United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2015-2020 in Timor-Leste

EVALUATION REPORT

May 2019

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Disclaimer

The evaluation report was commissioned by the United Nations (UN) in Timor-Leste. The report is designed to stimulate an exchange of ideas and to ensure that UN in Timor-Leste undertakes rigorous examination of its strategies, results, and overall effectiveness.

The contents of the report do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) or any of the UN Agency or their staff in Timor-Leste. The views expressed herein are those of the consultants[1] and the UNCT accepts no responsibility for errors.

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[1] The evaluation team was composed of Cristina MOSNEAGA, international consultant and Zulmira FONSECA, national consultant.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRG	Development Result Groups
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
HRAU	Human Rights Adviser's Unit
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JSG	Joint Steering Group
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NEET	Not in Education, Employment, or Training
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OHCHR	Human Rights Adviser's Unit in the Resident Coordinator's Office
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound
TB	Tuberculosis
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Executive Summary

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the independent external evaluation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2015-2020 in Timor-Leste. The report was commissioned by the United Nations Country Office, and undertaken by two external evaluators from January to May 2019.

The UNDAF is a partnership agreement between sixteen United Nations agencies[2] working in Timor-Leste. The UNDAF is structured along the four strategic development sectors defined in the SDP: (1) Social Capital (2) Infrastructure Development (3) Economic Development and (4) Governance and Institutional Development. Aligned with these four sectors, four outcomes and seventeen sub-outcomes have been elaborated to respond and evolve the needs within each sector.

This is an independent evaluation commissioned by the Resident Coordinator and the UNCT in Timor-Leste in accordance with the UNDAF guidelines. Looking forward to the next programming phase, this evaluation takes stock of achievements, identifies areas for improvement, and recommends actions for strengthening the planning process of the next UNDAF.

The **objectives** of the evaluation are:

1. Provide an independent assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and contributions to impact towards achievement of stated targets including SDGs given the Timor-Leste context, including, an analysis of what worked (or not) and why;
2. Assess the extent to which UNDAF is supporting the national development process and contributing to development results;
3. Generate a set of clear, strategic, forward-looking and actionable strategic and programmatic recommendations based on the key lessons from current and past cooperation to strengthen the design of the next UNDAF;
4. Provide a set of actionable and evidence-based recommendations to support greater accountability of the UNCT to UNDAF stakeholders.

The primary **users** of this evaluation include the RCO, the UN Agencies in Timor-Leste, national stakeholders including ministries, regional and local authorities, and civil society. Externally, the UNCT will use the findings from this evaluation to inform about UNDAF achievements. Internally, the UNCT will consider the recommendations from this report to develop their future programmatic strategy in Timor-Leste, but also to strengthen UN coherence and improve UNDAF monitoring and evaluation framework, internal data collection process, and addresses operational strengths and weaknesses.

The Evaluation Team (ET) conducted the evaluation in a three-phase, participatory approach, incorporating Human Rights Based Approach and gender equality principles.

In Phase I: Inception, the ET conducted a document review, held consultations with the reference group in order to finalize the evaluation approach, evaluation tools and agree on the

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[2] FAO, ILO, IOM, UN WOMEN, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, WHO (in alphabetical order, as signatories of UNDAF)

schedule. The ET conducted the first country visit between 20 February and 4 March, 2019. The primary focus of this visit was to review existing monitoring data and processes, meet with internal and external stakeholders and beneficiaries, and aggregate preliminary findings and recommendations into a draft evaluation report.

In Phase II: Data Collection, the ET returned to Timor-Leste from 08 to 14 April, 2019 to conclude primary data collection and finalize the assessment of programmatic strengths and weaknesses. The ET collected feedback on the draft report and revised the document accordingly. At the end of each evaluation phase, the ET held four validation workshops (two during each country visit), two with external stakeholders (national partners including ministries and civil society) and two with Heads, Deputy Heads and staff of the UN agencies based in the country.

In Phase III: Analysis and Reporting, the ET analysed the collected data, produced and revised the report drafts.

The most important limitation encountered by the ET was the 'low evaluability' of the current UNDAF. While the current UNDAF is in its pre-final year of implementation, which makes it evaluable in terms of the stage of execution, other elements that render a programme evaluable are missing. In particular, the ET found that the UNDAF outcomes and objectives were not commonly understood or known (in particular by national stakeholders, both government and civil society organizations), indicators in the UNDAF results matrix were not SMART or regularly monitored, baseline data was either set to zero or referenced from no longer verifiable sources, there were no annual reports or reviews available for the current UNDAF. The ET minimized this limitation by approaching this evaluation as formative rather than summative.

The evaluation team answered the following evaluation questions formulated around the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria:

A. **Relevance and Strategic Focus** of the UNDAF in relation to the issues it was designed to address as well as their u national to national policies and strategies.
B. Assess the **Principled** adherence to assess the principles of integrated programming as per outlined in UNDAF guidance to reinforce inclusivity and ensure "No one left behind" in terms of progress towards agreed UNDAF outcomes:
C. Assess the **Effectiveness** of UNDAF implementation and performance in terms of progress towards agreed UNDAF outcomes. Identify lessons learnt for future programming, particularly how the UN can best contribute to mainstreaming and localizing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.
D. Assess the **Efficiency** of the UNDAF as a coordination and partnership framework.
E. Analyse to what extent results achieved and strategies used by the UNDAF are **Sustainable** (i) as a contribution to national development and (ii) in terms of the added value of UNDAF for cooperation among individual AFPs.

Evaluation Findings:

- **Relevance and Strategic Focus**: UNDAF outcomes and objectives are well aligned to national the SDP priorities. Both documents have the same "pillars" (for SDC) and "outcome areas" (for UNDAF) and very similar sub-sectors. Since UNDAF's outcomes and objectives touch upon almost every aspect of the development agenda in

Timor – Leste, maintaining relevance over the years has not been an issue. Yet, this resulted in lack of strategic focus and a plethora of very diverse initiatives (ranging from building infrastructure to prevent violence against women) all implemented under the umbrella of UNDAF.

- **Effectiveness**: UNDAF's interventions effectively contributed to Timor-Leste's development goals. Although quantifying this contribution is difficult as interventions under each UNDAF outcome area remain diffused among a wide range of programmes, projects and activities that do not necessarily tell one coherent story. While the UN agencies are delivering in terms of actions and targets agreed in their country programmes, the evaluators note that the current UNDAF indicators track programme, project and activity-based progress rather than intermediary and higher level outcomes and impact, rely on high-level statistics (i.e. the country level). These indicators do not appear to measure actual improvements in the sectors it addresses. Given the high-level objectives and indicators included in the current UNDAF, as well as the activities implemented in parallel by other development partners in the country in the same sectors, it is difficult to quantify and directly attribute results under each outcome area to the UN.

- **Efficiency**: The absence of a UNDAF Joint Steering Group, formal annual work plan and as well as progress reports rendered the co-ordination and review process un-participative. There is no regular review of progress towards achieving UNDAF results, guidance on planning and implementation, and co-ordination with donors and development partners happens at the sectoral level (e.g. health and nutrition) rather than at a higher, more strategic level.

- **Sustainability**: In general, the interventions under UNDAF may have achieved mostly social and institutional sustainability, and to some extent financial sustainability. This financial sustainability especially applies to sectors which are heavily dependent on state funding (health, education, agriculture, etc.) and for those initiatives strictly aligned to ministerial sectorial work plans. Therefore, some UNDAF outcomes may be more sustainable than others.

Recommendations:

- **Recommendation 1: Adopt a stronger leadership role.** The UN's strong brand and its ability to work with multiple government institutions are important comparative advantages—especially since these relationships, and the legitimacy they bring, are important in the development context of Timor-Leste. In that sense, the UN in Timor-Leste could consider assisting the government, in particular the Prime Minister's office in co-ordinating the various initiatives related to the SDP and Agenda 2030 by supporting the high-level donor co-ordination group at the national level. On a higher strategic level, this role could be assumed by the RCO. On the sectoral level, individual UN agencies are already taking the lead.

- **Recommendation 2: Build a permanent and regular dialogue with stakeholders.** The UN has a considerable weight in the country and should use it. The UNDAF could amplify the UN voice, facilitate the dialogue with the government and serve as a mapping tool for fundraising. For the next UNDAF cycle, it is suggested that the RCO set up the mechanisms for regular exchange of information, review and dialogue with government and non-government stakeholders (Joint Steering Group, Results Working Groups, Annual Work Plans and Annual Reviews).

- **Recommendation 3: Dedicate full-time staff to manage the UNDAF process.** Many of the weaknesses of the current UNDAF identified by this evaluation stem from the

fact that the RCO lacks appropriate staff. RCO has struggled to foster a complex collaboration among a large number of actors (both UN and external) without an adequate budget or full-time capacity. At the time of the writing, it has been noted that by the end of 2019, RCO in Timor-Leste will benefit from the expertise of a full time Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) specialist and a communication expert. This should strengthen the RCO's position and ensure it has full-time capacity with a dedicated budget to manage the UNDAF process, to guide its development and maintenance, to promote areas of co-ordination and joint programming, to ensure all agencies have an appropriate role, reconcile differences and build a sense of common purpose.

- **Recommendation 4: Build a Theory of Change.** The next UNDAF should be built on a credible and feasible theory of change, developed as a result of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) currently under way and expected to be finalised by end of 2019, informed by what is doable in Timor-Leste and accepted by the government. The TOC should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis, i.e. during the annual UNDAF reviews and the mid-term external evaluation, for example.

- **Recommendation 5: Place the SDGs at the core of the new UNDAF.** SDG targets and indicators are not formally referenced in the current UNDAF as the strategy document was developed in 2013– 2014 prior to the official launching of Agenda 2030, although the objectives reflect the aspiration of SDGs. The new UNDAF could use national targets for SDGs as indicators for reporting on UNDAF performance and achievements. This could be followed by matching the SDGs with UN Agencies expertise and identifying the areas for intervention, focusing on joint interventions. This would give the SDGs the prominence the UN System wants them to have and, simultaneously, orient the UN programming in Timor-Leste fully towards Agenda 2030. A mapping exercise linking UNDAF outcomes, SDGs and UN Agencies has been conducted in early 2019. This should be used for the future UNDAF cycle.

- **Recommendation 6: Explore innovative approaches for collaboration.** The new UNDAF presents the opportunity to discuss the possibility of engaging with the private sector and civil society (both underdeveloped and little engaged at the moment). In practical terms, these partnerships need to be meaningful for the UN (from a strategic and development standpoint), beneficial to the country's goals and ultimately appealing to the private sector too. Moving from UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to UN Development Assistance Partnership (UNDAP) could be one way forward. Setting up a government – led SDG platform to which all UN Agencies and development actors in the country can contribute (regardless of the sector) is another option. Engaging with the private sector (e.g. social enterprises) and exploring alternative ways of financing (e.g. Green or Social Impact Bonds) is another.

- **Recommendation 7: Move towards joint programming.** In view of preparing the new UNDAF, it is worth exploring the areas that would benefit from joint programming, such as addressing the complex needs of rural populations; supporting income generation opportunities in rural areas, health and nutrition, education. These could also be the stepping stones for a more co-ordinated UNDAF.

- **Recommendation 8: Be mindful of smaller agencies.** The UNDAF formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation process require an effort from all agencies, large and small. Attention should be paid to ensuring that the process is an inclusive one, reflective of the differences among agencies (e.g. presence in the country, size, expertise and resources). Agencies' contributions should be commensurate with their resources and the obligations they have in the country.

Map of Timor-Leste[3]

[3] Source : UN

1.   Country Context

1.1 Timor-Leste Background

Timor-Leste is one of the world's youngest countries, having gained full independence in 2002 following more than four centuries of colonial rule by Portugal and a quarter century of occupation by Indonesia. It is also one of the poorer countries in Asia, yet with tremendous potential for development.

