



**STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS
IN
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF KOREA
2011-2016**

REVIEW AND UPDATED SITUATION ANALYSIS

**Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea**

UN & DPRK Strategic Framework Process

REVIEW AND SITUATION ANALYSIS

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report represents the first stage in the preparation of the **new Strategic Framework (SF) for the UN's work in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK)**. The new Framework will cover the **five year period 2017-2021** and replace the existing Framework, which has been extended to cover the six year period 2011-2016. A draft of the new SF is expected to be completed in early 2016, after which it will be reviewed and approved by the various stakeholders, within and beyond DPRK.

The new Framework focuses on the **UN's country-level work**, responding to the needs to DPRK as a sovereign UN member state. It will be strategic in nature and guide the work of the six UN agencies resident in the country (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, FAO and WHO, supplemented by a UNOCHA-seconded staff member in the UNRC's Office) as well as the non-resident agencies (NRAs). As such it will not replace the more detailed country programmes of individual agencies, which anyway span differing programming and funding cycles. It is intended to be a **hybrid document**, encompassing both long-term development, as well as shorter-term humanitarian programmes which address the immediate human needs in the country; in this it represents a departure from its predecessor.

The report starts by discussing a number of conceptual issues that will underpin the SF process, including those mentioned above. It **deconstructs the UN's role in DPRK** into six discrete but inter-related functions, which it then groups according to **upstream policy support/knowledge transfer** on the one hand and **downstream programme delivery/resource transfer** on the other. It goes on to argue that the **UN's comparative advantage** lies more in the former than the latter.

The report then goes on to **review the current SF 2011-2016**. It notes the **Mid-Term Review (MTR)**, conducted in December 2013, as well as the **Results and Resources Framework (RRF)**, which was updated in 2012 but not since. Notwithstanding the fact that neither of these standard processes really lived up to their potential, the report concludes that the **UN has achieved substantial success** in many areas, listing highlights of this. In discussing resources (see table in Annex 1), the report notes that the UN has managed to sustain a **good level of programme delivery** and could even absorb more funds if they were provided. Moreover, despite significant difficulties, the **UN's M&E performance** was generally commendable.

The report continues with an extensive discussion of the **management and operational issues** confronted by the UN in the country. Starting with the **challenging external environment**, the report notes that, while the UN's guiding legislation appeared to support a continuation of both humanitarian and development work, the spill-over impact of sanctions could jeopardise the UN's in-country work altogether, perhaps as an unintended consequence. **It concludes that the UN needs to develop a revitalised narrative which conveys the importance of engagement with DPRK and of the UN's country-level work to the international community.**

There then follows a discussion of the **in-country constraints** faced by the UN, including: access to data, internal travel and access; secondment of national staff; and the unofficial cap on international staff numbers. It recommends that the UN works with the government to achieve a more flexible and favourable operating environment. However, it notes that the **UN also has its own internal issues** which need to be addressed. The first of these is the high "**effective vacancy rate**" of **international staff**, as a result of recruitment difficulties, international travel, R&R travel and short tours of duty, all of which contribute to staff being stretched to the limit, as well as a lack of institutional memory and perspective.

Continuing its review of management and operational issues, the report discusses the **special case of UNDP** which, for historical and other reasons, appears to be unusually and undesirably

inhibited. It goes on to review the existing **coordination mechanisms**, making some suggestions for improvements. Finally, reviewing the **capacity of the UN Resident Coordinator's own office**, the report concludes that this needs further strengthening if it is to fulfil its potential in DPRK.

The report then proceeds to discuss an **updated situation analysis**, beginning with the primary source of government priorities, the **Leader's New Year Address in January 2015**. Noting that his address confirms that the UN's country-level work sits firmly within DPRK's own priorities, it notes that, with some exceptions, there is otherwise a general **lack of sectoral plans** from which the UN could take more detailed guidance. Nonetheless, a review of the country's engagement in the **UN's normative agenda** shows that it has joined more than 70 UN conventions, protocols or other treaties (see Annex 4 for a complete up-to-date list). Anecdotal evidence also suggest that DPRK is participating in much of the work on **UN technical standards** undertaken by the specialised agencies, both in-country and outside. It concludes that there is therefore a strong basis for the UN assisting the government to meet these commitments (including those emanating from the UPR recommendations), when requested, as for example UNICEF is doing with respect to CRC.

It discusses DPRK's characteristic development strengths and weaknesses, noting the unusually strong **ethos of self-reliance and national ownership**, as well as a surprisingly developed national infrastructure with however a **lack of resources allocated for development** purposes. There are also significant **gaps in analytical data** available to the UN for planning purposes, notably national income statistics, a national MDG report, an updated Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) or a credible gender analysis. Notwithstanding these problems, Annex 2 reveals **an impressive list of recent or planned situation analyses**, undertaken by the UN together with the DPRK, which provide an unexpectedly firm foundation for the UN's work.

Drawing on this body of work, the report goes on to delineate the broad situation with respect to the three focus areas selected for the SF thematic groups: **Food security**, including agriculture, fisheries and nutrition; **Social development**, including education, health and WASH; and **Resilience**, including climate change, environment, energy and disaster management. While it has suggestions to make in all three areas, it concludes that the UN's work is well aligned to the needs and strategic priorities of these thematic areas.

Looking towards the new Strategic Framework, the report suggest a few considerations that might go into its formulation. These include:

- ? Assume that external conditions will continue to be stormy
- ? Assume that internal and external resources will continue to be a struggle
- ? Start with a vision for the UN in DPRK (a first draft is provided)
- ? No need for a radical shift in priorities, although some adjustments desirable
- ? More emphasis on upstream policy dialogue and technical transfer
- ? Need for built-in flexibility and "principled opportunism"
- ? More engagement with the Non-Resident Agencies
- ? Engineer a shift from MDGs to SDGs
- ? Consider a modified approach to the Results and Resources Framework
- ? Consider a revitalised narrative to consolidate international support for the UN in DPRK
- ? Finally, on page 39 the report proposes a **possible four part structure for the new Strategic Framework, with "Household Food and Nutrition Security" as the strategic centrepiece**.

The report concludes by suggesting that a thorough discussion between all stakeholders is necessary as a precursor to designing the new SF, in order to ensure that it hits the "sweet spot" where DPRK priorities, the UN's capacities and the donors' willingness to finance all overlap.

Maps of North Korea (DPRK)



Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CERF	UN Central Emergency Response Fund
CMAM	Community Management of Acute Malnutrition
CoI	Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in DPRK (OHCHR)
CPF	FAO Country Programme Framework
CRC	UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
DPRK	Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea
EB	Executive Board
ECCO	Climate Change Outlook Report
EDC	Environment Development Centre
EPI	Expanded Programme of Immunisation
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFCD	Food for Community Development
GAVI	Global Vaccine Alliance
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GFATM	Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GFS	Gravity-Fed Water Supply System
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
IFC	Internal Financial Controls
IMCI	Integrated Management of Child Illnesses
HCFC	Hydro-Chloro-Fluoro-Carbon (an ozone depleting substance)
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
HDI	Human Development Index
HMIS	Health Management Information System
KECCA	Korea-European Collaboration and Cooperation Agency
LMIS	Logistics Management Information System
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MLF	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MOCM	Ministry of City Management
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
NCC	National Coordination Committee
NCD	Non-Communicable Diseases
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRA	Non-Resident (UN) Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMT	Operations Management Team
PCM	Project (or Programme) Cycle Management

PDC	Pubic Distribution Centre
PDS	Public Distribution System
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PRRO	WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PV	Photovoltaic
RCO	UN Resident Coordinator's Office
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SCEDM	State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management
SBAA	Standard Basic Assistance Agreement
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SF	Strategic Framework
SDHS	Social and Demographic Health Survey
SMT	UN Security Management Team
SRH	Sexual Reproductive Health
SWG	Sectoral Working Group
TCP	FAO Technical Cooperation Programme
TG	Thematic Group
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNESCAP	UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organisation
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRC	UN Resident Coordinator
UNS	United Nations System
UNSF	UN Strategic Framework
UPR	Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council
WASH	Water and Sanitation/Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation

II. BACKGROUND, PROCESS AND APPROACH

(a) Background and Process

The current Strategic Framework (SF) delineating the UN System-DPRK relationship at the country level was approved by the Government of DPRK and the various stakeholders within the UN System during 2010; it spanned the five year period 2011-2015. When plans to review it and transition to a new Framework were disrupted by prolonged banking disruptions in 2014, it was agreed between the DPRK Government and the UNCT that the current Framework be extended by one year, through 2016, and that the new SF would cover the five year period 2017-2021. The process of its preparation was planned to cover a six month period through December 2015, after which the final draft of the SF would be reviewed by higher authorities within and beyond DPRK.

The process is overseen by a Steering Committee, co-chaired by the NCC and the UN Resident Coordinator, acting in consultation with the UN Country Team. Four Thematic Groups (TGs) have been established by the Committee to support the SF process, each comprising government and UN technical personnel, in the following focus areas:

- **Food security:** agriculture and nutrition
- **Social development,** education, health, water and sanitation/hygiene (WASH)
- **Resilience:** climate change, environment, energy and disaster management
- **Data,** including monitoring and evaluation

All four of these represent an organisational arrangement for supporting the SF process, and are not intended necessarily to reflect national and UN priorities as such; the fourth is anyway qualitatively different in that it is not so much a substantive thematic area as a cross-cutting and enabling issue which is common to the first three Thematic Groups. This structure is expected to be modified in the light of final decisions on the new Strategic Framework.

The work of these groups is further informed by Sectoral Working Groups, established under the aegis of the NCC, which meet periodically and also include technical specialist working on bilateral programmes, including international NGOs. In this way it is expected that all available expertise will be brought to bear on the SF process.

This document represents the end of the first phase of this process, namely a review of the current Strategic Framework and an updating of the situation analysis which will underpin the next Framework. Its preparation has been supported by an external consultant. The process has involved an extensive desk review of past and ongoing UN activities, interviews with many of the principal stakeholders in-country, as well as several participatory consultations including a situation analysis workshop in early July which involved members of all four of the existing thematic groups (TG).

