage in a number of crosscutting areas—e.g. gender, human rights, working with adolescents and youth and data—and this need to be featured more prominently.
119. In particular, more attention needs to be given to clearly defining the deliverables for the coordination structures around three main areas—planning and design (which is relatively well-coordinated), implementation and monitoring (which are not). This does not necessarily require a new architecture but rather to ensure that the current V2030—MSDF coordination structures work towards a clear purpose.
120. The UN should build on the decision to work through the appropriate V2030 Thematic Groups in the development of the CIP and develop a modality to jointly oversee the implementation of the MSDF interventions within the context of the sector plans.
121. Support the RCO and PIOJ to maintain a “who, what and where” database of UN programmes / interventions to allow for the identification of areas of convergence.

## Monitoring the UNDAF

122. PIOJ should monitor the MSDF [indicators] on an annual basis and build stronger links to the individual agency reviews. A more systematic adoption of national indicators within the CIP would help to build synergies between the various review processes.
123. The individual agency quarterly reviews should eventually be replaced by review of the CIP that would bring together the UN and all relevant line ministries under the auspices of the PIOJ.
124. PIOJ and the UN should establish a joint calendar to streamline the reporting of UN results and the sectoral reviews of the MTF and how these contribute to the achievement of national results.
125. The UN should build on the work done to revise the UNDAF result matrix and use the proposed intermediate results to structure [cluster results] each section of the CIP to allow for consistency and to potentially highlight areas of cross-sectoral convergence.
126. This will require the UN to significantly strengthen the M&E capacity within the RCO. Currently, the M&E working group is pulling from the limited capacities within resident agencies and the bulk of the work is falling to 1-2 individuals with other responsibilities with limited success. Dedicated capacity in the RC Office would go a long way towards improving the overall use of data to monitor the UNDAF and also serving to provide support to agencies in much the same way the senior human rights advisor was able to provide inputs to national planning processes.