Timor-Leste is the chair of the g7+, a voluntary association of twenty countries that have been affected by conflict and are in transition to longer-term development. The g7+ is the first and so far, the only platform that brings together countries, led by senior level political leadership, that share similar experiences of fragility and its associated challenges. Timor-Leste is a pilot country for implementation of the landmark New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States. Fragile countries themselves are now advocating for changes to this engagement, and are also demanding the lead in their prioritization and implementation. Thus, the second Fragility Assessment (2015) was led and fully funded by the Government of Timor-Leste through the Ministry of Finance. Technical support came from key relevant ministries, and both expertise and financial support was given by the g7+ Secretariat to facilitate the data collection and consultations. The second Fragility Assessment for the five Peacebuilding and State building Goals placed particular emphasis on the need for continued gender inclusion, financial transparency of institutions and political parties, better quality of service delivery, improved use of Tetum in the justice and education systems, infrastructure development, and improved employment opportunities in all industries.

Despite being an oil producing country, Timor-Leste is still considered one of the poorest countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Its economic performance has been fragile, characterized by slow-moving investment of aid funds and oil revenues. The country is benefitting from the commercial exploitation of its petroleum and natural gas reserves in the waters southeast of Timor. In June 2005, the National Parliament of Timor-Leste unanimously approved the creation of the Petroleum Fund (PF) aimed at effectively managing and investing oil revenue in the country's development after exploitation of these resources ends. The perceived wealth coming from the PF may be misleading, as oil reserves are forecast to deplete by 2021 and, according to the law, the government is only allowed to withdraw an Estimate Sustainable Income (ESI), which would ensure that the core funds of the PF would not be spent. The Parliament revised the state budget at the end of January 2019, lowering the planned withdrawals from the PF to $1.2 billion, which is still more than double the ESI of $529 million. Key sectors will once again have limited funding under the 2019 budget (education 10%, health 5%, agriculture 2% and water 1%). Infrastructure gets the largest share of the budget (roads – 19% and other infrastructure 6%). [4]

This may be explained by the fact that emerging from decades of conflict, Timor-Leste's public infrastructure including roads, ports and airports, water and sanitation systems, and government facilities were either non-existent, destroyed or severely dilapidated. The government's spending program is driven by an ambition to overhaul the nation's public infrastructure in order to crowd-in private sector investment and boost long-term growth prospects. While this represents a viable economic strategy in principle, there are indications of limited capacity to

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[4] La'o Hamutuk (2019) General State Budget

implement the programme, with execution rates for the infrastructure budget low and increasingly high prices demanded for construction works[5].

Timor-Leste continues to experience shortages of human capital; Timorese have had to develop government experience, and become equipped with adequate skills for professional services or business. Timor-Leste's institutional frameworks are still developing, with the country having undergone a series of markedly different institutional regimes in recent times[6].

Forty-two percent of the population in Timor-Leste currently lives below the national poverty line (declined from 50.4% in 2007) [7]. Unemployment is high, employment opportunities in the formal sector are generally limited, and job creation by the private sector falls far short of demand. Most of the population have no consistent earnings, and many are subsistence farmers. Access to health services poses a major concern as 70% of the population lives in rural areas in small, dispersed villages isolated by mountainous terrain and poor road conditions. Rural communities rely heavily on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. At the same time, they have limited capacity to adapt to climate change and other environmental challenges. In Timor-Leste, forest and soil degradation is a major problem. Unsustainable land management practices, including slash and burn agriculture, have led to rapid deforestation.

Timor-Leste is the youngest nation in the Asia-Pacific Region with a population characterized as one of the most youthful in the world. Many youth lack access to quality education, even after completing high school and university, because they lack quality non-formal education. Many Timorese youth have very few of the skills and knowledge required to find jobs[8]. Timor-Leste has very low employment rates, with only 31% of the working age population engaged in work and only 21% of 15 to 24-year-olds currently working. Every year, around 18,000 youth enter the workforce and many are unable to find work. More women (27,800) than men (19,705) were not in education, employment, or training (NEET): almost a quarter of women (24%) are NEET versus 17% of young men. However, the differences are minimal in younger youth—with 13% of young men aged 15-19 and 15% of young women aged 15-19 being NEET—and much higher in older youth: 34% of female youth aged 20-24 were NEET[9].

1.2 Timor-Leste's Development Strategies

Timor-Leste joined the UN in 2002 in the category of Least Developed Countries (LDC), defined as low-income countries suffering from severe structural impediments to sustainable development. Since then, the country has achieved progress.

In March 2018, for the second consecutive time, the UN's Committee for Development Policy (CDP) found Timor-Leste eligible for graduation towards the middle-income category. The high growth in income had recently put Timor-Leste on a path to graduation from LDC status on the basis of the "income only" criterion. However, the CDP did not recommend Timor-Leste for graduation and will consider it again at the next triennial review, in 2021.[10] Timor-Leste has fulfilled two criteria required for LDC graduation, however, as the economy is largely undiversified and heavily oil dependent, the country's economy remains vulnerable. Timor-Leste also needs to make extra efforts to diversify quickly its economy making it a post-oil

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[5] World Bank (2018), Systematic Country Diagnostic
[6] World Bank (2018), Systematic Country Diagnostic
[7] Asian Developpement Bank (2019), Poverty Data : Timor – Leste
[8] Timor-Leste National Human Development Report 2018,
[9] UN Development Group, UNHR, UNFPA and UN Women (2018), Policy Brief no. 3 « Leaving no Youth Behind in Timor-Leste : Young People Neither in Education, Employment nor Training »
[10] https://www.un.org/ldcportal/the-2018-triennial-review-of-the-ldc-category/

country in less than five years. the Government is investing in the non-oil economy, using both withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund as well as concessional loans to finance large infrastructure projects, enhance human resources development and promote new sectors such as tourism and hydrocarbon-related industry, as well as revitalizing old sectors such as agriculture[11].

In 2010, Timor-Leste approved the National Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 (SDP), the overarching development strategy of the country. The vision of the SDP is for Timor-Leste to become a middle-upper income country by 2030, with no extreme poverty and with a sustainable and diversified economy not dependent on oil[12]. The government also developed a National Planning Framework with a view of establishing Development Centres in the regions of the country, building on the comparative advantages of each region and their growth potential. The mid-term review of the SDP (in progress as of the time of writing) is expected to shed more light on what has been achieved.

The Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Finance play a key role in mobilizing, planning, budgeting and monitoring the spending of financial resources (coming mainly from state revenues - both oil and non-oil - and donor contributions and loans). The Ministry of Finance is responsible for managing ODA and organizes annual high-level meetings and quarterly operational meetings with development partners.

Figure 1. Resource Mobilization in Timor – Leste[13]

Receipts for Timor-Leste

	2015	2016	2017
Net ODA (USD million)	212.3	223.5	232.0
Net ODA/GNI (%)	7.6	9.8	8.9
Gross ODA (USD million)	212.5	223.8	232.0
Bilateral share (gross ODA) (%)	70.1	72.0	70.6
Total net receipts (USD million)	237.6	207.4	259.1

The latest data published by OECD/DAC (Figure 1) shows that ODA in Timor-Leste has been on the rise since 2015. The sectors that receive the largest share of funding are social infrastructure and services (33%), education (19%), multi-sector initiatives (15%), and economic infrastructure and services (14%). Australia, Japan, the EU (including bilateral donors such as Portugal and Germany), and the US are among Timor-Leste's largest contributing donors, followed by IDB, IDA, Korea and New Zeeland.[14]

Since the adoption of the SDP, Timor – Leste has undertaken several steps in ensuring greater transparency and accountability towards donors, development partners and the public at large. The Government Portal for Transparency[15] was set up, which includes the Aid Transparency

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[11] UN (2018), Timor-Leste's Vulnerability Profile
[12] Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund remains the cornerstone of the Government´s economic policy.
[13] OECD/DAC Aid Figures : Timor-Leste
[14] idem
[15] Timor-Leste Transparency Portal

Portal[16], a central repository for all aid information in Timor-Leste has become available in aimed to improve aid transparency, accuracy and predictability and to ensure assistance provided is efficient and effective.

1.3 The UN in Timor-Leste

UN involvement in Timor-Leste continued after independence in May 2002 to ensure security and stability. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was set up in May 2002[17]. The Mission assisted with core administrative structures, interim law enforcement and public security. The mandate of UNMISET was completed in May 2005 and a successor UN political mission—the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)—was established on 20 May 2005. Expressing its concern over the still fragile security, political and humanitarian situation in Timor-Leste, in August 2006 the UN Security Council established a new, expanded operation—the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)— to support the Government in "*consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion*"[18]. UNMIT finished its mandate on 31 December 2012.

Figure 2. Main Milestones in Timor-Leste's Contemporary History

An initial UNDAF in Timor-Leste was implemented between 2009 and 2013. It focused on: (1) Democratization and Social Cohesion, including deepening State-building, security and justice; (2) Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods, with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including youth, women, IDPs and disaster-prone communities; and (3) Basic Social Services, encompassing education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and social welfare and social protection. It was the first UNDAF marking the move from peacekeeping and recovery to longer-term peace-building, dialogue and reconciliation, and healing of social trauma.

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[16] The Development Partnership Management Unit at the Ministry of Finance manages the Aid Transparency Portal (ATP). ATP is an initiative of the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste with support from the Governments of Japan, Australia, USAID, and the ADB.

[17] United Nations Security Council resolution 1410 (17 May 2002) establishing the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) to replace the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

[18] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704 (25 August 2006) establishing the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) for an initial period of six months

Table 1. UN Agencies Core Areas of Intervention in Timor – Leste

UN Agency	Core areas of intervention
FAO	FAO work in Timor-Leste focuses on five key areas: support to improvement of institutions and coordination mechanisms for policies, laws and regulations; support to the first agriculture census; support to improve farming livelihoods, food availability and diversity of household diets; support to smallholder fishing and aquaculture households to become more resilient in the face of climate change; and support to renewal, realignment and development of Timor-Leste's cash crop economy.[19]
ILO	The ILO supports Timor-Leste to move forward with decent work objectives through the implementation of the Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) for Timor-Leste 2016-2020. DWCP includes the following objectives: youth employment promotion and social protection; rural socio-economic development; and good labour market governance institutions.
IOM	IOM supports the government through the provision of technical assistance and advice to further strengthen institutional capacity. Since 2005, the IOM Mission has been working closely with the government to develop coherent and well-coordinated migration systems to ensure efficient migration management for Timorese citizens, visitors, immigrants, irregular migrants, and asylum seekers, as well as providing technical support to the National Directorate for Disaster Risk Management. The Mission has also been providing support and technical assistance to the Government and civil society in dealing with new emerging trends such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling.[20]
UN Women	In Timor-Leste, UN Women works in partnership with government, civil society, and development partners, including the private sector to support the advancement of national and international gender equality commitments in Timor-Leste. UN Women's programming has focused in the areas of Women's Economic Empowerment, Ending Violence Against Women, Gender Responsive Planning and Budgeting; Advancing Women's leadership and the wider Women, Peace and Security Agenda; and supporting CEDAW implementation and coordinating gender equality efforts within the UN system and among external partners.
UNDP	UNDP's work in Timor-Leste focuses on poverty reduction and improving the economic opportunities that help people to lift themselves and their families out of poverty through sustainable livelihoods programmes, social business enterprises and access to financial services. UNDP's programmes focus on alleviating poverty by building up a range of skills at both the national and local levels, insuring government partners, community groups and individuals possess the know-how to reduce poverty and build and maintain sustainable livelihoods.
UNFPA	UNFPA supports governmental and nongovernmental organizations' activities to address population issues and strongly promotes

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[19] FAO in Timor-Leste
[20] IOM in Timor-Leste

	reproductive rights and gender equality as key elements to achieve human rights and human dignity. UNFPA assistance contributes towards establishing basic social services and generating baseline socio-demographic data. In the area of sexual and reproductive health, UNFPA supports the provision of comprehensive reproductive health services and training, with a focus on safe motherhood, particularly emergency obstetrical and new-born care (EmONC), and family planning (FP). In the area of gender, UNFPA advocated and provided support for raising awareness of domestic violence. [21]
UNICEF	UNICEF in Timor-Leste focuses on reaching the most vulnerable children and women across the country and support the commitment of Government of Timor-Leste as per CRC. UNICEF and partners work in all 13 municipalities, with a particular focus on the disadvantaged municipalities Oecusse, Covalima, Ermera, Ainaro and Viqueque. UNICEF collaborates with local governments, community-based organisations, civil society, non-governmental organisations, development partners, other United Nations agencies, academia and international organisations in four key areas, namely 1) Child Survival and Development, 2) Education, 3) Child Protection, and 4) Social Inclusion under current Country Programme Action Plan 2015-2020.
WHO	WHO assists in strengthening the national health sector and coordination to ensure clarity of roles and coordination among development partners and relevant government counterparts. WHO provides support for organizing national health sector coordination meetings. WHO co-chaired the Ministry of Health's Health Development Partners meetings with the Delegation of European Union to Timor-Leste. Consequently, a Joint Health Sector Review is convened annually for the purpose of reviewing progress, identifying issues and making recommendations for areas of improvements in the health sector. WHO provides intensive technical support for implementation of the grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). The Head of WHO Country Office is an active member of the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), playing a key role in advocacy and decision making. WHO provides support to hold regular monthly meetings of the various technical working groups including the Expanded Programme on Immunization, Food Safety, HIV/AIDS and Emergency Health Cluster[22].
OHCHR	OHCHR, through the Human Rights Adviser's Unit (HRAU) placed in the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Timor-Leste, provides capacity development support to national institutions, in particular Government and the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), as well as civil society to enhance their knowledge and skills to promote and protect human rights. The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) receives support to integrate human rights in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and their individual and joint programmes to support implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). OHCHR provides technical assistance to all partners to engage with the UN human rights mechanisms.