Also as a part of this process, the UN Resident Coordinator convened a UN Regional Consultative Workshop, which was held in Bangkok in early September. This meeting brought together representatives from four levels of the UN System: the resident UN Country Team; the non-resident members of the UNCT; the regional bodies of the UN System; and the headquarters of the UN. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a common understanding within the UN System of the specific challenges faced by the UN-DPRK relationship; to develop a shared vision for that relationship in the context of a new Strategic Framework (SF), 2017-2021; and to work out ways to ensure that the multiple roles of the UN worked in a way that was complementary and mutually

supportive in the context of DPRK. An early version of this paper was presented to, and discussed by, the meeting. It has been revised to take account of the comments received during and after the workshop

The next stage in the UNSF formulation process is to be a joint UN-DPRK prioritisation workshop in Pyongyang, scheduled for late October, which will build on this Situation Analysis jointly to define programme and operational priorities for the next Strategic Framework. The outcome of this workshop will pave the way for a first draft of the new SF in the last quarter of 2015. Finalisation of this draft and its clearance through the DPRK and UN System processes is expected to stretch into the early months of 2016.

(b) Situating the Strategic Framework within UN Programming Processes


The UN's Strategic Framework in DPRK should be viewed in the context of parallel programming processes undertaken by the six UN agencies resident in DPRK. These agency programmes do not all conform to the five year period of the SF. This applies equally to the current SF and its successor. Thus:

- **UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP** country programmes will be co-terminous with the SF, 2017-2021. Their current programmes have all been extended through 2016 to accommodate the new SF time-frame. All three are expected to take their lead from the approved UN Strategic Framework and to be submitted to their respective executive boards in September 2016.
- **WFP's** current Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) spans the 30 month period, January 2013 to June 2015 and has recently been extended through December 2015, pending formulation and approval of a new PRRO; the current plan is that WFP will further extend the existing PRRO to June 2016, and launch a new 30 month PRRO starting from July 2016 through December 2018. Thus, its programme for the final 3 years of the new SF will remain undefined for several more years. Similarly, the ongoing PRRO's predecessor programme covered the first two years of the current SF.
- **WHO**, a UN Specialised agency rather than a voluntary fund and therefore funded from both assessed and voluntary contributions, operates within a biennial budget framework, while being guided by a current country cooperation strategy which spans the period 2014-2019.
- **FAO**, also a UN Specialised Agency, operates an existing Country Programme Framework (CPF) which covers the four year period 2012-2015 (two biennia), but will be extended through 2016 to enable alignment with the new SF. Core budgetary activities, notably the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), will continue to be defined on a biennial basis.
- A substantial portion of the UN's programme in DPRK (about one-third) is funded by the global health funds active in DPRK - **GAVI and GFATM** - which have their own programme cycles. This significantly affects the UNICEF and WHO programme content also, since they act as implementing partners.
- Access to resources from the **Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)** is, by its nature, decided on an annual basis and determined by the in-country situation that then prevails. Over the past five years this has averaged between 10 and 20% of overall UN resources in

the country, and impacts the programmes of five of the six resident agencies: WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA and FAO.

- The **Non-Resident Agencies** of the System also maintain their ongoing relationships with DPRK as a member state, which each has its own dynamics. They are normally managed within a standardised UN System biennial budgetary framework, but non-core resources may be managed according to their own time frame.

The new Strategic Framework cannot and should not therefore conflict with these separate programming processes, but rather it should provide an overall strategy, with priorities within which they can be designed and implemented.



2016 represents a transitional year for the UNSF in DPRK, the final year of an extended existing framework. However, in effect the new SF has to be designed and approved in early 2016 and must therefore embrace a six year perspective, i.e. through 2021. For this reason, among others, it is therefore essential that it does not focus on spurious detail but instead addresses the longer term strategies and priorities for the UN's work in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK). It will necessarily leave the detailed plans to the individual UN funds, programmes and agencies.


(c) Some Conceptual Issues

Several other aspects of this exercise and its approach to the UN's Strategic Framework should also be explained at this stage, since they will have a direct impact on all stages of the process, and will become recurrent themes in the remainder of this report. They are:

- ❖ **A Hybrid Document:** The UN Country Team wishes the new Strategic Framework - and therefore this entire process - to combine the longer term development processes with those designed to meet the immediate, short-term humanitarian needs of the population. This hybrid concept therefore melds the development with the humanitarian aspects of the UN's work in DPRK. This

fully accords with the operational realities in DPRK, but it differs from the approach adopted for the current SF, where the UN's emergency support programmes were treated as an add-on to regular development activities.

- ❖ **A Holistic Approach:** The UNCT also wishes to ensure that the Strategic Framework is holistic in its approach to the work of the UN at the country level. This means that it should include the work of all UN agencies, including those not resident in the country (NRAs). While this poses problems in terms of data collection, it is nonetheless illuminating in terms of the UN's total country-level relationship.
- ❖ **A Country-Level Focus:** This exercise is focussed principally on the UN's role at the country level, where it works in close collaboration with its host government, a sovereign member state of the United Nations. While it must be cognisant of them - and complementary to them in its work - it cannot encompass the global, intergovernmental processes which comprise the alter ego of the UN System.
- ❖ **Programme Delivery v. Policy Dialogue:** An important consideration when reviewing country-level work is the often-used distinctions between upstream and downstream on the one hand, and between knowledge transfer and resource transfer on the other. Following therefore is a graphic which illustrates these ideas:



In general, **downstream programme delivery** embodies a strong element of resource transfer. An example of this might be WHO's and UNICEF's support to DPRK's immunisation programme, financed by GAVI; this programme involves provision of the vaccines themselves together with the requisites for the cold chain necessary to ensure the overall effectiveness of the programme. WFP's PRRO is another case in point, through the provision of locally produced fortified foods to children and pregnant/lactating women.

Upstream policy support, on the other hand, characteristically embodies less resource transfer, and more knowledge transfer. Thus, for example, when FAO provides training to DPRK veterinary officers, or UNESCAP provides training to DPRK statisticians on the latest techniques for national

income statistics, these activities constitute the transfer of knowledge and technical know-how. Such activities are low in cost but potentially high in impact.

This distinction should not be regarded as watertight but as an aid to understanding the processes involved. Downstream programme delivery normally embodies important elements of knowledge transfer, and vice versa, but it is illuminating to maintain this conceptual distinction in mind.

- ❖ **Deconstructing the UN's Country-Level Functions:** An essential element in such a holistic approach is also an understanding of the various strands of the UN's work at a country level - not just in DPRK but in any of its member states. The following graphic attempts to break this out into six distinctive elements:



These are conceptual distinctions, rather than water-tight operational compartments. Many of the UN's activities in DPRK, as in other countries, embody several of these functions. In reviewing any project or programme, however, it is helpful to keep in mind these various elements of the UN's work.

- ❖ **The UN's Comparative Advantage:** The UN Country Team is keenly aware that the UN's role in DPRK is also defined by what it does well, acknowledging that within the development process as a whole there are areas for which the UN System is ill-suited. This is more than simply the level of funding which is an inherent limitation to the UNS (large scale loans and development banking generally have not prospered within the UNS); it also reflects institutional capacities and mandates.

An example of this substantive limitation is the power sector, an area which is repeatedly emphasized as being of the highest importance to the government. Yet, around the world, the UN's main contribution to this sector is more appropriately renewable energy and low-cost solutions at the local level, rather than power generation for the national grid.

On the other hand, the UN has an almost unique capacity (and indeed credibility) in terms of international norms, technical standards, etc. Being the intergovernmental and legislative origin

of many if not most such international normative standards, the UN System is also well placed if requested to assist the DPRK government, as an individual member state, to meet those standards which it has chosen to implement within the country. This will be discussed in more detail later in this report.

These are just some of the considerations that should inform the process of preparing the UN's next Strategic Framework for DPRK.

III. REVIEW OF STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 2011-2016

As indicated in Section II above, the following review is not intended to be an evaluation of the current SF. Nor can it discuss all aspects in detail; most elements are anyway subject to more detailed treatment as well as evaluation in the context of the specific UN agency programmes which take place according to their own dynamic. This is only to be expected and underlines the essentially strategic nature of this UNSF exercise.

(a) Mid-Term Review, December 2013

While the current UN Strategic Framework for DPRK was approved in 2010 for implementation over the five year period 2011-2015, there was a mid-Term Review of the Framework in December 2013. This brought together representatives of the DPRK Government with the resident and non-resident agencies. Prior to this meeting, there was preparatory work done by the then-constituted seven SF Theme Groups: Health; Food Security and Agriculture; Nutrition; WASH (water and sanitation/hygiene); Education; Climate Change and Environment; and M&E and Data. There was also a consolidated report prepared on performance vis-à-vis the Results and Resources Framework (RRF).

During the MTR discussion each of the theme groups presented their findings and recommendations to the meeting. Indeed, the MTR meeting discussed many of the issues which will be highlighted again in this paper, revealing evidence of an overall consistency and continuity of issues encountered, if not of their resolution. The recommendations which resulted from the ensuing discussion, together with the current status of each, are summarised in the following table:

Mid-Term Review – 4 December 2013	
Recommendation	Current Status
1. Encourage active government participation in Theme Groups to improve multi-sectoral approaches.	Effectiveness of TGs is under regular review, which resulted in creation of Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs) as part of the Strategic Framework Roadmap in June 2015
2. Review the structure and composition of Theme Groups towards further consolidation.	
3. Improve access to quality data.	Continuing discussions in the context of specific situation analyses
4. Strengthen greater interaction between UNCT and government at senior levels including communication among line ministries.	Line ministries explicitly encouraged to participate in newly-formed Sectoral Working Groups (SWGs).
5. Provide uniform access to UN System for effective coordination and monitoring.	Issue will be re-visited in the context of the new Strategic Framework
6. Strengthen UN activities in pilot counties as agreed in 2011 between government and UN agencies.	UN agencies committed to strengthening this aspect of their work in the context of their programme reformulation exercises.

As will be clear from what follows, most of the issues and challenges identified during this MTR remain to be fully addressed. It is hoped that, during the transition to the new Strategic Framework, further progress will be made on most if not all of them.

(b) Results and Resources Framework

The UN Strategic Framework that was approved in 2010 for implementation over the next five years included, as an integral annex, a results matrix specifying intended outcomes and outputs with resource mobilisation targets in each case. It was organised in line with the four selected strategic priorities: Social Development; Partnerships for Knowledge and Development Management; Nutrition; and Climate Change and Environment. The outcomes selected were high level, the outputs quite general and the targets ambitious. Although mentioned under one outcome - that relating to education - WFP was otherwise virtually non-existent in this matrix, and contributed no resource mobilisation target, despite managing the largest component of the UN programme. This was presumably because the SF deliberately excluded programmes which addressed the more immediate humanitarian needs relating to food security and nutrition. This segregation of UN functions at the country level will be rectified in the new hybrid strategic framework of the future.