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[21] UNFPA in Timor-Leste
[22] WHO in Timor-Leste

1.4 UNDAF 2015-2020

In 2013 and 2014, the UNCT and the Timorese government jointly developed the current UNDAF (2015-2020)[23] to establish a strategic programme framework to support national development priorities as outlined in the SDP. The UNDAF is a partnership agreement between sixteen United Nations agencies[24] working in Timor-Leste. Although not specifically mentioning them, the UNDAF reflects the aspirations of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It also builds on Timor-Leste's initiatives as chair of the g7+ and as a pilot country for implementation of the landmark New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States.

The UNDAF is structured along the four strategic development sectors defined in the SDP: (1) Social Capital (2) Infrastructure Development (3) Economic Development and (4) Governance and Institutional Development. Aligned with these four sectors, four outcomes and seventeen sub-outcomes have been elaborated to respond and evolve the needs within each sector. This structure is supposed to ensure the national ownership and alignment of UN development activities to national priorities and to provide the basis for collaboration with development partners.

Five major types of stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the UNDAF:

1. UN system;
2. Government of Timor–Leste;
3. Civil society (including national and international NGOs);
4. Donors; and
5. People of Timor-Leste as the target beneficiaries of the UN system's work.

These stakeholders should, in principle, inform and impact the design, process, implementation and performance of the UNDAF in different ways. The diagram below shows the evaluation team's understanding of these key groups of stakeholders and their role in UNDAF's implementation.

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[23] Originally expected to end in December 2019, but extended to December 2020.
[24] FAO, ILO, IOM, UN WOMEN, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, WHO (in alphabetical order, as signatories of UNDAF)

2.   The Evaluation Process

3.1 Evaluation Purpose, Objectives and Intended Users

The UNDAF guidelines[25] stipulate that an evaluation should be carried out in the course of an UNDAF. This is an independent evaluation commissioned by the Resident Coordinator and the UNCT in Timor-Leste in accordance with the UNDAF guidelines. Looking forward to the next programming phase, this evaluation takes stock of achievements, identifies areas for improvement, and recommends actions for strengthening the planning process of the next UNDAF.

The evaluation's **purpose** is two-fold:

1. to generate evidence and lessons learnt based on the assessment of the current performance of the UNDAF outcomes and to strengthen the formulation of the next UNDAF; and

2. to provide information for decision-making that supports national development efforts.

The **objectives** of the evaluation are:

5. Provide an independent assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and contributions to impact towards achievement of stated targets including SDGs given the Timor-Leste context, including, an analysis of what worked (or not) and why;
6. Assess the extent to which UNDAF is supporting the national development process and contributing to development results;
7. Generate a set of clear, strategic, forward-looking and actionable strategic and programmatic recommendations based on the key lessons from current and past cooperation to strengthen the design of the next UNDAF;
8. Provide a set of actionable and evidence-based recommendations to support greater accountability of the UNCT to UNDAF stakeholders.

The primary **users** of this evaluation include the RCO, the UN Agencies in Timor-Leste, national stakeholders including ministries, regional and local authorities, and civil society. Externally, the UNCT will use the findings from this evaluation to inform about UNDAF achievements. Internally, the UNCT will consider the recommendations from this report to develop their future programmatic strategy in Timor-Leste, but also to strengthen UN coherence and improve UNDAF monitoring and evaluation framework, internal data collection process, and addresses operational strengths and weaknesses.

3.2 Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation team answered the following evaluation questions formulated around the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria:

A. **Relevance and Strategic Focus** of the UNDAF in relation to the issues it was designed to address as well as their u national to national policies and strategies.

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[25] UN Development Group UNDAF Guidelines (2017)

B. Assess the **Principled** adherence to assess the principles of integrated programming as per outlined in UNDAF guidance to reinforce inclusivity and ensure "No one left behind" in terms of progress towards agreed UNDAF outcomes.

C. Assess the **Effectiveness** of UNDAF implementation and performance in terms of progress towards agreed UNDAF outcomes. Identify lessons learnt for future programming, particularly how the UN can best contribute to mainstreaming and localizing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

D. Assess the **Efficiency** of the UNDAF as a coordination and partnership framework.

E. Analyse to what extent results achieved and strategies used by the UNDAF are **Sustainable** (i) as a contribution to national development and (ii) in terms of the added value of UNDAF for cooperation among individual AFPs.

3.3 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

The ET used a rights-based and inclusive approach, with explicit attention to gender equality, women's empowerment, and the needs of persons living with disabilities. The evaluation complies with the UNEG "Standards for Evaluation in the UN system", "Norms for Evaluation in UN System and "Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation"[26] in selecting interviewees, in interacting with them and in respecting their personal and institutional rights. They were assured that no direct attribution would be made to them if they did not want, they were chosen to ensure a fair representation of views in order to ensure a balanced perspective.

Informed verbal consent was sought from stakeholders prior to asking any questions related to the UNDAF evaluation. To obtain consent, the ET briefly explained the reasons and objectives of the evaluation, as well as the scope of the questions asked during the interview. Stakeholders had the right of refusal or to withdraw at any time. The ET also ensured respondent privacy and confidentiality. Comments provided during individual and group discussions were aggregated to render impossible the identification of specific stakeholders.

The ET is unaware of any conflicts of interest.

The evaluation has been carried out in collaboration and consultation with three important groups:

1. The Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) composed of the Government of Timor-Leste (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), UN (UNICEF, WFP, UN Women), donors (KOIKA), and CSOs, who volunteered for the ERG;

2. The Resident Co-ordinator, Heads and Deputy Heads of UN agencies with an office in the country, and a selection of technical and policy members of UN agencies, and;

3. Representatives of national stakeholders (Prime Minister's Office, Heads of Department at the Ministries of Health, Education, Social Affairs, Agriculture, regional authorities and heads of health, education, agriculture and tourism sectors in Oecussi and Ermera).

Phase I: Inception

The ET began work with a kick-off meeting with the ERG. This meeting established contract expectations, ensured all parties were on the same page regarding priorities and desired outcomes, came to agreement on the evaluation questions and the evaluation timelines. Based on information gained during the kick-off, the ET held an internal team planning meeting to formally launch the desk review and evaluation planning. The ET then began communicating with the UN Agencies based in Timor-Leste and the selected government stakeholders to introduce the evaluation, team members, and schedule meetings. The ET produced an inception report outlining the objectives and expected timeline of the first country mission to ensure all parties were prepared.

The ET began desk review after these initial arrangements. The desk review was focused on reviewing (i) the results framework and monitoring system, and all available data and indicators and (ii) UN Agency country programme documents and external resources. All documents reviewed can be found in Annex 2 of the evaluation report. The ET included analysis of monitoring data where possible to present findings on programmatic strengths and weaknesses.

Phase II: Data Collection

From February 19 to March 4, 2019 the international consultant travelled to Timor-Leste and together with the ET's national consultant conducted the first country trip. The trip consisted primarily of consultations with RCO and UN Agencies staff, and consultations with stakeholders. The ET also conducted two site visits to Oecussi and Ermera municipalities. The purpose of the trip was two-fold: 1) to gather contextual information needed to address EQs; and 2) to consult with key stakeholders at the district level including direct beneficiaries. The trip also offered an opportunity for the ET to discuss relevant contextual constraints that may impact the evaluation schedule.

At the end of the first country trip, the ET convened two validation workshops with relevant UN staff and government stakeholders to share preliminary findings and recommendations for each EQ. The ET presented findings from the trip and UNCT had the opportunity to ask questions about the data review process and results. Additionally, the ET facilitated a discussion around UNCT's learning needs for the next UNDAF to ensure that the recommendations would be aligned and able to provide the desired information. The ET then drafted the evaluation report and submitted it with all data collection tools to the ERG and all UN Agencies working in Timor-Leste for comment and feedback.

The international consultant returned to Timor-Leste from April 8 to April 14 to finalize collecting qualitative data. The ET conducted additional KIIs with UN Agencies and international development partners.

The ET used a purposive sampling approach to select respondents. While many stakeholders were based in Dili, the ET travelled to two additional municipalities in Oecussi and Ermera. The ET made concerted efforts to include both sexes in the qualitative sample. KIIs were conducted one-on-one or in small groups, as appropriate. Direct beneficiaries were not specifically targeted given the macro-level of this evaluation, but the ET could exchange with a few patients at the health centres and farmers during the site visits. The sites for the visits outside the capital city were selected to cover the work of different UN agencies, in different sectors, and in different municipalities. In Oecussi, the ET looked at joint actions in the field of nutrition, agriculture and tourism implemented by UNDP, WFP, UNICEF and WHO at

different times throughout the current UNDAF. In Ermera, the focus was on joint actions in the nutrition and health sectors implemented by UNICEF, WFP, WHO and IOM. The ET also looked for examples of successes and challenges to triangulate the information collected through other means.

For details regarding how each EQ was addressed and how the corresponding data was analysed, see Annex 3 for the Evaluation Design Matrix.

KII data collection tools were prepared for each respondent category/type, and were semi-structured. KIIs generated data for all EQs (see Annex 5). Table 3 provides an overview of the qualitative respondent categories, methods, locations, and estimated sample size. Annex 4 includes a complete fieldwork itinerary.

Table 3: Qualitative Sample Details

Qualitative Respondent Category	Respondent Details	Method	Interview Location	Est. Sample Size
RCO	Resident Coordinator, Head of RC Office, Human Rights Adviser, Data Specialist, Communications Specialist	KII	Dili	5 (2 men and 3 women)
UN Agencies active in Timor – Leste	FAO, ILO, IOM, UN WOMEN, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO (in alphabetical order)	KII and Group interview	Dili, Oecussi, Ermera, Skype	38 (13 men and 15 women)
Government Stakeholders	Heads of Department and Specialists from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Protection, Ministry of Education, Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	KII and Group interview	Dili, Oecussi, Ermera	17 (12 men and 5 women)
Civil Society	Alola Foundation, Asosiasaun Maneo and NGO Belun	KII	Dili, Oecussi, Ermera	8 (2 men and 6 women)
Development Partners	JICA, EU[27]	KII	Dili	6 (5 men and 1 woman)
TOTAL				54

Phase III: Analysis and Reporting

The ET's data analysis approach utilized data triangulation to crosscheck results. During fieldwork, the ET consolidated and internally reviewed information daily. The ET met regularly (at least once a day, after all interviews for the day were completed) and critically assessed responses received, emerging trends, challenges, and areas for further investigation. Each team member took notes during each meeting to allow for post-fieldwork aggregation of findings.

Though preliminary analysis is important during fieldwork, the majority of the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data was conducted post-fieldwork.

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[27] Meetings with the World Bank and KOICA were solicited but did not happen because respondents were unavailable during the country visit.