In August 2012 - less than two years into the five year SF - the Results and Resources Framework (RRF) was revised. This revised version dropped the resource dimension altogether; it has not been subsequently updated in the past three years. A status review of the RRF was presented to the MTR meeting in December 2013, although it was not subsequently revised or updated. The existing RRF is therefore now three years out of date.

Notwithstanding the 2012 RRF, like its predecessor, provides a remarkably accurate picture of the UN's country-level development priorities and efforts, even though it excluded the more immediate needs addressed by WFP. Yet it does not seem to have provided an effective management "dashboard" on a continuing basis. The probably reason for this is that government and UN managers are more inclined to focus on the targets and indicators jointly developed for their subsidiary programmes and projects, each of which normally have their own RRF and which, as earlier indicated, proceed according to their own timelines and dynamics.

Under these wholly understandable circumstances it is not obvious that an RRF at the Strategic Framework level is a useful tool. Its practical value should perhaps be reviewed in the course of developing the new SF.

(c) Some Achievements

The current Strategic Framework was divided into four strategic priorities, and an unspecified fifth element described as "outside the UNSF Results Matrix" which, for the purpose of this review, is treated as a fifth strategic priority.

Following are some of the highlights of the past several years, which reflect specific achievements in DPRK to which the UN has made an identifiable contribution; given the very high level of national ownership which characterises DPRK's approach to its national development, the UN's role can only be supportive in nature. Apart from the provision of essential materials, such as vaccines, etc., this support has included technical advice, national training and international study tours for

DPRK officials; in some cases this international training has taken the form of DPRK participation in inter-country training workshops.

The following list is not intended to be comprehensive, nor does it imply any independent quality validation. It is nonetheless an impressive list of ongoing UN-DPRK collaboration.

1. Social Development

This strategic priority is divided into three distinct elements and the achievements listed are organised according to this division, while fully understanding that there are strong interconnections, especially between health on the one hand and WASH on the other.

Health

- ✓ Continuation of the Immunization programme including introduction and expansion of Pentavalent and IPV
- ✓ Consolidation and expansion of the National TB Control programme and pre-elimination of malaria in DPRK, supported with GFATM funds
- ✓ Expansion of e-Health system including HMIS and tele-medicine service across the country
- ✓ Expansion of SRH services including screening for Cervical Cancer and STI/syphilis among Ante-natal women; and service expansion of community based IMCI
- ✓ Strengthened emergency preparedness and response capacity, including establishment of State Emergency Anti-epidemic Commission,
- ✓ Improvement in Human Resources in terms of the technical capacity of HHD, mid-wives, and health care worker/providers and managers at all levels.
- ✓ Improvement of Logistics Management system across the country including improvement of infrastructure, streamlining of LMIS, limited supplies of essential medicine and other commodities

WASH

- ✓ Water assessments in 45 counties completed; report available.
- ✓ Introduction of new improved rural latrine “Harmless Sanitary Toilet”.
- ✓ Technical capacity building of county/ri level WASH technicians on design, construction of Gravity Fed Water Supply(GFS) system and promotion of Sanitation and hygiene
- ✓ Construction of water supply systems, mainly GFS in county towns and villages.
- ✓ Promotion of improved sanitary facilities and hygienic behaviours.
- ✓ Update of technical guidelines on design, construction of GFS and rural sanitation and hygiene
- ✓ Distribution of Emergency WASH kits and rehabilitation of water supply systems in natural disaster damaged areas.

Education

- ✓ Curriculum reform for maths and English for school
- ✓ Formulation of learning development standards in pre-education
- ✓ Introduction of child friendly school framework and child centred teaching
- ✓ Comprehensive quality interventions in boarding schools
- ✓ National learning assessment initiated based on international standards
- ✓ Introduction of new mid-wifery curriculum nation-wide

- ✓ Initiation of under-graduate programme in demography at the Population Institute, Kim Il Sung University

2. Partnerships for Knowledge and Development Management

Focused principally on upstream capacity development and training in DPRK's central development institutions, this strategic priority is the one where the least achievements can be reported and, for this reason, the NCC/UNCT has already, in the context of this new Strategic Framework process, decided to eliminate it as a Thematic Group, preferring instead to mainstream it in the other priority sectors. This would appear to reflect the fact that, while the UN is providing extensive knowledge transfer to DPRK, it is predominantly taking place in the context of sectoral programmes. However, it is still a very important element of the UN's overall work in the country and should probably be built upon in the future, for reasons explained below, as well as elsewhere in this report.

The most regrettable absence in this area is a good collaborative endeavour between the UN and DPRK in the area of monitoring the country's progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the underlying reason for this is the DPRK's reluctance to share all its national development indicators with the UN. As a result, although the government produced its own MDG Report in 2009, this is not fully accepted by the UN. This gap in development analysis is particularly worrying as the international community transitions to the new Sustainable Development Goals. At the time of writing the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) is understood to be seeking UN support for the preparation of a final MDG report, to be published in late 2015 or early 2016. Both DPRK and the UN should make every effort to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation to ensure that such a report is prepared - as a baseline for at least some of the new SDGs, as well as the new UN Strategic Framework. To this effect, the SHDS 2014 will be providing information on the progress of selective MDGs.

Another category of programmes, which comfortably falls within this strategic priority, pertains to the ongoing relationship that the specialised agencies have with DPRK as one of their member states. The current SF and its results matrix was fashioned in the image of the resident agencies, and reflects their substantive capacities and priorities. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many other specialised agencies work with and sometimes in DPRK, which in turn benefits from participating in international conferences, seminars and workshop on the one hand, as well as from technical training and consultations in-country; these definitely amount to knowledge partnerships and contribute to sectoral development management in the country. However, it is difficult to document these relationships, still less to assess them, since there is no central data base.

Nonetheless, the fact that there is insufficient centralised knowledge does not mean that this aspect of the SF is insignificant. The Non-Resident Agencies should make more effort to work in consultation/collaboration with the resident UNCT and the UNRC's office should be staffed so as to better support them. The next SF should ensure that the framework created explains and encourages this network of relationships between the Non-Resident Agencies (NRA) and DPRK. It is a very important element in the UN's engagement with DPRK.

3. Nutrition

This strategic priority includes both nutrition and food security. It also embraces the fundamental enabling sector of agriculture and fisheries production. An essential component in the

DPRK context is the continuing provision of immediate food and other humanitarian needs for the most malnourished segments of the population.

- ✓ National Nutrition Survey published in 2012, a joint effort of DPRK working with UNICEF, WFP and WHO.
- ✓ UNDP/FAO Seed production and post-harvest losses programme, which offered a new dimension to national policy thinking.
- ✓ WFP's indispensable contribution under its Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, ensuring that targeted populations receive an adequate diet.
- ✓ WFP has also supported 14 local factories (currently only 8 due to lack of funds) which produce fortified foods; these are operated by government with WFP supplying the inputs and monitoring support.
- ✓ WHO's and UNICEF's work at both the policy and the operational levels.

A notable exercise within this strategic priority was the development of a potential inter-agency joint programme, a concept note for a multi-sector nutrition strategy, modelled on the UN's global programme to this end. While the intention was clear and the underlying analysis sound - nutrition does indeed require an integrated, multi-agency approach - the proposal was evidently insufficiently rooted in the government's own processes and remains on the shelf. It should probably be re-visited.

4. Climate Change and Environment

Since DPRK has signed or ratified a number of environmental conventions and protocols (see Annex 4 for a list of all UN Conventions joined by DPRK) a substantial amount of the UN's work has been in the field of training and capacity building to enable the country to fulfil its commitments. This priority area also includes disaster preparedness, response and mitigation strategies, which is now subsumed under the term "resilience", where institutional progress has also been tangible. Following are a few selected highlights:

- ✓ Strategic Action Plan for the EDC Capacity Building for next 10 years is completed and now ongoing, with support from UN agencies.
- ✓ The National Action Plan for Environmental Education and Awareness in the DPRK is prepared but not launched yet pending further discussion with DPRK side on the schedule and cost of launch event.
- ✓ DPRK's Hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) Phase out Management Plan was formulated and approved by the Executive Committee of the MFMP and began implementation since December 2014. HCFC Licensing and quota system is operational.
- ✓ State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management (SCEDM) was created and functional as central government organization in 2014; this was first stage of a UN programme to build the capacity of DPRK in disaster management.
- ✓ Provincial and county level governmental organs specializing in disaster management have been established and operational nationwide with improvement in technical quality.
- ✓ A pilot programme has introduced solar PV systems, biogas systems, solar hot water and solar water pumping systems at 4 project sites. This has resulted in other villages and other communities replicating the approach and it is hoped that in time this will spread across the country.
- ✓ A national ten-year Agro-Forestry Strategy has recently been agreed and approved.

- ✓ A Road Map has been produced for Enhancing Institutional Capacities in Disaster Risk Management for Food Security

There therefore appears to have been considerable progress in terms of government focus and institutional development. The groundwork will need to be followed up by extensive capacity development in the next few years.

5. Initiatives Outside the UNSF Results Matrix

There doesn't appear to be anything of note to report under this open-ended component of the current Strategic Framework. In particular it should be noted that the "immediate humanitarian relief in the event of natural or other disasters" has not proved to be necessary during the period under review, while immediate food and other needs have been addressed under nutrition and food security (see Strategic Priority 3 above). Having said this, the current concern about the adverse effects of a prolonged drought and possible consequent flooding on agricultural production in the country may necessitate an international response in the near future; at the time of writing this is under active consideration.

(d) Resources

Annex I provides a summary of the UN System's programme expenditure in DPRK over the first five years of the current Strategic Framework, 2011-2015. The figures for 2015 are naturally the best "guesstimates" of the managers concerned, and no numbers have been included for 2016, the extended sixth year of the SF.

The sources of funding for the UN's work in the country are very diverse. Apart from the globally assessed programmes of the specialised agencies and the regular programmes of the voluntary funds, which each receive contributions from most member states for allocation across the world, the programmes in DPRK have received specific additional contributions from at least 25 donors over the course of the five year period. Some of these are from traditional OECD-DAC donors, but not all. Of particular note are those donors with a regional interest in DPRK.

A significant portion (almost one-third) of the UN's work in the country is supported by global funds, most of which are managed outside the UN but use the UN agencies as their implementing partners. GFATM and GAVI are especially notable for their continuing support and their contributions have enabled a real impact to be achieved in terms of child immunisation, as well as the management/reduction of TB and malaria. Given the fact that the DPRK has joined a number of the UN's environmental conventions, it is also interesting to note that the GEF has been involved in the past - and probably should be approached again - while the Multilateral Fund for Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF) has provided some support to the country for the elimination HCFCs. Finally, it is notable that the UN's own Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) has proved to be a reliable and valued supporter, enabling significant UN work to address the immediate and most pressing of human needs in the country.

With the exception of UNDP (a special case which is discussed in Section IV.(d) below), most agencies appear to have a reasonable delivery rate, despite the many hurdles that exist. To be sure there is some carry-over of unutilised resources from year to year, but this is generally absorbed in the subsequent year, kept within acceptable bounds and does not result in an undue accumulated unused balance. Of course, this has continually to be managed, a challenge which is made more difficult by the year-to-year uncertainty about resources available. The complex country-level implementation process also militates against easy flexibility, and switching the delivery tap on (and

off, it must be said) takes considerable time and effort. A more consistent reliable funding cycle would ease this.

In general, however, the UN's implementation capacity in DPRK is proven and could absorb more donor funding, if this materialised. It is notable in this regard that several agencies have unfunded gaps in their DPRK programmes.

(e) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Monitoring and evaluation is an essential component of programme and project cycle management (PCM). Robust and credible M&E is an essential prerequisite for sound development management and resource mobilisation.

Notwithstanding the operational difficulties which are discussed in greater detail in Section IV.(b) below, UN staff in the country appear to be making laudable efforts to travel within the country, visit project sites and validate the impact of its work. This is not an easy process in DPRK - it should be noted that it is considerably more difficult and uncomfortable during the winter - and staff are to be congratulated for the energy they demonstrate in this. As suggested elsewhere, it would be helpful if the DPRK were to enable more flexibility and spontaneity in such visits, but the UN is at least able to monitor where its assistance goes with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Independent evaluations are rather less easy to produce in the DPRK context, although this has not deterred the UNCT from insisting on them. Thus, UNDP/FAO undertook such an evaluation of their Seed Production and Post-Harvest Losses programme, while the UNRC commissioned an independent assessment of the CERF's value added; these were both done in 2014. More recently, UNFPA conducted an evaluation of its country programme in March 2015 and WHO has produced several evaluations of its work for the GFATM, as well as on improving the health of women and children. There also appear to be some plans for independent evaluation work in the context of new agency programmes.

Given the significance of its overall funding for immediate humanitarian needs in DPRK, the independent assessment of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), which was undertaken in 2014, deserves special mention. While validating the fund's contribution to the country, the assessment called for a stronger medium-term strategy, based on evidence-based needs assessment, to ensure a decreasing dependency on it for what should more appropriately be deemed development activities to address chronic malnutrition and increase overall resilience. In reviewing issues of M&E relating to CERF-supported programmes, the report touched on many of the management and operational issues that are discussed elsewhere in this report, especially Section IV below. It is hoped that the new Strategic Framework will address these concerns.

The UNCT should continue to push for such independent validation of its work, which adds credibility to its resource mobilisation efforts. The Government should acknowledge the benefits also, and cooperate to this end.

IV. MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Following is a discussion of the management and operational issues which impinge upon the effectiveness and overall impact of the UN in DPRK. Some are well known, others less so. Equally, some are amenable to being addressed at country level, while others are not. They are all issues which affect the above review of the current strategic framework (Section III), the updated situation analysis (Section V) and, to the extent that they are not adequately addressed, will constrain the new Strategic

Framework (Section VI). Full consideration of them therefore represents an essential element in this whole process.

(a) The External Environment

There is no doubt that the geo-political context of DPRK, informed by its history and its geography (see maps on Page 7), has a substantial impact on UN operations in the country. The dynamics of the six-party talks; the imposition of UN and other sanctions on DPRK in relation to nuclear non-proliferation (NPT); and the review processes of the UN Human Rights Council - the Special Rapporteur, the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process - all serve to condition international attitudes towards DPRK, and vice versa. More specifically, the approach of major donors to the UN are also affected by this reality, as is their willingness to contribute to UN programmes in-country.

For the most part, the UNCT - including the non-resident agencies - cannot influence these larger dynamics, save to highlight the value of their work in-country and to point out the sometimes unintended consequences of actions at the international level. In doing so it can draw encouragement from the fact that there is no prohibition in UN legislation against humanitarian and development activities, which are in fact explicitly excluded from the sanctions regime. Operative paragraph 19 of UN resolution 1874 makes this clear. Enacted in June 2009 following DPRK's third nuclear bomb test, it:

“Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, **except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population...**”

This appears to empower the UN development and humanitarian agencies to carry out their work at the country level in accordance with the functions laid out in Section II.(c) above.

However, it is also possible that this external environment could destabilise and even negate the UN's work in-country. The difficulty of sustaining basic international procurement as well as financial transactions and their vulnerability to international sanctions is of particular concern. For this reason, the UNCT needs to agree its own "disaster mitigation strategy", which should include a revitalised narrative which highlights the value to the international community, as well as to DPRK, of the UN's in-country work. Presuming that the purpose of international sanctions is not to inhibit the UN's in-country programmes, the UNCT needs to be ever-vigilant about making this case whenever and wherever necessary.

In fact there are opportunities to demonstrate this also: during 2014, in the course of the Human Rights Council's Second Universal Periodic Review of DPRK - a standard procedure applied to all member states - the government accepted, and committed itself to implement, 113 of the UPR's many recommendations. Many of these are in areas in which the UNCT is already working with the DPRK authorities, especially those relating to economic, social and cultural rights, but also in relation, for example, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Right to Food. If requested by the government, the UNCT could do even more to support the implementation of these UPR recommendations, and to underline the value of its work in the country. Another possibility would be

collaboration with the UNCT in preparing the currently delayed second report on implementation of CEDAW.

Moreover, this international context also affects the willingness of the international donor community to provide funding for UN programmes and the UNCT must be conscious that there are limits to the funding available, and cut their cloth accordingly. While the humanitarian imperative is a constant and while there are still some generous donors who will continue to support the UN's country-level work, it seems unlikely that there will be a surge in donor support in the foreseeable future.

(b) The In-Country Constraints

For its own reasons, DPRK adopts a relatively restrictive approach to the UN's work in the country, applying a variety of controls which serve to handicap the UN's work and limit its potential to assist the people of the country. These fall into four general categories, viz.

1. **Access to data:** All information and data in DPRK are in the hands of, and controlled by, the Government, notably the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) with which the UN works closely. The CBS releases official data and statistics only to the extent that it can be convinced that it is required for the specific purpose intended. In general this process appears to work better than might be expected - and better than is often acknowledged. Nonetheless the UN frequently feels this process limits its ability to undertake or contribute adequately to situation analyses and confines its perspective on some issues too narrowly; this constraint extends even to the rationale for the selection of pilot beneficiaries and/or communities for UN programme activities. The Government would be well advised to take a rather more open and expansive view on this issue, which would enable more comprehensive development assessments to be undertaken and would further enhance the UN's - and the government's - credibility with prospective international donor, as well as ensuring that national programmes and UN assistance are better designed and targeted.
2. **Internal travel & access:** Monitoring visits to project activities, with the accompanying validation of beneficiaries and outcomes, is an essential component of the UN's work around the world; yet it is subject to similar "need to know" controls as apply to data. In DPRK this is further complicated by the need to obtain advance clearance for any such travel, for the itinerary to be planned in advance detail and for international staff to be accompanied by seconded DPRK nationals, as guides and interpreters. In some counties, only national staff are permitted access; WFP is the only agency to have a negotiated agreement that support will only be provided to locations which can be visited by international staff, a provision that should be mainstreamed across the UN's work. The current filtration process diminishes the independence and objectivity of such monitoring visits and the consequent credibility and accountability of the UN; in doing so it limits the scope of potential UN assistance. It would therefore be sensible for DPRK to review its policies with the UN with a view to engineering a little more flexibility and spontaneity to such monitoring visits.
3. **Secondment of national staff:** The UN's national staff are, without exception, seconded from the government for a limited period of time, normally three years. Only UNDP has agreed with the authorities that their staff be accorded UN contracts, but their staff is also released from government for a limited period of UN service. Selection processes for seconded staff

vary a little between UN agencies, but there is general agreement that the technical qualifications of those proposed do not always match the requirements of the UN - and that the three year secondment provides insufficient time to train them, nor for them to provide the traditional role of institutional memory, continuity and perspective amidst a rotational international UN management (see below). The DPRK government should review this policy with a view to mainstreaming the approach already agreed with UNDP; broadening the pool of seconded staff; and significantly increasing the duration of their attachment to the UN. Such a strategic change towards longer-term national UN staff would be in the interest of both DPRK and the UN.

4. **International staff numbers:** The DPRK authorities also limit the number of international staff permitted into the country. Although not obviously formalised, this cap on international staffing appears to be based on a ratio of staff member to UN funds managed. This might be more understandable if the UN's primary role were resource transfer but, as is evident from the review of recent activities provided above, the UN is often focused on managing the transfer of technical skills and know-how, the workload - and the value to DPRK - of which is unrelated to its direct costs. Moreover, the continual turnover of national staff highlighted above puts a far greater responsibility for basic internal UN processes on international personnel, certainly greater than would be the case in almost every other country in which the UN operates. The DPRK government should therefore permit UN agencies to assign the international staff they wish to, safe in the knowledge that the numbers will themselves be limited by the UN's own concern for its overhead costs.

(c) The UN's Own Internal Issues

Within this restrictive and challenging national environment, the UN has its own self-inflicted issues, most notably in terms of its international staffing. It has already been noted that the UN has a high reliance on its international staffing for performing basic functions, in addition to overall management, oversight and strategic planning. However, this is made more difficult by:

- Short tours of duty (at least two agencies have standard two-year assignments for their representatives);
- Regular R&R trips out of the country (which seem to vary between agencies);
- Regular overseas missions for one reason or another; and
- Recruitment difficulties, which mean positions spend significant periods of time unfilled.

The net result is that the "effective vacancy rate" of UN International Staff - the amount of possible work days for which a staff member is not in-country - is unusually high, which in turn suggests that staffing levels should be adjusted upwards to take this into account - another reason why the DPRK should be encouraged to relax its de-facto cap on international staffing numbers.

The unintended consequence of this set of factors, moreover, is that the UNCT has a relatively short experience of, and limited time perspective on DPRK. In an organisation which has a generally poor institutional memory, this is a significant weakness in a complex country where it takes time to build national relationships of trust and where change can be slow. It should be noted that this was

one of the issues raised by the NCC at the December 2013 Mid-Term Review of the Strategic Framework; it did not however result in any agreed course of action.

(d) UNDP: a Special Case

Even in the complex international and national contexts of the UN's DPRK relationship UNDP is a special case - a special case which now needs priority attention.