- **Qualitative:** ET members reviewed and finalized all KII notes and discussed main findings (so that each team member could contribute to the final document). Analysis methods utilized include comparative analysis, gap analysis, and content analysis.
- **Triangulation:** Analytical triangulation approaches were employed as part of the ET's development of findings and conclusions. Triangulation enabled the ET to cross-verify and cross-validate the findings that emerged from using the above data collection methods (KIIs, desk review, site visit observations). The ET utilized methodological triangulation in developing parallel protocols with the same or similar questions across KIIs. This enabled greater data triangulation because each method addresses sub-sets of the same EQs, and their findings were validated or refuted by the other techniques. Monitoring data / results indicators and secondary data were also utilized in the triangulation process, as available.

3.4 Evaluation Timeline

Table 4 provides an overview of the evaluation timeline, from launch to completion. Annex 4 provides a more detailed schedule for qualitative fieldwork.

Table 4: Evaluation Timeline

Task	Dates
Onboard consultants, kick – off	15 January, 2019
Conduct Desk Review, submit and finalize Inception Report and Tools	15 January – 15 February, 2019
Fieldwork: First Country Trip	19 February – 4 March, 2019
Conduct Data Analysis and Draft Report	5 – 30 March, 2019
Fieldwork: Second Country Trip	8 – 14 April, 2019
Draft Evaluation Report, comments and revision	15 April, 2019 – 17 May, 2019
Final Evaluation Report	by 15 June, 2019

3.5 Evaluation Strengths and Limitations

Evaluation Strengths

This evaluation utilized quantitative data collection methods. The key strength of the qualitative methods is their ability to gather in-depth, nuanced information from participants and allow the ET the flexibility to probe around key areas of interest, uncovering both intended and unintended results. While quantitative data was mainly derived from the UNDAF results framework and quantified "what" was happening, qualitative data was able to tell "how" and "why" it was happening – this information was crucial for understanding if the UNDAF intervention logics was valid, or if it needed to be updated/revised based on participants' experiences and drivers.

Furthermore, the purposive sampling (KIIs) technique ensured that the sample population was representative of different types of UNDAF stakeholders and their experiences, which is something that cannot be guaranteed using random sampling alone. The inclusion of eighty-one interviews also allowed for a reasonable degree of saturation within the evaluation timeframe and resources. The triangulation between different data types (e.g. including quantitative monitoring data from the results framework), and between different data sources (e.g. UN staff vs. government staff) reduced the risk of bias in any one source or data

type, and increased the likelihood of gathering the "what," "why," and "how" of UNDAF results.

Evaluation Limitations

While the strength of using qualitative data collection methods is their depth, the limitation to these methods is the lack of breadth in the sample, as these methods are time consuming and involve a smaller sample size. In other words, although the findings are rich and nuanced, they are only generalizable to the sample population in the three districts sampled, but not to the entire UNDAF intervention area and beneficiary population. The ET minimized this limitation by utilizing secondary data targeting all the UNDAF priority areas.

The biggest and most important limitation encountered by the ET was the 'low evaluability' of the current UNDAF. An Evaluability Assessment examines the extent to which a project or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion by looking at the programme design, availability of data and the stage of execution[28]. While the current UNDAF is in its pre-final year of implementation, which makes it evaluable in terms of the stage of execution, multiple elements under the other two headings are missing. In particular, the ET did not find that the objectives were realistic and commonly understood or known (in particular by national stakeholders), performance indicators were not SMART or regularly monitored, baseline data was either set to zero or referenced from no longer verifiable sources, there were no other reviews or progress reports for the current UNDAF (with the exception of an internal mid-term review conducted within UNCT with limited effect, discussed under Findings).

The ET was only able to conduct the evaluability assessment (in particular clarifying the availability of data) after the launch of the evaluation assignment, when they got access to the programme documents. The limitation was that the ET was bound to the TOR (Annex 1) that were prepared for a 'high evaluability' programme rather than a forward-looking technical assessment with a focus on the next UNDAF cycle, for example. The ET minimized this limitation by approaching this evaluation as formative rather than summative[29].

Secondly, as stipulated in the TOR, the evaluation was conducted at a macro level and did not focus on specific country programmes or projects. The ET found it difficult to assess to what extent and how the UNDAF outcomes had been attained without consulting specific agency country programmes. Given that UNDAF outcomes are by definition the work of a number of partners (both UN agencies, but also implementing partners such as national ministries, regional and local authorities, civil society organizations, international non-governmental organizations, other development partners in Timor-Leste) attribution of development change to the UN Timor-Leste was difficult to determine.

Lastly, there is a possibility of respondent and evaluator specific biases based on subjective human interactions, including but not limited to recall bias (participants may have responded to questions posed by the ET with answers that blended their experiences into a composite memory, in particular those questions that referred to UNDAF formulation, which happened in 2013-2014), gender or social bias (participants may have responded in a way that conformed to what they feel was appropriate gender or social norms, in particular during visits outside the capital city), and selection bias (when evaluator or ERG preferences influences who is selected

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[28] UNODC Evaluability Assessment Template
[29] Summative evaluation refers to the assessment of outcomes; formative assessment gauges development over time.

to participate). Several measures were taken to reduce the effect of respondent biases and validate interview results, including the following:

- o Ensuring that respondents understood the confidentiality of responses;
- o Incorporating responses from key informants and survey respondents who have no vested interest or were not directly involved; and
- o Requesting that respondents provide a rationale for their answers, including examples of specific activities and actions that contributed to reported outcomes.

3. Evaluation Findings

This section contains two parts. First, it provides a summary of the key interventions implemented under the current UNDAF in all the outcome areas by all the UN Agencies[30]. Second, it details the findings per evaluation criterion while answering the evaluation questions as formulated in the TOR.

Table 5. UNDAF 2015 – 2020 Outcome Areas and Key Interventions

UNDAF Outcome 1: Social Sector	Key Interventions
People of Timor-Leste, especially the most disadvantaged groups, benefit from inclusive and responsive quality health, education and other social services, and are more resilient to disasters and the impacts of climate change. **SO1.1:** The most disadvantaged groups of men, women and children benefit from gender-responsive and inclusive social protection, social cohesion and behaviour change programmes, including for the prevention and protection of women and children from violence. **SO1.2:** Children, youth and adults benefit from inclusive and quality education at all levels in an equitable manner. **SO1.3:** Population of Timor-Leste, in particular the most excluded, benefit from equal access to quality health and nutrition services and behaviour change promotion interventions. **SO1.4:** People of Timor-Leste, particularly those living in rural areas vulnerable to disasters and the impacts of climate change, are more resilient and benefit from improved risk and	Endorsed policies: • Family planning policy; • Nutrition and Food policy (finalized and pending for approval by the Council of Ministers); • New-born and child health policy; • Food fortification policy • National Youth Policy and revision of National Youth Policy • National Action Plan on Gender-Based Violence • National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security Draft policies: • breast-feeding policy; • health human resource policy Endorsed code: • Marketing of Breastmilk Substitute Code Endorsed legislation: • Tobacco control legislation (decree law) endorsed (approved in 2016) Endorsed guideline: • high impact nutrition intervention Endorsed strategies/plans: • NCDs Strategy for Prevention and control of NCD, Injuries, disabilities and Care of the Elderly and linked Action Plan • Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal, Child and Adolescent Health Strategy approved, but cancelled in 2017.

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[30] Based on the UNDAF Results Matrix, as reported by the UN Agencies in April 2019 (see Annex 6 for the full updated Results Matrix)

sustainable environment management. **SO1.5:** In an enabling environment, young men and young women make informed choices for a healthier and more productive life as citizens who actively contribute to the peace and development of their country.	Assessments: • El Nino/Climate Change Resilience Assessment in March 2016, Climate Vulnerability; and • Capacity Assessment (CVCA) with risk maps conducted in 3 municipalities (Baucau, Ermera and Liquica) in 8 admin-posts (Baucau Villa, Quelicai, Vemasse, Ermera Villa, Hatulia, Liquica, Bazartete and Maubara. • Government supported to conduct its first national-wide chronic food security analysis through the standardized Integrated Phased Classification Protocole. Validation of the analysis by the Council of Minister is pending. • Suco Disaster risks management committees (SDMC) established and Community-based Disaster Risks Management (CBDRM) plans developed and approved at post-administrative and 7 Municipalities (Manatutu, Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Manufahi, Ainaro and Covalima)
UNDAF Outcome 2: **Infrastructure Sector**	**Key Interventions**
People of Timor-Leste, especially the rural poor and vulnerable groups, derive social and economic benefits from improved access to and use of sustainable and resilient infrastructure. **SO2.1:** Improved capacity for the planning, constructing and maintaining of climate-resilient infrastructure for rural development and local service delivery by national and sub-national bodies, with improved institutional frameworks and increased gender equitable citizen participation. **SO2.2:** Women and men in Timor-Leste are deriving social and economic benefits from improved rural roads access, with the Government of Timor-Leste effectively planning, budgeting and	Implementation of 5 roads and bridges project in the 3 municipalities benefitting approximately 70,000 people in rural communities. 530 km of rural roads are currently in good condition. On-going maintenance of 390 km of rural roads. Roads for Development Programme: • technical support for the rural roads contract cycle including: procurement, contract management, and implementation of works. • technical support for contract management system in Corporate Services. • Rural Road Masterplan and Investment Strategy developed and includes priorities and proposed budget allocation for rural road rehabilitation and maintenance until 2020. • Ongoing maintenance and development of the Integrated Rural Roads Management and Information System. ERA Agro-Forestry project: • integrating procedures and systems including social and environmental safeguards in

delivering rural road rehabilitation and maintenance, using labour-based methods as appropriate. **SO2.3:** Women and men in Timor-Leste, in particular school children and people living in rural areas, have increased access to - and utilize - safe and reliable water and improved sanitation and hygiene services, in an equitable and sustainable manner.	execution of climate resilient infrastructure within agro-forestry areas in Baguia, Baucau. • Ongoing support provided on capacity development for staff in government departments and contractors in planning, developing and implementing rural infrastructure including at least 50 technical staff and representatives from 6 municipalities, and staff from 38 local contracting companies. • Training in environmentally friendly labour-based methods for constructing infrastructure to 10 Nos Contractors based in Baucau to enable them execute climate resilient infrastructure within agro-forestry areas in Baguia, Baucau.
UNDAF Outcome 3: Economic Sector	**Key Interventions**
Economic policies and programmes geared towards inclusive, sustainable and equitable growth and decent jobs. **SO3.1:** Capacity of relevant institutions enhanced to carry out inclusive and sustainable economic policy analyses and programmes for better access to decent employment. **SO3.2:** Technical capacity enhanced to develop viable and sustainable agribusiness sub-sectors and value chains promoting local bio-diversity. **SO3.3:** Rural resilience, livelihoods and food security improved through better production and postharvest management practices, better management of natural resources and ecosystems services including actions on climate change adaptation and mitigation. **SO3.4:** Financial and technical capacity of relevant institutions enhanced to deliver skills, productivity, and employability of the workforce.	• Support to beef cattle value chain development, with regulations, training and information, resulting in improved practices and increased production of local quality meat, and generating approximately 800 new jobs in the value chain. • Support to horticulture value chain development, with piloted contract farming with farmer groups in Maubisse. Through this arrangement farmers got access to inputs, technical assistance and a reliable market. The development of the horticulture value chain has facilitated farmer to market linkages with over 55 tons of produced sold to supermarket in Dili, and generating 168 full time jobs with 166 business start-ups. • 2 (National Adaptation Programme of Action NAPA and National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan NBSAP) • 3 strategic actions as below (indicator not SMART to define strategic actions) • Ministry of Tourism (MoT) supported with development of National Tourism Policy • Support to MoT (jointly with TAF and others) with development of a National Tourism Website • Support to ETDA to deliver training for guesthouse operators • Over 6,000 SME's have registered and accessed business information through IADE • Support to MEACE and Chambers of Commerce of Timor-Leste to carry out Enabling Environment for Sustainable Enterprise Survey (EESE)