The first UN agency to open an office in the country in 1979, UNDP played a significant role in the country for the next 25 years, including in the humanitarian operations of the 1990s. However, in 2007, following a critical report by the UN Board of External Auditors, the government of DPRK did not accept the minimum conditions set by the UNDP Executive Board which led to the office being closed. It was reopened in 2009 when, following negotiation of a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the UNDP Executive Board (EB) authorised a re-opening. During this closure, moreover, an internal review process resulted in a DPRK-specific set of internal financial controls (IFC) being instituted, to ensure that there could be no recurrence of the problems. A new agreement with the government was signed, which inter alia reaffirmed and strengthened the existing Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA), originally signed by UNDP and the DPRK Government in 1979 (and which inter alia reaffirmed the provisions of the International Convention on Privileges and Immunities). As already noted above, this also enabled UNDP to recruit its DPRK national staff as full staff members, with related benefits, although it didn't resolve the issue of de facto three year secondments.

The new modus operandi for UNDP reserved project approval to the Administrator but appeared to authorise a normal range of UNDP's development activities at the country level and was therefore consistent with operative paragraph 19 of UN Resolution 1874 of the same year (2009), discussed in IV. (a) above. The new DPRK-specific IFC, however, which were significantly more restrictive than UNDP's standard financial controls - in DPRK they reserve approval authority to UNDP's regional or global managers, rather than being fully delegated to the UNRC/UNDP Resident Representative, as is the practice elsewhere. This was designed to ensure that the country office's business processes, controls and risk mitigation measures were appropriately tailored to the DPRK-specific context, bearing in mind EB requirements. The perhaps unintended consequence has been to make UNDP's implementation at best slow and ponderous at the country level; at worst it has inhibited initiative. One possible explanation for this is that the requirements of the IFC have not been matched by sufficient staffing at the regional and global levels to cope.

Furthermore, UNDP appears to be restricting itself to working only at the Ri-level, i.e. the level of the village cooperative and related services, rather than further upstream in the DPRK development processes; nowhere in the world would this play to UNDP's characteristic comparative advantage, but this is especially true in DPRK, where upstream policy discussion is a necessary precursor to any meaningful national impact. As a consequence of these policies, UNDP's contribution to the UN's country-level work in DPRK is unusually and undesirably limited.


UNDP's reduced capability in DPRK is an important issue for the UN's country-level development and humanitarian work: opportunities to build and support national development processes and institutional capacity go wanting. The UNCT is effectively missing a potentially

significant member of the team, which can complement the work of other agencies; it is, for example, the obvious agency to support MDG and SDG work at the national level. It is also a constraint on the UN Resident Coordinator for whom UNDP has traditionally been an indispensable tool to carrying out a wide range of activities, including providing administrative support to Non-Resident Agencies who wish to undertake activities in the country. As the UNCT moves towards a new Strategic Framework, therefore, the issue of UNDP's programme focus and operational agility need to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Another unfortunate consequence of UNDP's tribulations has been the build-up of unspent programme resources. As of mid-2015, this unutilised balance amounted to \$25.5 million, with little prospect of this being disbursed fully in the foreseeable future. Since these are resources which were allocated to DPRK by the UNDP Executive Board for the benefit of the people of DPRK, UNDP should give active consideration to how this resource overhang might be addressed.

(e) Coordination Mechanisms

One of the responsibilities of the UNRC and the UNCT is to ensure, in cooperation with the national authorities, that adequate and appropriate mechanisms exist for coordination between all the country-level stakeholders. The following graphic illustrates the formal structures that currently exist for this purpose:



On the face of it, this structure would appear to provide the necessary opportunities for coordination, although it is always necessary to review ToR, membership and overall value-added at regular intervals. Coordination meetings can exact a heavy price in terms of staff time - at a premium in the special circumstances of DPRK - so the overall conduct of the meeting cycle (agenda, background papers, chair, minutes, follow-up and frequency) should also be regularly reassessed. This also has implications for the RC Office's workload and capacity (see sub-section immediately below).

Having said this, it is not clear that these impressive coordination structures have been able to achieve the synergies possible when the UN agencies work closely with the government on a given issue, or on joint programming. The government's reluctance to attend some of the established working groups contributes to this, perhaps because the DPRK's own approach to programme management is characteristically quite centralised and ministerially segregated; this makes coordination at the lower levels of the system a challenge. However, it behoves the UNCT to continue to seek ways to make this happen and to ensure that they themselves do not contribute to the current "silo tendency", which is not in the interests of the government either. Such synergies would benefit both sides of the partnership.

One other specific area internal to the UN also needs to be strengthened, namely UN system coordination on operational and administrative issues. The Operations Management Team (OMT) is a standing sub-committee of all UNCTs. Yet in DPRK the Chair of the OMT is not an ex-officio member of the UNCT, as is usually the case, and anecdotal evidence suggests there is insufficient sharing of operational policies between agencies. Given the range of operational challenges faced by the UNCT in DPRK, there needs to be more focus on harmonising approaches to such common challenges. This represents another potential task for the RCO.

A final area which probably needs attention is that of the International NGOs (INGO) which are funded by the European Commission and which work under the aegis of KECCA. Since INGOs are always in danger of feeling marginalised in the DPRK context, the RCO should make every effort to ensure that their needs are accommodated within the coordination structure.

(f) The UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO)

The overall capacity of the UNRC's office is another cause for concern. The current structure of one international staff member supplemented by a locally-recruited expatriate is built upon a modest core budget from UNDP's RCO appropriation, reinforced by the secondment of an OCHA staff member, with special expertise on the humanitarian side. This represents the bare minimum and in resource terms amounts to only 0.36% of programme delivery (see Annex I). Given staff turnover and the "effective vacancy rate" (see discussion in Section IV.(c) above), not to mention the importance of institutional memory, there needs to be a more robust approach to this vital support function.

Although the UNRC himself has an extensive and exhaustive job description, there is no institutional ToR for the supporting RCO. It is clear, moreover, that the special circumstances of DPRK pose an unusual, centralised burden on the incumbent of the UNRC position, beset with demands from within the country as well as beyond. One example of this is the annual requirement to prepare a report on the impact of UN sanctions, one of several requests from elsewhere in the UN System that might not exist in most other programme countries. The need for data collection, analysis and strategic thinking on the UN's role in the country; more or less annual humanitarian appeals; the identified need for a revitalised UNCT narrative in support of resource mobilisation and the UN's role in the country; greater coordination on operational policies; simply supporting the above coordination structure - these all argue for a more robust RC Office, with increased international staff.

Coordination is a service not only to the resident UNCT, but to the Non-Resident UN Agencies, the international donors, the international NGOs operating in the country and, very importantly, to the host government itself. It is demanding on both staff-time and resources. It should be more than

process management and should include the maintenance of institutional memory and the preparation of analytical reports to assist decision-making. It could usefully extend to ensuring a common international projection of the UN's DPRK work.

Although additional resources from UNDP/DOCO are unlikely to materialise, there is reason to think that bilateral funds could be mobilised to strengthen the RCO, or that the resident agencies themselves might consider cost-sharing an element of the budget - a burden-sharing that would enhance collective ownership of the function. The starting point, however, should be preparation of a DPRK-specific ToR for the RCO, which sets out requirements and expectations; this should be accompanied by a budget. It should be prepared by the UNRC, approved by the UNCT and then presented to potential funding sources.

V. UPDATED SITUATION ANALYSIS

(a) National Priorities

The starting point for the UN's country-level work is always the priorities of the host government, representing as it does a sovereign member state. The highest level statement of these priorities in DPRK is the most recent New Year Address by The Leader, in this case from January 2015. Following is an extract insofar as it delineates development priorities for the country:

The Leader's New Year Address, 2015

1. Military preparedness
2. "Definite precedence" to science & technology
- 3. Self-supporting economy**
 - "Resolve the food problem"
 - "Improve their dietary life"
 - **Agriculture production, animal husbandry and fishing**
 - **Afforestation**
4. Address shortage of electricity
5. Basic industries: coal, metal and other...
6. Sport: "whole country should bubble with enthusiasm for sports"
- 7. Health: "The public health sector should improve the hygienic and anti-epidemic work and preventive and curative medical care and boost pharmaceutical production"**

Noting the highlighted elements, this appears to place the UN's work in what are priority areas for the country. However, this address apart, there is a paucity of clear statements of DPRK priorities at the sectoral level. One recent exception is the DPRK National Agroforestry Strategy and Action Plan, 2015; another is the Medium-Term Strategic Plan for Health Development, which was supported by WHO. Furthermore, it is understood that the government is shortly to publish a national nutrition strategy and action plan 2014-2018, which will be a welcome addition. There may be others, but these have not been made available to the UNCT, who instead rely on joint situation analyses, of which there is more discussion below.

(b) DPRK and the UN's Normative Agenda

DPRK has been a member state of the UN since 1991 and enjoyed observer status for 20 years before that. As such it has participated in many of the UN's global and regional discussions and debates. In the process it has contributed to the shaping of the UN's global agenda, and entered into membership of more than 70 UN Conventions, Protocols and other Treaties. Annex 4 provides an up-to-date list of these. All imply formal commitments by the government to implement policies and approaches in a variety of different areas; most recently this was supplemented by the government's commitment in 2014 to implement 113 of the UPR recommendations. Commitments in all these varied areas represent an opportunity for the UN System to offer its services in helping DPRK to live up to its commitments, when it makes a request for this.

This seems to be happening, at least on a selective basis. A few examples: UNICEF is already working with the government to prepare its next country report in compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). UNEP is working with DPRK to prepare an updated Environment and Climate Change Outlook (ECCO) Report, under the aegis of the Kyoto Convention, and this is now in an advanced stage of finalisation. UNIDO has been working with DPRK to design and now implement its HCFC Phase-out Management Plan with funding from the Multilateral Fund for Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF). Almost any of the UN's programmes in DPRK can be said to be supporting implementation of elements of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including for example the Right to Food or Education for All.

However, this is only one element of the UN's normative activities. The System as a whole, especially its specialised agencies, develops globally and promotes at a national level a wide range of international technical standards, whether in health, crop forecasting, agricultural research, national statistics, demography, meteorological data, civil aviation flight safety, and much else. It is difficult to gather comprehensive information on this network of technical relationships, save to assert that DPRK is very much a part of it, and benefits significantly. Anecdotal examples include: UNFPA has provided training on the latest techniques for cervical cancer screening, which DPRK has rolled out nationally; UNFPA is also helping ensure that the forthcoming 2018 census meets international standards, as it did for the 2008 census; UNESCAP has provided training in the latest standards for national income statistics. Finally, DPRK has requested assistance from the UN in preparing its final MDG report, and is seeking training in the new SDGs.