SO3.5: Enhanced business environment and access to financial services and capital promotes growth of socially conscious private sector and pro-poor industries, especially (or including) in rural areas.	• Support to the maize value-chain development with inputs (seeds and equipment), training and demonstration on sustainable production technology (Conservation Agriculture) and improvement of post-harvest management practices (silos) in 10 Municipalities • 7 700 small holder farmers supported with training on sustainable production technology (Conservation Agriculture) inputs (maize and legume seeds), equipment (planting tools, hand tractors and knife rollers) and post-harvest management (silos) in some 280 Farmers Groups in 10 Municipalities (90 *Sucos*) • An estimated 5 000 smallholder farmers adopted mitigation measures to reduce climate induced risks by planting local tree species and kind grass to protect/rehabilitate springs and degraded land prone to landslide or erosion, in 21 Sucos (7 Municipalities) • Food and Nutrition Security Policy approved in Jan 2017 includes Outcome 2: Enhanced stability and resilience in food production and supply.
UNDAF Outcome 4: **Governance Sector**	**Key Interventions**
State institutions are more responsive, inclusive, accountable and decentralized for improved service delivery and realization of rights, particularly of the most excluded groups. **SO4.1:** Citizens' access to effective and efficient justice system improved, particularly for women, children and disadvantaged groups. **SO4.2:** Public sector oversight, accountability and transparency of institutions, mechanisms and processes strengthened. **SO4.3:** Decentralized institutions provide more efficient, accountable and accessible services to citizens, particularly for the rural poor and other disadvantaged groups.	• National Parliament approved suco (village) Law (pending promulgation by President). The suco law includes a quota of 50% for women as candidates for the village and sub-village chief positions, in alignment to the CEDAW concluding observations (art. 23.b) • Country Assessment on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights conducted by the National Human Rights Institution – the Provedoria (PDHJ) - and takes into consideration recommendations of the HR mechanisms related to SRHR. The report was launched in December 2017. • Technical support to the legal and gender working group, for development of recommendations on the draft Land and Expropriation Law from a women's human rights perspective. UNCT submission to Parliament with analysis of the draft law from a human right, including a women's rights perspective. Committee A (Constitution, Justice, Public Administration, Local Power and Anti-Corruption) of National Parliament incorporated all recommendations into its report for the National Parliament

SO4.4: Relevant state institutions have improved capacity to collect, analyse and use reliable and timely socio-demographic disaggregated data for evidence-based planning, budgeting, monitoring, reporting and decision-making targeting disadvantaged groups.	• MOU Social Audit signed between GOTL and CSOs • National Action Plan for Children in Timor-Leste 2015-2020 based on human rights recommendation Concluding Observations (COBs) endorsed by Council of Ministers. • Decree Law 3/2016 was approved by the Council of Minister, creating the Municipal Authorities/Administrations in the 12 Municipalities. The decree law was developed in consultation with the women's organizations and has included temporary special measures for gender equality, especially on women's leadership. • Integration of gender into planning and budgeting process and Public Finance Management Reforms • Publication of Gender and Sustainable Development in Timor-Leste with Secretary of State for Inclusion and Equality and Directorate of Statistics • Two initial State reports and two follow up report submitted to UN Treaty Bodies (on migrant workers, torture, women and children respectively). Various recommendations integrated in national action plans (on gender-based violence; women, peace and security; and children respectively)

4.1 Relevance and Strategic Focus

To what extent are UNDAF objectives or outcomes still valid and aligned to key national development priorities including their underlying and root causes priorities?

The UNDAF's overarching goal of "*supporting equitable and sustainable development in a rising young nation*" and approach – which consists of identifying outcome areas, sub-sectors and objectives within which UN agencies implement interventions in accordance with their individual country programmes - have not changed during the implementation period from 2015 to 2019 (and is unlikely to change in 2020). Individual UN Agencies' activities may have evolved over time as the context shifted (e.g. to take stalk of political changes in the form of multiple changes in government, of the announced decentralization reform, but also of other development initiatives implemented in their sectors).

The current UNDAF strategy document is based on a list of seventeen high-level sub-outcomes (formulated as objectives) and fifty-two indicators. The advantage of having cluster objectives (such as, for example, sub-outcome 1.2 "*Children, youth, and adults benefit from inclusive and quality education at all levels in an equitable manner*" or sub-outcome 2.1 "*Improved capacity for the planning, constructing and maintaining climate-resilient infrastructure for rural development and local service delivery by national and sub-national bodies, with improved institutional frameworks and increased gender equitable citizen participation*") is that they are so broad and cover so many elements that they remain relevant and aligned to national priorities over a long period of time. On the other hand, such widely formulated objectives lack in "strategic focus" as they appear to cover everything and everyone ranging from justice to social affairs to economic policies to infrastructure works and ultimately 'targeting' the entire population of the country both young and old, women, men and children, urban and rural, of all backgrounds.

To what extent is UNDAF aligned with priorities of SDP and relevant policies?

Because of the high-level nature of its outcomes and objectives, the current UNDAF is aligned to the priorities of the SDP ensuring, in theory, a high level of relevance. A closer look at the SDP reveals that it is also a high-level policy document therefore ensuring alignment is not difficult. In practice, both documents have the same "pillars" (for SDC) and "outcome areas" (for UNDAF) and very similar sub-sectors (Figure 3). Since UNDAF's outcomes and objectives touch upon almost every aspect of the development agenda in Timor – Leste, maintaining relevance over the years has not been an issue. However, this high-level relevance and lack of strategic focus have resulted in a plethora of diverse activities all implemented under the umbrella of UNDAF (see Table 5, section 4 on Evaluation Findings). In 2017, the UNCT in Timor-Leste conducted an internal review of UNDAF (all the UN Agencies present in Dili were involved, although some, arguably, to a lesser extent). While the aim of this internal reflection process was to narrow down the objectives, update them to reflect the country's needs in the medium term, and identify more specific indicators, it did not result in a revision of the results framework matrix. The UNDAF strategy document and its results matrix were kept as originally approved. There is no rationale provided for this decision in any of the documentation, but interviewed UN staff who were involved in the exercise noted that "*such changes would have required the agreement of all agencies and it would have taken a long time and effort*".

Figure 3. UNDAF 2015-2020 Alignment with SDP 2011-2030 in Timor-Leste

Was the UNDAF (and UNCT) responsive to changing environment in Timor-Leste at national and subnational level and how did and should it adapt to these changes?

A theory of change (TOC) explains how activities are understood to produce a series of results that contribute to achieving the final intended impacts of a programme.[31] While UNDAF's TOC is not clearly defined in any one chart or document, the strategy outlines two main tracks:

- Support Timor-Leste's progress in peace and state building and its commitment to use the country's resources to promote sustainable development, offer significant opportunities to increase economic growth and access to social services, and;

- Build capacities and national ownership along the four strategic development sectors: (1) Social Capital (2) Infrastructure Development (3) Economic Development and (4) Governance and Institutional Development.

The UNDAF strategy describes the UN's activities, their engagement with key government stakeholders and expected results. However, the strategy document does not outline *how* the UNDAF's activities are expected to *produce results* and the UNDAF's *intended impacts* (e.g. through hypothesis or 'if then' statements with stated assumptions). The evaluators concluded that the UN in Timor-Leste adapted mainly at the Agency level through the choice of interventions or activities to be implemented rather than at the Framework level. As explained above, the UNDAF strategy and its results matrix have not been revisited since their approval in 2015.

4.2 Principles of Integrated Programming

The five UN programming principles include capacity development, results-based management, environmental sustainability, gender equality and Human Rights-Based Approach and are intended to guide UNDAF planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as to focus the UN's support to national development priorities.

To what extent have human rights principles and standards been reflected or promoted in the UNDAF? To what extent has institution-building and institution-strengthening taken place in human rights and gender equality terms?

The UNDAF refers to human rights principles and standards. It also indicates how it will promote them (UNDAF Strategy Document, page 25):

> *"The UN System will particularly highlight support for addressing data gaps that will lead to better implementation of UN programming principles, including a human rights-based approach (improved data on disadvantaged groups), gender equality principles (sex disaggregation) and environmental sustainability (data on climate change and disaster risk and resilience).*
>
> *UN Agencies are committed to ensure that UNDAF results contribute to national gender equality goals and commitments, with a dual focus on integrated actions in programming to address persistent sectoral gender*

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[31] Patricia Rogers (UNICEF), Methodological Brief no.2, Theory of Change

> *equality gaps, as well as targeted actions to address specific issues, such as violence against women."*

From interviews with individual UN Agencies, it became clear that these principles are key to the UN System in general and therefore feature in all country programmes, as well as project documents, and any deliverables produced. The evaluators are not sure to what extent UNDAF has helped the UN Agencies "promote" these principles, since the mention in the text of the strategy document is overarching and no further details are included as to how these principles will be integrated or operationalized during the implementation phase. The results matrix contains indicators that are both disaggregated and not disaggregated (see example below). Therefore, it is difficult to measure the precise extent of this aspect.

A Human Rights Adviser's Unit[32] (HRAU) was established in Timor-Leste in 2013. The HRAU works closely with the government, the National Human Rights Institution (the Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice), civil society organizations and the UNCT supporting efforts to further develop the capacity of partners to promote, protect and mainstream human rights. The HRAU comprises one international and three national staff. Activities of the HRAU in Timor-Leste include the following:

- Providing technical advice and capacity building, including on the human rights-based approach, for, Government, civil society organizations, human rights defenders, rights-holders and the UNCT;
- Capacity building on human rights monitoring and reporting, and seeking redress for rights-holders, in particular from discriminated groups and civil society organizations acting on their behalf;
- Supporting the Government, the National Human Rights Institution, civil society and the UNCT to engage with the UN human rights mechanisms and to increase the implementation of priority recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and other UN human rights mechanisms,
- Assisting and supporting the National Human Rights Institution to fulfil its human rights promotion, monitoring and investigation mandate
- Sharing evaluations of the impact of existing development programmes incorporating a human rights-based approach, and best practices;
- Support the integration of human rights in the curricula in primary schools;
- Capacity building of the police and the military on human rights.

The thematic focus areas of HRAU support include:

- addressing discrimination, with a focus on persons with disabilities and members of the lesbian, gay, transgender, bi-sexual and intersex community (LGBTI); HRAU supports discriminated groups to claim their rights and use national and international protection systems;
- combating impunity and strengthening accountability and the rule of law through capacity building on human rights for the police and army, and increasing the use of international human rights law in court proceedings and decisions
- widening the democratic space, through supporting civil society to conduct and advocacy and to build human rights knowledge among youth to increase youth participation in society

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[32] OHCHR in Timor-Leste

- integrating human rights in development, by supporting Government and the UNCT to integrate a human rights-based approach in development and supporting Government and civil society in the area of land and housing;
- strengthening the effectiveness of international human rights mechanisms, through supporting all partners to engage with treaty bodies, the UPR and the Special Procedures, and contribute to implementation of priority recommendations.

To what extent and in what ways has the UNDAF responded the "promise to leave no one behind and appropriately addressed the situation of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, including through measures targeted at reducing inequalities" and other cross-cutting issues reflected in UNDAF? Were specific goals and targets for vulnerable and marginalized people set and if so have they been met?

UNDAF programming is meant to reinforce inclusivity and ensure "*no one is left behind*" in terms of progress towards agreed outcomes. The overall set-up of the current UNDAF is ambitious and involves sixteen UN agencies (twelve located in Dili and four operating from Jakarta), a dozen national ministries and a plethora of stakeholders mentioned in the strategy document (communities including men, women and children, local authorities, civil society organizations). The ET, however, could not determine the extent to which the current UNDAF formulation process was a bottom-up approach. The ET concluded from interviews that the formulation process happened primarily at the national / central level. It is therefore difficult to assess to what extent the UNDAF formulation process has been based on a thorough joint assessment of the situation of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, and may have not gone beyond using individual agency analysis of root causes of development challenges.