This is not intended to gloss over the many problems that exist in the DPRK-UN relationship, some of which are discussed elsewhere. However, it is intended to point out that, for all of these issues, there is an active and sometimes effective collaboration between the two in furtherance of the UN's normative agenda and technical standards. In many cases this is addressing global and regional public goods in the process, thus embracing most of the UN country-level functions outlined in Section II. (c) above.

(c) Development Strengths and Weaknesses

For historical and ideological reasons, the nature of DPRK's development management processes are unusually centralised, with command and control being the dominant feature. This is centred on the country's "juche" philosophy, which can best be translated as "self-reliance".

Developmentally, this represents an unusually disciplined form of national ownership, a key ingredient to successful and sustained development. It is DPRK's characteristic strength when the government commits itself to a course of action and manifests itself when a new policy or priority is taken up nationally; counterpart funding is not regarded as an issue. The counterpart budget for WFP's programme is an illustration of this within the UN's programmes. However, its inflexibility makes it incumbent upon the UN to be quite sure that its areas of operation have the focus of senior DPRK managers, without which local initiatives will likely dissipate. Development values and initiatives travel down the line of command more easily than in the reverse direction.

This characteristic also makes inter-departmental coordination at the local level more difficult, without well-structured collaborative arrangements at the centre; similarly coordination with the UN agencies can also be weak. This argues for more UN attention to the upstream policy dialogue dimension of its work, however slow to incubate this may be, precisely because of the more dynamic multiplier effect that this may potentially offer; a similar argument applies to technical training and skill transfer. Anecdotally there would appear to be real opportunities for this kind of partnership.

DPRK's other challenge, however, is the absence of anything like adequate resources allocated for development as such. In this regard, the country is characterised by an unusual paradox: it has strikingly strong structures and institutions, which however lack the resources to be fully effective. A metaphor for this is the remarkably developed infrastructure in and around Pyongyang, such as the six lane highways, with however little traffic, or the electricity grid, which delivers a wholly inadequate supply to most communities. A more down-to-earth example might be the health system, with impressive outreach to the village (ri) level, including household doctors with patient caseloads of 500-600 people and excellent patient records - but few supplies flowing through the system other than those provided by WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA. When resources are provided, as in the case for example of GAVI's support for child immunisation, the results can be an amazing 98% coverage; however, this is the exception rather than the rule.

(d) Existing and Planned Sectoral and Thematic Analyses - and the Gaps

Notwithstanding the limitations regarding data availability and access in DPRK, which are discussed in greater depth in Section IV. (b) above, there are in fact an impressive number of situational analyses which have been undertaken by the UN in collaboration with the government in the last several years, or which are planned for the next few months. Annex 2 provides a running list of these, which naturally form the basis for what follows. They also mean that this report will only highlight the main features, rather than delving into the details which already exist elsewhere.

One of the areas in which DPRK is exceptionally strong is that of demographic statistics. The 2008 Census was of international standard and its 2018 successor is already being planned with UNFPA support; the forthcoming UNFPA-supported Socio-Economic and Demographic Health Survey will provide a useful complement to this. Registration data (birth and deaths) is also of a high quality, as might be expected of a government which provides specific food rations to each of its citizens. This is complemented by detailed patient records, thanks to the industry of the household doctors. Unfortunately, for domestic legal and other reasons, data below the county level is, however, difficult for the UN to obtain, which makes targeting more difficult..

Moreover, in planning for the new Strategic Framework, there are several important gaps which need to be addressed by the government and the UN acting together. These are:

- **National Income Statistics:** The government is highly restrictive on the matter of national income statistics, which are not made available to the UN. This makes it impossible to prepare a National Human Development Report (NHDR) and renders any assessment of DPRK's Human Development Index (HDI) and its consequent international ranking impossible. Such data is an important baseline for much development policy formulation.
- **National MDG Report (MDGR):** There have been similar issues relating to DPRK's efforts to prepare an MDGR, although one was apparently drafted by the government in 2009. One of the metrics for measuring the current Strategic Framework was that of the MDGs, so this is an important gap, especially with the expected transition to Sustainable Development Goals for the new SF (see below and Annex 3). It would be helpful if a national MDG report could be prepared jointly by the government and the UN in the next twelve months, as a prelude to the transition to the SDGs.
- **Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS):** this UNICEF-inspired worldwide programme to analyse the status and needs of children and women at the household level is normally a starting point for targeting programmes in this sector. Although such a survey was undertaken in 2009, it was never finalised because of issues with regard to exporting data to UNICEF's central database, a difficulty that continues to stand in the way of an updated survey. It is hoped that the government will work with UNICEF to address this problem.
- **Humanitarian Needs Assessment:** Given the annual, predictable recourse to the CERF and the international community for funding to address immediate human needs in the country, it is important to ensure an evidence-based and independently verified assessment of these needs, supported by a process which is acceptable to both the government and the UNCT. Donors' willingness to continue supporting such appeals could be positively influenced by such a consensual approach to such assessments.
- **Gender:** Gender is a core issue for the UN and DPRK has signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The starting point for any programme to ensure implementation of CEDAW must be a well-grounded situation analysis. The UNCT has initiated some work in this area, but there needs to be active collaboration between the UNCT and the CBS, as well as other national actors to assess the state of play and priorities for future work.

These are just five areas on which more work certainly needs to be done, and for which greater collaboration between the UNCT and DPRK could be very productive. There are no doubt others.

(e) Summary of Current Situation by SF Thematic Group

The following updated situation analysis draws upon and summarises the work done in the many analyses listed in Annex 2. It has been organised into the sectoral groupings that defined the SF thematic groups established for the purpose of preparing the new strategic framework. This basic framework, with some modification (see Section V below) still appears to summarise the UN's

principal and most appropriate areas of focus, at least insofar as the resident agencies are concerned, although this has still to be agreed in the context of the new SF.

1. Food and Nutrition Security (incl. Agriculture, Horticulture, Livestock and Fisheries)

Food security - the ability of DPRK to provide the whole of its population with an adequate and well-balanced diet - continues to be at the centre of the country's development challenges.

The National Nutrition Survey which was published in 2013 provided ample statistical evidence of this: 28% stunting of children under five, with 7% acute stunting and 4% actual wasting. This chronic malnutrition and the related micronutrient deficiencies reflect a serious lack of diet diversity, since people are evidently living principally on carbohydrates. Stunting has an irreversible impact on the development of children and has inter-generational implications for the country's overall development. Unsurprisingly, similarly serious problems were found in respect of pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and other adults. Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements as well as levels of anaemia (31%) were also found to be of serious concern in the survey. While this comprehensive survey has not been updated recently, field visits and anecdotal evidence suggests that the general picture remains the same, with the potential for further deterioration due to drought-induced food shortages.

Indeed, at the time of writing this generic situation analysis is over-laid by an application for funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) by the UNCT which, after collating the results of numerous field visits, includes data from the existing UNICEF-supported Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) programme which shows that there has been a 38 per cent increase in children being treated for Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in 2014 compared to 2013, a period which coincides with the onset of the drought. A UNICEF field assessment missions conducted in mid-2015 to South Hwanghae and North Pyongan provinces identified the most severe cases of SAM ever observed to date; for the first time, children's heights and weights are reported as being minus 4 and minus 5 standard deviations from the norm. While the details can be found elsewhere, there can be little doubt that malnutrition is a major challenge in DPRK. And while the precise accuracy of such figures is important, updated precision need not defer urgent action; the UN System is anyway unable to assist the whole population.

UNICEF is responding to the challenges of undernutrition among women and under five children through a multi-sectoral strategy involving the nutrition, health and water and sanitation sectors, in support of 1000 days approach with the goal of reducing under five stunting. UNICEF's support combines technical assistance for up-stream policy development with downstream implementation. At the policy level, maternity leave has been extended from 5 to 8 months, and the MoPH has approved a "National Nutrition Strategy and Action Plan 2014-2018" -- as well as technical guidelines for (a) treatment of malnourished children, (b) promotion of infant and young child feeding and (c) prevention and control of micronutrient deficiencies -- all of which can guide future UN nutrition activities under the UNSF. Through the health system, UNICEF is supporting expansion of services to treatment of severely malnourished children, promotion of optimum young child feeding practices (breastfeeding and improving complimentary feeding: food diversity and home fortification, quality and timeliness), and provision multi-nutrient supplementation to adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and children 6 to 24 months. Through the water, sanitation and hygiene sector, UNICEF addresses prevention of diarrhoea and environmental enteropathy -- an asymptomatic condition caused by poor sanitation that inhibits the absorption of nutrients.

Clearly the short-term response to this is, and will continue to be, the provision of supplementary feeding to targeted populations and institutions - PLW, nurseries, orphanages,

kindergartens, paediatric hospitals, etc. - comprising a basket of foodstuffs which are balanced and nutritionally fortified. This is the essence of WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO). However, the longer-term, sustainable response must be increased and diversified food production, the speciality of FAO within the UNCT. Existing UN analyses suggests there is much work to be done in this area.

The most recent country-wide assessment was undertaken jointly by FAO and WFP in the Crop and Food Security Assessment of 2013. This is further supplemented by FAO's periodic early warning report on agricultural production and food security, part of the global GIEWS system. Although again focused on short-term issues, this regular GIEWS series of reports on DPRK, the most recent of which was published in February 2015, paints a picture of weak and limited national production, in need of more robust production as well as greater diversification.

A proxy variable for this assessment is the pattern of monthly rations provided through the Public Distribution System (PDS). Leaving aside the logistical difficulties involved in the PDS and the probable problem of equity and consistency across the nation, the pattern over the last eight years is that rations have never approached the government's stated target of 573 g/person/day and has frequently fallen to little more than half this level; the figure for July 2015 was 410. There are no statistics on the extent to which this shortfall is made up by kitchen garden production in rural areas, but the national food deficit is clear.

The UN's current focus on nutrition and support to agricultural production therefore appears to be well-judged and wholly appropriate. Bearing in mind the longer-term sustainability of any solutions, there should probably be more UN resources and greater focus on all aspects of food production, encompassing agriculture, horticulture, fisheries and livestock.

2. Social Development (Education, Health and WASH)

A major part of the UN's work is in this area, including by UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA, with supplementary feeding support to education and health institutions provided by WFP. Like most other sectors there is a potentially strong infrastructure with however a grave shortage of recurrent budgetary resources and a consequent lack of materials and equipment.

Education is the least supported of these, principally because DPRK already boasts twelve years of primary and secondary education, with 100% enrolment for girls as well as boys. However, evidence as to the overall quality of the education provided, including the curriculum and teaching materials, is limited. Nonetheless, UNICEF has been able to contribute to curriculum development and teacher training in certain selected areas.

The health sector has been a major priority for the UN in DPRK, although its focus is naturally a little dependent upon resource available. Thus, thanks to financial support from GAVI and the GFATM, both of which use WHO and UNICEF as their implementing agents, there has been substantial progress made in child immunisation, where the coverage rate is a world-leading 98%; in combatting TB, where the country has apparently met its global target of a 50% reduction in infections between 1990 and 2015, although much work still needs to be done; and in containing malaria, for which cases have declined several fold between 2000 and 2014, with apparently no reports related deaths. There are no statistics relating to HIV/AIDS, which the government states is not an issue for the country.

Both UNICEF and UNFPA focus particular attention on Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH). In the area of reproductive health, the major challenges are a relatively high maternal mortality ratio; a weak national family planning programme with limited options made available to both women and men; and a high level of reproductive tract infections - itself a source of a singularly successful UNFPA/DPRK collaboration to address cervical cancer by means of a nationwide programme. And

then, of course, there is the underlying problem of malnutrition, discussed above but of direct relevance to RCH.

Among the health areas which are currently relatively neglected are issues relating to non-communicable diseases (NCD). For example, smoking and its related health problems are widespread, with so far little effort to combat it. Furthermore, demographic data suggests that DPRK is experiencing an ageing population, which implies a rise in degenerative diseases; this is an area which probably requires more attention and resources, starting with a nationwide situation analysis on the prevalence of NCDs.

As regards the WASH sector, there is no recent comprehensive nationwide survey of the sector, although a more selective assessment was undertaken in 2014 by UNICEF together with the Ministry of City Management (MOCM). This was a survey of 17 counties, two cities and one district, spanning ten provinces; it reviewed the availability of, and access to all types of water systems, piped and otherwise. There is little doubt anecdotally that clean water and sanitation facilities should continue to be a sector in need of UN support; a nationwide assessment of the situation would be an important step to this end, including a study of groundwater levels, which are probably adversely affected by the drought.

3. Resilience (Climate Change, Environment, Energy and Disaster Management)

This thematic area brings together the work of primarily two resident agencies - UNDP and FAO - but includes several important NRAs, such as UNEP, UNIDO. There is a growing recognition of its importance in DPRK and real progress appears to have been made in recent years. In particular, the creation of an appropriate institutional framework to address disaster risk reduction and preparedness on the one hand and environmental analysis on the other is a welcome development which merits follow up by the UNCT. Afforestation is already a component of the UN's work, with both FAO and WFP engagement, through its Food for Community Development (FFCD) element in the PRRO.

In view of the several environmental treaties that the government has joined (see Annex 4 for the complete list) this area also offers the possibility of additional resources, as illustrated by the MLF. There would appear to be an opportunity to re-visit the possibility of re-engagement by the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) or the Green Climate Fund (GCF), but this too must be accompanied by a careful attention to accountability issues: DPRK has recently been classified as non-compliant in terms of meeting its targets for HCFC reduction, jeopardising even MLF funding.

Disaster preparedness, mitigation and response represent an ever-present challenge in DPRK, where the impact of extreme weather conditions is exacerbated by deforestation and weak infrastructure and where community resilience is low due inter alia to poverty and malnutrition. Each year brings such challenges, but 2015 has been an illustration of general point, dominated as the first half was by concerns about the cumulative impact of several years of below average rainfall and resulting drought conditions. In August this was overtaken by serious floods in the North of the country: the Rason was estimated to have received 50% of its annual rainfall in less than 24 hours.

(f) **The Bottom Line**




Bearing in mind the above analysis of DPRK's development challenges and setting them alongside the UN's comparative advantage, the current strategic thematic priorities of the UN in DPRK appear well placed. However, this understates the potential and importance of a fourth component in the UN's DPRK engagement, namely that related to development management, which is discussed in greater detail below.

VI. TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

It is early in the process of developing a new strategic framework to settle anything very firmly. The process designed by the NCC early in 2015 deliberately provides for several months of internal and external consultation to ensure that all stakeholders have had the opportunity to make their contribution. This is appropriate, indeed essential, since the work of the UN in any country depends upon achieving a consensus between:

- ✓ DPRK, the host government and a sovereign UN member state;
- ✓ The UN family of funds, programmes and agencies, each with their international mandates and including those non-resident in the country; and
- ✓ The international donors, also UN member states, who finance the various activities, on a selective basis.

It is important therefore to take the time to find this "sweet spot", which will enable the new Strategic Framework to have an impact on the lives of ordinary North Koreans.



What follows is a very tentative attempt to delineate some of the more obvious possible considerations, at least at this stage, so that this consultative process can reflect on them and then move forward to discuss specific possibilities in more detail. At this stage, these are:

- ? **Assume that external conditions will continue to be stormy:** It is unlikely that the external environment that affects DPRK will change in the near future. However, if/when it does change, the Strategic Framework must be flexible enough to adjust.
- ? **Assume that internal and external resources will continue to be a struggle:** For this reason, the UN's programmes in the country will continue to struggle to find sufficient funding, domestically as well as internationally. This argues in favour of maximising the impact of the UN resources that are available by increasing the proportion applied to policy analysis and dialogue, as well as the technical transfer of skills and knowledge, with an intended multiplier effect within DPRK's own programmes.
- ? **Start with a vision for the UN in DPRK:** It would be helpful if the UNCT were to prepare a mission statement, or vision, for its work in DPRK - of course one that is also acceptable to the DPRK Government. This could be agreed more broadly within the UN System, with the non-resident agencies and with agency headquarters. It would serve to frame the overall approach for the Strategic Framework itself. A first draft of such a vision is suggested below:

A Possible Vision for the UN in DPRK

"The UN in DPRK is committed to connecting the country to international values, standards and technical skills so that it can improve the lives and possibilities of its population, as well as their resilience. To this end it will actively engage with the DPRK Government in situation analyses, policy discussions, knowledge & capacity building, as well as programme delivery to support it in meeting international commitments; priority national development goals; and immediate human needs."

- ? **No need for a radical shift in thematic priorities:** Following the updated situation analysis provided above, there seems little need for a major shift in priorities for the UN in DPRK, although there should be every effort also to address the gaps that are identified in this report, including national policy analysis.
- ? **Place greater emphasis on upstream policy dialogue and knowledge transfer:** If the priorities are generally sound, the UN should probably place greater emphasis on its policy discussions with government, as well as its transfer of technical skills through training and study tours. This would increase the impact of its inevitably limited resources.
- ? **Need to be flexible and opportunistic:** Planning ahead 6 years, i.e. through 2021, requires an openness to changed circumstances and a willingness to adapt. On past performance, the UNCT has already proved itself adept at this. The new SF should identify the principles and priorities that will guide the UN's work within DPRK, within which opportunities should be seized as they present themselves. Such "principled opportunism" should be one of the most important guiding principles for the new SF.
- ? **More engagement with the Non-Resident Agencies (NRAs):** With only six UN agencies resident in the country, the role of the NRAs should be treated as an integral part of the SF, including a strategic priority added which permits and encourages such NRA engagement with DPRK across all the sectors in which the UNS works. The RCO should be specifically tasked with supporting this wider engagement by the UNS, an approach with needs to be reciprocated by the specialised agencies themselves.
- ? **From MDGs to SDGs:** The international agenda will shift later in 2015 with the expected adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Sustainable Development Goals (See Annex 3.). Together with their 150 plus subsidiary targets, the SDGs present a challenge to all member states, and none more so than DPRK. The new SF should reflect this transition from the MDGs to the SDGs, but it will need to be highly selective about which SDGs and which targets to prioritise during the 2017-2012 time-frame.
- ? **Modified R&R Framework:** Careful consideration should be given to the nature of the RRF that would make sense in DPRK. Given the effective six-year time-frame, the differing subsidiary agency programming cycles and the general resource uncertainty - leaving aside the country-level uncertainties in themselves - a standard RRF doesn't appear to make much sense. Strategic goals/objectives could perhaps be included; metrics by which to judge the success of the UN's work in DPRK could be developed; however precise results and resource allocations make little sense and should probably be left to individual agency programmes, as they are designed.
- ? **Need for a revitalised narrative to consolidate international support for the UN's work in DPRK:** given the problematic and challenging external environment, it will be essential for the UNCT in DPRK to tell its story effectively and convincingly. This too requires careful thought as the UNCT and DPRK approach the design of the new Strategic Framework. It is a task that should be coordinated by the RCO, which will need the staffing to make it happen.

? Place "**Household Food and Nutrition Security**" at the "**Strategic Centre**" of the UNSF: The new Framework would benefit from a clear sense of strategic priority of this sort. The concept itself is defined in the literature as follows: "Food and nutrition security is achieved when adequate food (quantity, nutritional quality, safety, socio-cultural acceptability) is available and accessible for and satisfactorily used and utilized by all individuals at all times to live a healthy and active life". It would appear to be an objective that is wholeheartedly shared by the DPRK Government and the UN System.

- This thematic area would combine a strengthened focus on **agriculture production, including livestock, horticulture and fisheries** on the basis that this is a prerequisite to any sustainable solution to malnutrition. It would naturally encompass **supplementary feeding and other nutritional programmes**, and extend to **food processing and rural livelihoods**, so essential if households are to contribute to their needs. It would be supplemented by programmes to address the **immediate humanitarian needs of the population**.

? Complement this Strategic Centrepiece with three additional thematic areas:

- **Social Development:** This would encompass **health, education, water and sanitation (WASH)**. It is a repeat of the same theme in the current Strategic Framework.
- **Resilience and Sustainability:** This would address all issues relating to **environmentally sustainable development**. It would also include **disaster risk management**, preparedness, mitigation and response.
- **Development Management:** This would cover the work of many of the non-resident UN agencies, but extend to include **national statistics and policy analysis** relating to the MDGs and the new SDGs. It would also encompass work done on such **normative agenda** elements as the UNCRC, CEDAW, etc.

? Adopt a **Graphic Representation of this UNSF Structure**: Following is a possible way of presenting the UNSF, highlighting the central role of Household Food and Nutrition Security:



? Adopt an Overall Narrative Theme :

A Unifying Theme for the Strategic Framework

“Sustainable & Resilient Human Development”

Development that is:

- ✓ **People-centred**
- ✓ **Institutionally sustainable**
- ✓ **Environmentally sustainable**
- ✓ **Enhances resilience**

There are, of course, many ways to present the UNSF structure, none of which should be understood as creating watertight compartments; all four of the above components are inter-dependent and mutually supportive. However, if a revitalised narrative is a desirable by-product of the strategy itself and integral to its effective implementation, a persuasive presentation is important. The version suggested immediately above is intended to provide this impetus, by conveying values and priorities within the range of the UN's country-level activities in DPRK.