Overall, the evaluators could only talk to a few UN staff and one government official who were involved and recalled the UNDAF formulation process carried out in 2014 (over five years ago as of the time of writing). The low number of respondents may be explained by staff turnover both at the UN and the government (three different governments have come and gone in the period from 2015 to 2018). The respondents recalled that discussions were mainly held with central government representatives in Dili during workshops organized by the RCO and that one workshop involved other stakeholders including civil society. This observation is relevant as it may explain why the objectives included in the UNDAF strategy document were formulated at a high – level. It may also explain why the UNDAF results matrix does not appear to contain specific goals or targets for vulnerable and marginalized people (even though the key words are included in the text). For example, sub-outcome 1.1 "*The most disadvantaged groups of women, men and children benefit from gender-responsible and inclusive social protection, social cohesion and behaviour change programmes, including for the prevention and protection of women and children from violence*" contains four indicators, of which one is not gender disaggregated nor measured, one does not have a target although it has a baseline, and all of them are measured from different external sources (not necessarily matching sources, i.e. methodologies may differ and results may not be comparable):

Outcome 1. Social Sector			
1.1 Social Security Sector			
Sub-outcome 1.1. *The most disadvantaged groups of women, men and children benefit from gender-responsible and inclusive social protection, social cohesion and behaviour change programmes, including for the prevention and protection of women and children from violence*			
Indicator	**Base line**	**Target**	**Status as of February 2019**

1.1.1 Number of men, women and children in the most disadvantaged groups benefiting from integrated social protection	Men: 17,245 Women: 24,043 Children: 132,234 (Source: National Directorate of Social Assistance year unspecified)	Men: 19,000 Women: 26,500 Children: 145,500	Men: 52,239 Women: 71,395 154,330 (78,809 boys, and 75,521 girls (Source: National Directorate of Social Assistance 2016)
1.1.2 % of women who agree with at least one specified reason to justify hitting or beating by their husband	86,2% Source: (DHS 2009/2010)	Missing data	80% (Source: Asia Foundation/Nabilan Study 2016) 74% (Source DHS 2016)
1.1.3 % of ever-married women (15 and older) whose husband demonstrates specific types of controlling behaviours	46,8% (Source: DHS 2009/2010)	43,8%	47% of ever-married 15-49 year-old-women whose husband displays 1 out of 5 controlling behaviours (Source: DHS 2016)
1.1.4 Number of men, women and children in the most disadvantaged groups benefiting from integrated social cohesion schemes supported by the UN system (such as community dialogues and other peacebuilding initiatives)	43,389 (Source: Ministry of Social Security and UNDP Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Programme, year unspecified)	25% increase	Missing data

To what extent does the UNDAF contain clearly articulated results (outcome level), indicators for measuring progress, and budgetary resources that reflect UN contributions based on the system's comparative advantage in the country?

The evaluators attempted to answer this question by examining the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems in place within the UNCT. Monitoring is the ongoing and systematic tracking of data or information related to a strategy and/or project. Monitoring data should ideally be analysed and used to inform efforts to learn, manage adaptively, and promote accountability. Monitoring data often takes the form of performance monitoring and context monitoring but can also include complementary monitoring when dynamic contexts or unproven relationships make results unpredictable. M&E systems organize actors, data sources, roles and responsibilities, and reports related to agreed-upon monitoring data.

Throughout the UNDAF implementation, the M&E work group and Agency staff have collected, managed, and reported on a range of data and information to show progress towards objectives. However, this data monitoring exercise was mostly concerned with the Agency level and reporting was done in the framework of their respective country programmes rather than UNDAF. The evaluators concluded that the foundation of the M&E system of the current UNDAF is not a performance management plan/guidance document (detailing the role of each actor, the purpose of each data source, the intended flow of data through the system, etc.). The system instead has evolved around impact and results indicators that are in fact proxies for

tracking progress (e.g. number of laws adopted or drafted, number of policy documents or strategies, etc.) For those indicators that do attempt to capture changes at the level of target populations (e.g. indicator 2.3.2 *"% of rural population using improved sanitation facilities"* or indicator 2.3.3 *"% of basic education schools with access to safe and reliable water supply"*) it is impossible to attribute any reported changes (positive or negative) directly to the UN.

One aspect that the UN staff noted as important for them to document and report was the change in attitude and perceptions with regards to development issues that they have observed in Timor-Leste since the inception of the current UNDAF. Currently the existing M&E system is unable to capture this type of result or change, which, though difficult to quantify, represents how the UN country team has learned about pathways for change or necessary conditions for interventions to succeed (e.g. the role of the Catholic Church in such areas as reproductive health, changes in perception among families with regards to what constitutes healthy nutrition for their children both among mothers and fathers).

The evaluators also note that interviewed UN staff agreed that monitoring data should be used beyond meeting reporting requirements and were keenly aware that the current system (and the indicators included within it) did not capture all information necessary to make strategic decisions about implementation of the UNDAF. While some data is currently collected, the evaluators find that the UN country team is not equipped to analyse or interpret results beyond the implementation of tasks.

4.3 Effectiveness

Were the objectives or outcomes achieved or not? What are the major factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of these objectives?

The evaluators examined effectiveness by looking at the extent to which the UNCT contributed to, or was likely to contribute to achieving the outcomes defined in the UNDAF. Assessing effectiveness of the current UNDAF proved to be a complex task for several reasons.

Measuring these aspects requires several key elements, including the existence of a baseline, impact indicators, as well as some distance in time. In the context of this evaluation, the report cannot provide a straight forward answer to the question on whether or not the objectives and outcomes were achieved. The main reason for that is because both the outcomes and indicators were formulated at a high level and do not allow to establish a direct link. For example, sub-outcome area 3.1 *"Capacity of relevant institutions enhanced to carry out inclusive and sustainable economic policy analysis and programmes for better access to decent employment"* is measured by indicators looking at *"the number of meetings convened regularly and policy changes explicitly reference the Macroeconomic Working Group analytical reports"* (indicator 3.1.1) and *"rate of vulnerable employment in the economy"* (indicator 3.1.3). None of the three indicators attached to sub-outcome 3.1 have been updated in the results matrix and the rate of vulnerable employment was referenced from a census in 2010 and in 2015 (dates prior to the start of current UNDAF implementation).

In addition to systemic limitations within UNCT (for example, the M&E System discussed above), the evaluation identified several external factors that hinder outcome realization.

Firstly, frequent changes in government, the absence of key ministers still awaiting appointment at the moment of writing this report (e.g. primary health care, strategic health

development, finance, state administration, education, youth and sports, social solidarity and public works), and capacity constraints within the line ministries have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the current UNDAF. Although knowledge generation activities take place regularly and are at the core of the UNDAF design, the results framework does not contain indicators to measure the actual effect of these interventions.

Secondly, the UNDAF addresses a range of complex issues within an implementation period that is too short to see effective change, in particular when change refers to attitudes and practices (e.g. "*an effective and efficient justice system*", sub-outcome 4.1 or "*public sector oversight, accountability and transparency*", sub-outcome area 4.2).

Whether or not the activities have reached their intended outcomes is therefore less clear. If the measure we use to gauge this aspect refers to the number of actions undertaken by individual UN Agencies under each outcome area and refers to outcomes as deliverables (e.g. laws or regulations adopted, seminars or meetings organized, number of participants, publications, etc.) then effectiveness ranks high. If, on the other hand, the intention is to assess 'intangible' outcomes such as levels of awareness, or capacity, or shifts in attitudes and behaviour, that would be impossible to do within the current results framework.

What are the collaborative advantages of the UN organizations to contribute to the achievement of development objectives in Timor-Leste? How have the UN agencies used these to support the implementation of the UNDAF?

The UNCT's primary comparative advantage in Timor-Leste is its close and trusted relationship with government agencies at all levels of society. The UN is perceived as having a crucial role to play in channelling resources towards the SDGs, but this can only be achieved if meaningful and strategic partnerships are developed outside the UNCT. The UN system defines partnerships for the SDGs as follows: "*Partnerships for sustainable development are multi-stakeholder initiatives voluntarily undertaken by Governments, intergovernmental organizations, major groups and other stakeholders, which efforts are contributing to the implementation of inter-governmentally, agreed development goals and commitments*".[33]

Therefore, the opportunities for, and added value of, the UN lie in bringing together partners, training and recruiting experts and strong leadership, scaling up technical capacities and advisory roles, measuring impact, boosting data collection and analysis, sharing knowledge, as well as other operational comparative advantages. This evaluation acknowledges the efforts deployed by multiple UN Agencies to work collectively in order to deliver more than the sum of their individual inputs. UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, WFP, FAO, WHO and UN Women have between them implemented several joint initiatives mainly in the areas of health, education and nutrition. Collaboration with local civil society organizations happens mainly through grant schemes, in which local NGOs are beneficiaries. In terms of partnerships with the private sector, the current UNDAF does not contain any. This could be explained by the absence of major private sector companies located in Timor-Leste and the low capacity of local non-governmental organizations.

What system and tools exist for monitoring implementation of the UNDAF? What challenges have been experienced in ongoing monitoring of UNDAF implementation and what improvements could be made?

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[33]UN "Maximising the impact of partnerships for the SDGs: A practical guide to partnership value creation"

The main tool that exists for monitoring implementation of the UNDAF is the UNDAF results matrix. Some of the challenges faced by the M&E working group were discussed in the section above. Here the report looks at the availability of data or lack thereof as one of the main factors hindering monitoring of implementation. The revision of UNDAF indicators by the UNCT revealed that out of fifty-four indicators included in the results matrix, thirty-four were used for reporting and on average sixty-five percent of data required to access progress was available (data availability ranged from zero to one hundred percent, Table 6).

Table 6. Summary of UNDAF results matrix indicators and availability of data as of March 2019[34]

Outcome	Sub-outcome/sector	Number of indicators	Indicator reported	Data available to assess progress
Social Sector	Social Security	4	3	75%
	Education	2	2	100%
	Health	3	3	100%
	Environment and resilience	2	2	100%
	Youth	3	3	100%
Infrastructure Sector	Environment-resilient infrastructure	4	4	100%
	Rural roads access	2	2	100%
	Water and Sanitation	3	2	67%
Economic Sector	Sustainable economic policy analysis and programmes	3	0	0%
	Viable and sustainable agribusiness and value chains	3	1	33%
	Rural resilience, livelihoods and food security	4	1	25%
	Skilled workforce	2	0	0%
	Business environment	5	2	40%
Governance Sector	Justice	3	3	100%
	Accountability and transparency of institution	3	2	67%
	Decentralized institutions	4	2	50%
	Data and evidence-based policy	2	2	100%
Total		**52**	**34**	**65%**

The M&E working group acknowledges that the next UNDAF cycle could make more use of national statistics as a source for data (as opposed to external surveys and data collection exercises conducted either as part of projects or by international development partners), which could also contribute to enhancing the national system by working with them and assisting them in data collection, for example. The M&E working group also noted that project-based indicators should be avoided considering that any project situation evolves fast and does not

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[34] This table was updated during the internal review process in September 2017. The RCO circulated the results matrix, including this table, for updates in March 2019. However, no updates were made to the table. Therefore, the assumption is that the situation as assessed in September 2017 has not changed.

necessarily gauge improvements or change at the sector level. Finally, all those interviewed conceded that formulating SMART indicators[35] specifying the UN agency, which would take the lead to monitor and update status, would constitute good practice.

Indeed, an essential problem in assessing effectiveness and UNDAF's contribution towards achieving stated outcomes lies in how we measure it. The current UNDAF puts a lot of emphasis on capacity development across priority areas and stakeholders. How, then, do we measure knowledge advancement or change in attitudes? We often do so based on a set of simple-to-track indicators, but investigation of these reveals that this may lead to erroneous conclusions.

The problem with the current results and reporting framework is that it relies on indicators that take highly dimensional phenomena and represent them in a low-dimensional way. Complex systemic outcomes like "*children, youth and adults benefit from inclusive and quality education at all levels in an equitable manner*" (sub-outcome 1.2) or "*the population of Timor-Leste, in particular the most excluded, benefit from equal access to quality health and nutrition services and behaviour change promotion interventions*" (sub-outcome 1.3) are collapsed into a single dimension, which are sometimes then measured in rudimentary ways because of data collection limitations. For example, can the net school enrolment rate (indicator 1.2.1) or literacy rate (indicator 1.2.2) really gauge the quality of the education that was acquired as a result of activities? Could the number of policies or strategic plans drafted or endorsed (indicator 1.3.1 and indicator 2.3.1, for example) really speak to behaviour change and equal access to quality healthcare in particular of those most excluded? Form often trumps function, and like in nature, low-capacity organizations camouflage: pretending to meet requirements instead of actually meeting them. Thus, the quality of capacities developed and knowledge transferred does not make improvements despite investment.

The problem with using progress indicators (e.g. number of policies drafted or the number of graduates from training institutions) is that we tend to assume that progress on any of the indicators leads to benefits overall, and that progress under any of the UNDAF indicators is increasing the overall achievement of an outcome. Yet, this is not always the case. Indeed, improvements in some dimensions may convey no benefit at all if they do not reach a certain threshold. For example, if the Ministry of Health which received support in developing legislation is unable to apply it in a consistent manner, or convey it to their collects (e.g. as a cascading effect from the national to the district level) the knowledge acquired is lost and may be compared to a half measure.

4.4 Efficiency

Efficiency refers to the use of resources (financial and human) deployed to achieve the results.

This evaluation did not include a financial audit or inspection of accounting documents, and the findings are based on feedback received from UN staff. In principle, the funding that was made available was adequate and sufficient to implement the planned activities. Since 2018, with the arrival of the new Resident Coordinator, efforts have been made to keep track of delivery rates and resource mobilization. Table 7 below summarises the information that was available at the time of writing. The evaluators note, however, that the rates are provided by

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[35] The acronym "SMART" summarizes key criteria, asking "Is the indicator specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and trackable?" See, for example, "Result Based Management in UNDP: Selecting Indicators"

individual Agency and do not refer to UNDAF outcomes or objectives. The overview also indicates that funding is linked to projects or core vs non-core funding[36] for each Agency and reflects the different approaches (for example, project based vs. programme based).

Table 7. UN Agencies Delivery rates 2017 and plan for 2018 with RM achieved in 2017 and plan for 2018[37]

UN Agency	Delivery Rates (achievement)		Resource Mobilization		Remarks
	2017	2018	2017	2018	
WFP	$14.630.442	$16.972.701	$13.783.739	-	Development Project DEV 200770 (2015–2017), approved budget USD 13.8 million. Immediate Response Emergency Operation (for El Nino) (October 2016–March 2017), approved budget USD 0.847 million. Delivery target year 2018 is for a three years duration of (1 Jan 2018 - 31 Dec 2020).
UNDP	$10.800.000	$12.700.000	$10.600.000	$8.900.000	-
UNFPA	$1.987.000			$1.017.895	95% delivery rates achieved in 2017 out of allocation US$1.987 million. Funds consists of Core and Non-core budget allocation. RM for 2018 also have additional of 1.2 million core funding. UNFPA aiming to reach a target of 97-100% implementation in 2018.
WHO	$9.222.200	$1.055.279	$9.429.381	$ 6,192, 210	Biennial work plan for 2016-2017, the resources was raised in the amount of $ 9,429,381 and the expenditure was USD 9,222,200 (98%). For the 2018-2019 biennium WHO has mobilized resources in the amount of USD 6,192, 210 till

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[36] "Core" funding refers to un-earmarked funding that is used at the sole discretion of the respective UN Agency and its governing board, and "non-core" funding means earmarked funding that is directed by donors towards specific locations, themes, activities and / or operations.
[37] Source : RCO, April 2019

					date and have utilized USD 1,055,279 (17%) till date.
UN Women	$1.218.698	$2.070.000	$2.000.558	$360.000	Delivery rate in 2017 was 83% out of $2,000,558. Included $378,00 Core and $840,698 non-core. Target of delivery rates in 2018 also included $360,000 for RM.
UNICEF	$8.115.937	$5.677.676	-	-	In-pipeline funds not included.
ILO	$2.793.589	$5.799.224	-	-	Project TLS/16/03/AUS
	$391.258	$3.584.519	-	-	Project TLS/16/02/EU
	$106.301	$126.524	-	-	Project TLS/15/50/PRT - *Total delivery rates in 2017 is 99.6% from all projects.*
FAO	$2.000.000	$5.000.000	-	-	The delivery target gradually increased each year with new projects in the pipeline, and through more intensive RM efforts.
UNESCO	$77.548	$86.822	-	-	Extrabudgetary budget - total of ongoing multi-year projects is $2,679,490 and expenditure (2017) $635,505.74. UNESCO budget consists of Regular Budget & Extrabudgetary Budget.
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISER'S UNIT	$344.839	$ 346,524	-	-	-

With regard to human resources, the evaluator notes two diverging views. On the one hand, it has been observed that the RC's Office is understaffed. The RCO has two full time national employees (one Head of Office and one Assistant). The positions of Communications Specialist and Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist were vacant at the time of writing, although the office benefits from the expertise of a Data Specialist (who joined the team in January 2018) and a Communications Advisor (who joined the team in April 2019, previously this function was executed by an intern). It has been remarked that the RC's Office is not working in isolation and the M&E specialists working at the Agencies could provide support (for example, through the M&E working group). Either way, it is clear that the RCO would benefit from full-time professional support in particular in the areas of Communication and M&E.

To what extent does the UNDAF demonstrate a complementary and coordinated approach by the UNDS (United Nations Development System), including consideration of joint programming and common positions on situations of concern? Are UNDAF priorities sufficiently targeted to maximize efficiency?

The current UNDAF contains several successful examples of joint collaborations. Such synergies have arguably resulted in greater efficiency in interventions as many of the governmental respondents recognized the UN's ability to mobilize its body of knowledge to provide multisectoral approach. Notable examples include joint collaborations between UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, FAO, and WHO in the areas of health, education and nutrition, and between the HRAU, ILO, UNICEF, WHO, UN Women, UNDP and UNFPA in the area of disability rights. In principle, such collaborations should reduce transaction costs, by streamlining, harmonizing and cutting out duplication. In practice however, UN staff interviewees pointed that there is a potential reduction in transaction cost for the government, while at UN level, it tends to increase. Harmonizing the intervention across UN agencies requires transaction costs, e.g. in terms of staff attendance in meetings and joint planning, as well as use of resources (such as cars and equipment).

Under the current UNDAF, the UN Agencies in the country did not employ joint programming, and complementarity and co-ordination of approaches happened to a limited extent for two main reasons. Firstly, the UNDAF priorities are not sufficiently targeted to maximize efficiency. As discussed in the sections above, the UNDAF wording of outcomes and objectives is all encompassing and could refer to the work of multiple agencies. Outcome 1 alone, targeting the Social Sector and including sub-outcomes referring to education, health, social security, environment, resilience, and youth, could by itself be the object of a separate UNDAF and overall touches upon the core mandates of all thirteen UN Agencies based in Timor – Leste. Ensuring complementarity and co-ordination appears to be difficult under such circumstances.

Secondly, under all outcome areas, the general low levels of local technical and managerial competence in the country also caused efficiency concerns. In the absence of a M&E system that efficiently monitors and track progress at the UNDAF level, it was difficult for the evaluation team to make the link between uses of resources and outcomes from the project level to the country programme level to the UN Agency level and how it all fits into the UNDAF use of resources and achievement of outcomes.

The evaluators note that while both government and UN staff, alike, see the added-value of UN contribution, more work is required to bring the UN to its expected level of efficiency in an UNDAF environment. UNDAF is potentially a viable mechanism for reducing duplication, increasing value for money, and obtaining efficiency gains as a result of working more closely together between agencies and with government. However, the current UNDAF in Timor-Leste does not allow this evaluation to draw more nuanced conclusions in that respect.

To what extent does the UNDAF underpin the UN transparency and accountability to beneficiaries of assistance, including through clear mechanisms for accountability?

Although the evaluation does not doubt the commitment of the RC and the UN country team as a whole to render UNDAF results accountable, the evaluators encountered evidence of lapse in the performance of these functions. Figure 4 below presents the key UNDAF structures and

mechanisms that should normally be in place to ensure the communication and feedback loop on a regular basis. The red crosses in the diagram indicate lack thereof in Timor-Leste under the current UNDAF.

Figure 4. UNDAF Governance Structures and Feedback Loop

According to the few interviewees who participated in the formulation of the current UNDAF, the Joint Steering Group (JSG) met several times in 2014. It was comprised of high-level officials from the national ministries working in the sectors identified in the four outcome areas, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and heads of UN Agencies in Dili. The JSG was never convened during the implementation period (2015 – 2020). At the level of UNCT, the following working groups (WGs) have been set up: Programme Management Unit, Monitoring and Evaluation, Human Rights and Gender, Communications. The WGs meet several times a year and involve mainly UN staff at the operational level (programme and project managers, policy officers).

Coordination around the UNDAF after its launch is essentially done around the preparation of the annual work plan and annual progress reports, which were never conducted in Timor-Leste. According to the UNDAF guidelines, "*the annual review process is where the UNCT primarily engages with government and other partners to review overall progress towards results, and takes stock of lessons and best practices that feed into the annual planning processes and commitments for the coming year*". This is a once-a-year opportunity for all agencies and national partners to interact and review the collective contribution of the UN to national priorities based on the UNDAF. Based on evidence gathered from individual interviews with UN staff, government and civil society, it became evident that the UNDAF did not continue as a living strategy for long after its signature in September 2015. This also means that there was no regular and effective coordination with the government or any other stakeholders.

Based on interviews, one of the main limitations stems from the fact that the UN agencies are independent entities with their own governance structures, mandates and institutional cultures. This evaluation concluded that individual agencies remained the primary unit of accountability for performance and management. While there was a subsidiary accountability between them,

the principal accountability remained within each agency. The UNCT struggled to develop a common approach under the brand of UNDAF. Some agencies struggle to accept that UNDAF refers to overall achievements and seek to see achievements categorized per agency rather than jointly under the heading of outcome areas or sub-sectors. The Resident Coordinator provides strategic leadership throughout the implementation process, but due to internal rotation the RC changed in 2018. He also does not have enough staff to carry out these duties (see above).

While several UNDAF co-ordination structures have been established in 2016 (M&E, Programme Management Group, thematic groups on gender, human rights, and communication), in practice, however, with the UNDAF losing life and vigour, these structures declined in activity.
In regards to the M&E, although the group maintains its membership and holds occasional meetings, it has not been successful in generating results information and in reporting on UNDAF performance to the UNCT on a regular basis. This may be explained by the fact that the M&E group was established before the Programme Managing Team (PMT). As PMT is established now, the role of M&E is to support PMT. Once this evaluation was launched, the group responded positively and agreed to discuss challenges and limitations to their work.

One other reason for lack of results-focus reporting in this UNDAF could be the fact that there wasn't enough demand for information about UNDAF performance (e.g. from within the UNCT or from the government) which could have triggered UNDAF results to be tracked and reported. Had annual UNDAF reviews been carried out, that would have generated a regular flow of information to the UNCT and national stakeholders.

The UNCT also appears to lack a clear knowledge sharing strategy. For example, the UN in Timor-Leste website has only recently become fully operational (December 2018) and does not yet include all updates on activities and progress, as well as to other materials produced with the UN support (or links to UN Agencies' websites where that information is published). Some respondents noted that "*it wasn't easy to find the website*" and government representatives the evaluators interviewed "*were not aware of the website*".

4.5 Sustainability

Sustainability was analysed by looking at the extent to which results achieved and strategies used by the UNDAF are likely to continue (i) as a contribution to national development and (ii) in terms of the added value of UNDAF for cooperation among individual AFPs.

Has UNDAF enabled innovative approaches embedded in institutional learning for national capacity development (government, civil society and NGOs) to enable these actors to continue achieving positive results without the UN/development partners' support?

The UN Development Group defines innovative approaches as "*practices that 'disrupt' business as usual, encourage change in the search for ever greater effectiveness, and identify new ways of doing things which could be of wide benefit*"[38]. Examples of innovations include using "*big data*" generated by mobile and online communications inform early warning systems for rising food prices or addressing economic inequalities through social venture incubators for initiatives, which are conceived, designed and led by the beneficiaries themselves to tackle societal challenges (e.g. young people).

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[38] UNDP (2015) Helen Clark's statement

UNDAF in Timor-Leste has followed a more traditional development approach in that the main avenues for co-operation are centred around technical assistance usually provided by hired consultants (both international and local). This finding has to be seen in the context of the country and the fact that the current UNDAF is the first ever focusing entirely on development (and hence moving away from humanitarian assistance).