These preliminary thoughts represent only a starting point for discussion between all the stakeholders in the UN-DPRK country-level relationship. The formulation of the next Strategic Framework will benefit from such a thorough discussion of these, as well as of the many issues raised earlier in this report. If this takes place, the report will have served its purpose.

VII. ANNEXES

Annex 1. UN Programme Financial Data, 2011-2015

Annex 2. List of Recent and Planned Analyses

Annex 3. The New Sustainable Development Goals

Annex 4. DPRK's Engagement in UN Conventions, Covenants and Other Treaties

Annex 1. Programme Expenditure in UN Programmes

	\$'000						
	<u>2011</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015 Est</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>Voluntary Funds</u>							
UNDP	3,750	5,952	4,452	4,021	3,794	21,969	
UNFPA	1,184	1,372	1,189	2,009	1,100	6,854	
UNICEF	8,845	13,061	16,900	24,211	20,000	83,016	2015 figure imputed by RE
WFP	64,440	35,210	37,180	34,650	33,950	205,430	
<u>Specialised Agencies</u>							
FAO	3,258	5,819	4,106	2,845	2,900	18,928	
WHO	6,000	7,200	7,300	8,857	8,857	38,214	
Non Resident Agencies	?	?	?	?	?	?	Figures not available
<u>UNRC Unit</u>	143	204	352	338	312	1,348	Includes OCHA staff secondment
<u>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</u>	<u>87,618</u>	<u>68,818</u>	<u>71,478</u>	<u>76,931</u>	<u>70,913</u>	<u>375,759</u>	

Major Sources of Multilateral Funding

UN Implementing Agencies

GFATM	10,162	10,816	10,816	10,450	12,035	54,279	UNICEF, WHO
GAVI	880	2,093	1,965	1,963	1,072	7,972	UNICEF
CERF	15,410	12,921	12,997	6,497	2,000	49,825	WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO
MFMP	?	?	?	?	?	?	UNIDO; figures not available
GEF	134	293	114	0	0	541	UNDP
TOTAL	26,586	26,123	25,892	18,910	15,108	112,618	
Percentage Contributed:	30	38	36	25	21	30	

Note: Funding for the UN's work in DPRK presents a complex picture, with numerous funding sources, programme "pockets" and time-frames. This simplified presentation makes no claim to being precise, but rather tries to provide an overview.

Annex 2. List of Recent and Planned Analyses

A. Recent Situation Analyses

1. DPRK: Annual Health Report Towards MDGs, 2012
2. UNFPA Reproductive Health Survey 2012
3. FAO/WFP: Crop and Food Security Assessment 2012
4. UNEP/DPRK: Environment and Climate Change Outlook (ECCO), 2012
5. CBS/WFP/UNICEF,WHO: National Nutrition Survey 2012, March 2013
6. FAO/WFP: Crop and Food Security Assessment 2013
7. UN Resident Coordinator's Annual Report 2014
8. UNDP/FAO: Evaluation of project on seed production for sustainable agriculture and reduction of post-harvest losses for food security, April 2014.
9. UNCT: 1,000 Days, Concept Note for a Multi-Sector Nutrition Strategy, April 2014
10. WFP: Mid-Term Review of the 2013-2015 Protracted Recovery and Relief Operation, November 2014.
11. WFP Standard Project Report 2014
12. UNFPA: Social and Demographic Health Survey, 2014
13. Impact assessment of essential medicines supported by UNICEF, 2014
14. Independent Review of the Value Added of CERF in DPRK, 2014
15. UNICEF/DPRK: Nationwide Survey of Water Facilities in DPRK, July 2014
16. OHCHR: Second Universal Periodic Review (UPR), 2014
17. UNCT/FTS: DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2015, February 2015
18. UNHCT: Assessment of Drought Conditions in DPRK 2015, June 2015
19. FAO/WFP/IFAD: Report on the State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2015.
20. FAO/GIEWS: DPRK Country Brief, February 2015
21. UNICEF: Humanitarian Action for Children, 2015
22. UNOCHA: DPRK Needs and Priorities, 2015
23. UNRC Application to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), July 2015

B. Planned or Current Draft Situation Analyses

24. WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2014-2019, being finalised
25. UNICEF: Situation Analysis, 2015
26. DPRK/WFP/FAO: Crop and Food Security Assessment, September 2015
27. UNFPA: Socio-Economic Demographic Health Survey (SDHS), 2015
28. WFP End of PRRO review, Autumn 2015
29. WFP Standard Project Report 2015, due May 2016
30. Min of Ed/UNESCO/UNICEF: EFA Country Report,
31. MOPH/WHO: Medium-Term Plan for Health 2016-2020

Annex 3. The New Sustainable Development Goals

1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and [promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries.
11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managed forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

Annex 4. DPRK's Engagement in UN Conventions, Covenants and Other Treaties

(Extracted from <https://treaties.un.org>)

Annex 4 - DPRK Engagement in UN Conventions, Covenants and other Treaties as at 17 July 2015

Full Title of the treaty	Action type	Date and place of conclusion	Date of deposit
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations	Accession	Vienna 18/04/1961	29/10/1980
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	Accession	Vienna 24/04/1963	08/08/1984
Convention on special missions	Accession	New York 08/12/1969	22/05/1985
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character	Accession	Vienna 14/03/1975	14/12/1982
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	Accession	Paris 09/12/1948	31/01/1989
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	Accession	New York 16/12/1966	14/09/1981
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Accession	New York 16/12/1966	14/09/1981
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Notification	New York 16/12/1966	25/08/1997
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity	Accession	New York 26/11/1968	08/11/1984
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	Accession	New York 18/12/1979	27/02/2001
Convention on the Rights of the Child	Ratification	New York 20/11/1989	21/09/1990
Convention on the Rights of the Child	Signature	New York 20/11/1989	23/08/1990
Amendment to article 43 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child	Acceptance	New York 12/12/1995	23/02/2000
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography	Signature	New York 25/05/2000	09/09/2014

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography	Ratification	New York 25/05/2000	10/11/2014
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	Signature	New York 13/12/2006	03/07/2013
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961	Accession	New York 30/03/1961	19/03/2007
Convention on psychotropic substances	Accession	Vienna 21/02/1971	19/03/2007
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961	Participation in the Convention by virtue of ratification, accession or succession to the Protocol of 25 March 1972 or to the 1961 Convention after the entry into force of the Protocol	New York 08/08/1975	19/03/2007
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	Accession	Vienna 20/12/1988	19/03/2007
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	Notification	Vienna 20/12/1988	31/05/2007
Constitution of the World Health Organization	Acceptance	New York 22/07/1946	19/05/1973
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization	Acceptance	Geneva 17/05/1976	02/03/1982
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization	Acceptance	Geneva 16/05/1998	07/10/1998
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control	Signature	Geneva 21/05/2003	17/06/2003
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control	Ratification	Geneva 21/05/2003	27/04/2005
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development	Accession	Rome 13/06/1976	23/02/1987
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization	Signature	Vienna 08/04/1979	10/08/1981
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization	Approval	Vienna 08/04/1979	14/09/1981

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization	Notification under article 25	Vienna 08/04/1979	24/06/1985
Agreement to establish the South Centre	Signature	Geneva 01/09/1994	06/12/1994
Agreement to establish the South Centre	Approval	Geneva 01/09/1994	31/05/1995
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Asian Highway Network	Accession	Bangkok 18/11/2003	12/10/2012
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network (with annexes)	Accession	Jakarta 12/04/2006	12/10/2012
Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	Geneva 06/03/1948	16/04/1986
Amendments to articles 17 and 18 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 15/09/1964	16/04/1986
Amendment to article 28 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 28/09/1965	16/04/1986
Amendments to articles 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 28, 31 and 32 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 17/10/1974	16/04/1986
Amendments to the title and substantive provisions of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 09/11/1977	16/04/1986
Amendments to the title and substantive provisions of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 14/11/1975	16/04/1986
Amendments to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization relating to the institutionalization of the Committee on Technical Co-operation in the Convention	Acceptance	London 17/11/1977	16/04/1986
Amendments to articles 17, 18, 20 and 51 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 15/11/1979	16/04/1986

Amendments to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (institutionalization of the Facilitation Committee)	Acceptance	London 07/11/1991	12/12/2002
Amendments to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization	Acceptance	London 04/11/1993	05/04/1994
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages	Accession	New York 17/12/1979	12/11/2001
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents	Accession	New York 14/12/1973	01/12/1982
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel	Accession	New York 09/12/1994	08/10/2003
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	Signature	New York 09/12/1999	12/11/2001
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	Ratification	New York 09/12/1999	25/07/2013
Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities	Ratification	Geneva 27/06/1980	05/06/1987
Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities	Signature	Geneva 27/06/1980	29/06/1983
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea	Signature	Montego Bay 10/12/1982	10/12/1982
Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space	Accession	New York 12/11/1974	10/03/2009
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity	Accession	Bangkok 27/03/1976	22/02/1994
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity	Ratification	New Delhi 23/10/2002	14/07/2003
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques	Accession	New York 10/12/1976	08/11/1984

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer	Accession	Vienna 22/03/1985	24/01/1995
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	Accession	Montreal 16/09/1987	24/01/1995
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	Accession	London 29/06/1990	17/06/1999
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	Accession	Copenhagen 25/11/1992	17/06/1999
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	Accession	Montreal 17/09/1997	13/12/2001
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer	Accession	Beijing 03/12/1999	13/12/2001
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal	Accession	Basel 22/03/1989	10/07/2008
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	Approval	New York 09/05/1992	05/12/1994
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	Signature	New York 09/05/1992	11/06/1992
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	Accession	Kyoto 11/12/1997	27/04/2005
Convention on Biological Diversity	Signature	Rio de Janeiro 05/06/1992	11/06/1992
Convention on Biological Diversity	Approval	Rio de Janeiro 05/06/1992	26/10/1994
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity	Signature	Montreal 29/01/2000	20/04/2001
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity	Ratification	Montreal 29/01/2000	29/07/2003
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	Accession	Paris 14/10/1994	29/12/2003

Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade	Accession	Rotterdam 10/09/1998	06/02/2004
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants	Accession	Stockholm 22/05/2001	26/08/2002