The evaluation could not identify national 'champions' that would maintain UNDAF momentum and achievements after the end of the current Framework (or rather of the interventions that are implemented as part of it). Even though the government enjoys an excellent working relationship with the UN and appears to be a strong advocate for its interventions, limited resources and co-ordination are very likely to curtail these intentions in the long term.

Have complementarities, collaborations and /or synergies fostered by UNDAF contributed to greater sustainability of results of Development partners and Government interventions in the country?

By its design UNDAF only provides the overall framework. UN staff interviewed acknowledged that internal co-ordination "*could have been better"* and more efforts should have been made in executing a more comprehensive, interlinked and coherent UNDAF. Some respondents noted that UNDAF is to a certain extent "*a repackaging of existing agency projects*", which is not necessarily a negative thing. However, the vertical links between the Framework outputs and objectives on the one hand and the individual interventions carried out by the Agencies on the other hand could have been improved in view of avoiding the impression of a patchwork of activities. Overall, the impression is that interventions are treated in a stand-alone mode rather than as part of a comprehensive approach (i.e. the focus appears to be on "getting things done" rather than "getting things done in a sequential and coherent way").

For example, it is unclear how the UNDAF interventions fit into the bigger development picture and how they interact with other donor-supported initiatives beyond information sharing during the sector working group meetings (which include the EU, USAID, the World Bank, bilateral programmes funded by the Australian Government, other agencies in the country). Interlocutors from the government mentioned overlapping initiatives in some sectors (e.g. studies carried out by consultancy firms in the education, health and infrastructure sectors) and at times were confused as to which actions were carried out under which project or with support of which partner.

Therefore, it is unclear the extent to which UNDAF contributed to sustainability of results. Given the lack of accountability structures, absence of annual reviews and regular meetings with the government stakeholders as part of the Joint Steering Committee, it is unlikely that the extent of that is big.

Does the UNDAF respond to the challenges of national capacity development and promote ownership of programmes?

One of the main challenges mentioned by respondents (both UN staff but also some government staff) was the weakness of national institutions in following through. The process

largely depends on the people in charge and there were many instances when it was reversed once the staff in question were no longer employed.

The weak national ownership of the UNDAF coupled with the emerging but not strong enough capacities at the national level are likely to be the biggest challenge to the sustainability of results. UNDAF's success relies on the commitment and actions of its stakeholders. While mid and long- term sustainability may be questionable due to the government inability to replicate results, it can be argued that the UNDAF has fostered short term sustainability by increasing the ability of the government to deal with the challenges it faces through its technical support, advocacy role and by equipping the government with evidence-based information. There is a potential risk that country programmes of individual agencies run the risks of decreased donors' interest due to the fact that some funds may be allocated to direct budget support (e.g. the EU).

4. Conclusions

Overall, the UNCT in Timor-Leste has been successful in implementing a range of initiatives in the UNDAF outcome areas. The UN agencies deployed a wide range of expertise aimed at strengthening the capacities of national and district level institutions as well as of communities and individuals in all the UNDAF sectors. The UN assistance in Timor-Leste has strengthened governance, justice and rule of law, has increased access of the poor and other vulnerable groups to basic services and more sustainable livelihoods.

Despite achievements at the implementation level, the evaluation notes that the current UNDAF did not serve its purpose as joint platform to engage with the government of Timor-Leste. This may be explained by the frequent changes in government from 2015 to 2018, but also by the lack of mechanisms that should normally provide opportunities for regular dialogue and overview. The current UNDAF did not act as a vehicle for the UN to leverage its comparative advantages and act as a convener between the government and donors in the mobilization of resources. In Timor-Leste, UN Agencies continue pursing individual rather than collective strategies in fundraising.

Strong leadership and commitment on behalf of both the UNCT and government are critical to the successful implementation of any UNDAF. The formulation process of the current UNDAF in Timor-Leste was successfully concluded with the signature of the UNDAF strategy document by the government and the UNCT in September 2015. However, shortly after launching implementation, and for the reasons explained above, the use of UNDAF as an overarching strategy declined and UNDAF ended "on the shelf". This is particularly relevant in the current context of Timor-Leste where the UN's role as a major player in the political and economic evolution of the country faces increasing challenges. Although the UN still has considerable weight in the country, it may not hold the same leverage as before December 2012 (after the mandate of the UN peace mission came to an end). Its recourses are not sufficient to exercise the influence it had previously exercised as other actors enter the arena.

Effective co-ordination requires investment of resources such as time and staff. Given their separate mandates, history of autonomy and of bearing responsibility for mobilizing their own resources, the cost for UN agencies involved in joint programme initiatives may understandably be high. It may be procedurally easier and ultimately cheaper at times to implement initiatives independently rather than merge with other agencies. This challenge cannot be tackled at the country level alone. Nevertheless, the evaluation notes the successful examples of joint initiatives implemented under the current UNDAF.

The evaluation acknowledges the efforts made by the UN agencies in Timor-Leste to join forces in setting up a regular monitoring and evaluation framework. The M&E working group and the initiatives undertaken by the RC and several agencies within the UNCT (e.g. UNICEF, UN Women, WFP) at organizing internal reviews with regard to allocation of resources (both human and financial), the usability of UNDAF indicators, and the relevance of chosen priorities are commendable. Nevertheless, the M&E system for the current UNDAF is not functioning properly to generate information on results in formats that are useful for reporting. The absence of annual reviews of UNDAF limited the opportunities to learn and share with the government and development partners. UN Agencies practice and succeed in institutionalizing results-based planning and monitoring at their individual levels. This should help the learning and adaptation process at the UNDAF level to institutionalize results-based reporting for UNCT as a whole.

5. Recommendations

This section makes suggestions building on the lessons learnt from the current UNDAF that could be implemented for the next UNDAF cycle.

Recommendation 1: Adopt a stronger leadership role. The UN's strong brand and its ability to work with multiple government institutions are important comparative advantages—especially since these relationships, and the legitimacy they bring, are important in the development context of Timor-Leste. In that sense, the UN in Timor-Leste could consider assisting the government, in particular the Prime Minister's office in coordinating the various initiatives related to the SDP and Agenda 2030 by reviving the donor co-ordination group at the national level. On a higher strategic level, this role could be played by the RCO. On the sectoral level, individual Agencies are already taking the lead.

Recommendation 2: Build a permanent and regular dialogue with stakeholders. The UN has a considerable weight in the country and should use it. The UNDAF could amplify the UN voice, in particular with regard to how the UN benefits the people of Timor-Leste, facilitate the dialogue with the government and serve as a mapping tool for fundraising. For the next UNDAF cycle, it is suggested that RCO set up the following mechanisms for regular exchange of information, review and dialogue with government and non-government stakeholders:

- Set up a Joint Steering Group. The JSG could be composed of government ministers and of all the resident UN organizations in Timor-Leste. The JSG should meet regularly, once at the beginning of the year to approve the annual joint work plans and funding allocations, and once at the end to review progress of the previous year and to make any adjustments required to achieve better results.
- Set up Results Working Groups one for each results / outcome area of the new UNDAF. Each of the RWGs has as co-conveners a senior government representative (e.g. Director General) and a senior UN agency staff member, and is composed of staff from the relevant government ministries and UN agencies. RWGs prepare the integrated annual work-plans (specific actions, no high-level objectives), meet quarterly to review progress and produce an annual progress review.
- Develop an easy to track monitoring and evaluation tool, which could include a few specific indicators linked to the ToC results chain under each objective. Rely on own capacities to collect data rather than external secondary sources over which there is limited control.
- These efforts could be underpinned by better knowledge management and sharing within the UN but also with external stakeholders (e.g. creation of intranet or shared drive where the latest progress reports and other information would be available to all UN staff).

Recommendation 3: Dedicate full-time staff to manage the UNDAF process. Many of the weaknesses of the current UNDAF identified by this evaluation also stem from the fact that the RCO lacked sufficient human resources to meet the needs. RCO has struggled to foster a complex collaboration among a large number of actors (both UN and external) without an adequate budget or full-time capacity. At the time of the writing, it has been noted that by the end of 2019, RCO in Timor-Leste will benefit from the expertise of a full time M&E specialist and a communication expert. This should strengthen the RCO's position and ensure it has full-time capacity with a dedicated budget to manage the UNDAF process, to guide its development

and maintenance, to promote areas of co-ordination and joint programming, to ensure all agencies have an appropriate role, reconcile differences and build a sense of common purpose.

Recommendation 4: Build a Theory of Change. It is recommended that the next UNDAF be built on a credible and feasible theory of change, developed as a result of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) currently under way and expected to be finalised by end of 2019, informed by what is doable in Timor-Leste and accepted by the government. It is also recommended that the TOC be reviewed and updated on a regular basis, i.e. during the annual UNDAF reviews and the mid-term external evaluation, for example.

Recommendation 5: Place the SDGs at the core of the new UNDAF. UNCT has conducted a comprehensive SDG mapping exercise linking current UNDAF outcome areas and sub-areas to objectives, types of support provided (e.g. capacity development, systemic change, providing services) and responsible Agencies. SDG targets and indicators are not formally referenced in the current UNDAF as the strategy document was developed in 2013– 2014 prior to the official launching of Agenda 2030, although the objectives reflect the SDGs. The new UNDAF could do a similar exercise and use national targets for SDGs as indicators for reporting on UNDAF progress and achievements. This could be followed by matching the SDGs with UN Agencies expertise and identifying the areas for intervention, focusing on joint interventions. This would give the SDGs the prominence the UN System wants them to have and, simultaneously, orient the UN programming in Timor-Leste fully towards Agenda 2030[39].The UNCT could also use Timor-Leste's SDG Roadmap[40] and Voluntary National Report (expected by mid-2019) to identify SDG priority areas for the next period (2021 – 2025). A mapping exercise linking current UNDAF outcomes, SDGs and UN Agencies has been conducted in early 2019. This should be used for the next UNDAF cycle.

Recommendation 6: Explore innovative approaches for collaboration. The new UNDAF presents the opportunity to discuss the possibility of engaging with the private sector and civil society (both underdeveloped and little engaged at the moment). In practical terms, these partnerships need to be meaningful for the UN (from a strategic and development standpoint), beneficial to the country's goals and ultimately appealing to the private sector too. Moving from UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to UN Development Assistance Partnership (UNDAP) could be one way forward. Setting up a government – led SDG platform to which all development actors and CQO in the country can contribute (regardless of the sector) is another option. Engaging with the private sector (e.g. social enterprises) and exploring alternative ways of financing (e.g. Green Bonds) is another.[41] Lastly, the next UNDAF should have the needs of the young population in its focus given Timor-Leste's demographics.

Recommendation 7: Move towards joint programming. The desk review and interviews with KIIs showed that joint initiatives implemented under the current UNDAF have been largely successful and benefited from support from both the UN and government. In view of preparing the new UNDAF, it is worth exploring the areas that would benefit from joint programming, such as addressing the complex needs of rural populations; supporting income

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[39] For an example of localizing the Agenda 2030 see UN DOCO (2018) "Localizing the SDG Agenda 2030 in Colombia"
[40] Timor-Leste's SDG Roadmap for the Implementation of Agenda 2030
[41] For more information on alternative ways of financing the SDGs see UN DOCO (2018) "Good Practices from Early Adopters"

generation opportunities in rural areas, health and nutrition, education. These could also be the stepping stones for a more co-ordinated UNDAF.

Recommendation 8: Be mindful of smaller agencies. The UNDAF formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation process requires an effort from all agencies, large and small. Attention should be paid to ensuring that the process is an inclusive one, reflective of the differences among agencies (e.g. presence in the country, size, expertise and resources). Agencies' contributions should be commensurate with their resources and the obligations they have in the country. The evaluation ream suggests that agencies identify the areas they want to be involved in. It may not be feasible for one agency to be involved in all the different UNDAF processes. The recommendation is for RCO to ensure that staff from these agencies have access to the decisions taken without having to directly participate in meetings. The RCO could also develop a platform (e.g. dedicated intranet site or common drive) for communication and sharing of information on ongoing processes, which could also become part of the knowledge transfer and corporate history / handover in case of staff turnover.

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