



**EVALUATION  
OF  
SOUTH SUDAN INTERIM COOPERATION FRAMEWORK (ICF)  
(2016-2018)**

**EVALUATION REPORT  
(7 July 2018)**

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## A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in South Sudan developed the Interim Cooperation Framework (2016 – 2017) as a successor framework to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012 – 2016. Implementation of the latter had been characterised by continuous adjustments in response to the country's worsening political and economic context during the period 2011 to 2015. The UNCT decided to develop a two-year interim framework, when the Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in August 2015, giving new hope for regaining momentum towards development.

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the final evaluation of the ICF, which was undertaken by a team of two independent evaluators during the period 19 March to 21 May 2018. The evaluation was based on analysis of secondary and primary data collected from various sources, including review of ICF annual reports, relevant UN agency files and reports; interviews with key informants, including management and programme staff of UN agencies, government counterparts at national, state and county level, civil society groups and community stakeholders; and field visit to Aweil.

### Country Context

South Sudan has been engulfed in ongoing conflict since its independence in 2011, with the most violent outbreaks occurring in December 2013 and July 2016. From 2013 to 2015, what had begun as a high-level conflict between leaders who belonged to different ethnic groups intensified the ethnic divisions, and the armed groups became increasingly and openly defined by ethnicity and links to local ethnic groups. In 2015, the international community pressured regional actors to withdraw their support for the opposing factions and rally behind a concerted peace effort, resulting in the Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS).

The conflict has had a very negative impact on the population, especially women and children, which is marked by displacement, hunger and disease. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *'nearly 4.3 million people – one in three South Sudanese – have been displaced, including more than 1.8 million who are internally displaced and about 2.5 million who are in neighbouring countries'*. Consequently, South Sudan's population has one of the highest poverty incidence in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the 2016 Human Development Report, 89.3 percent of the population are multi-dimensionally poor while an additional 8.5 percent live near multidimensional poverty.

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The Government did not develop a new national framework when the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) expired in 2016. When the ARCSS was signed in 2015, the UNCT developed the ICF 2016 – 2017 as an interim framework for the UN, *‘to provide the basis for UN support for development during the transitional period’*. The ICF emphasised resilience, recovery and peacebuilding, and comprised five outcome areas:

- 1) Enhancing the resilience of communities.
- 2) Strengthening social services for the most vulnerable,
- 3) Strengthening peace and governance,
- 4) Reinvigoration of the local economy, and
- 5) Improvement of the status of women and youth.

### Summary of key findings

Two findings highlighted the **relevance** of the ICF, which was found to be aligned to the global Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, and responded to the needs of the most vulnerable groups.

#### *The government has no capacity to provide social services, and the UN has filled the gap by responding to the needs of the most vulnerable groups.*

Government capacity to deliver basic services has declined along with the quality of life for its population, which, according to the Human Development Report 2016, South Sudan’s Human Development Index (HDI) decreased by 2.5 percent from 0.429 to 0.418, between 2010 and 2015; while it’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita decreased by about 36.4 percent over the same period. An analysis of sectoral budget allocations done by one UN agency noted that *“...in average terms, the total resources budgeted for allocation to the core development sectors viz. education, health and infrastructure, increased marginally from 3.1 percent in 2013/14 to 4.3 percent in 2014/15. When compared to the allocations made to the security sector, it is evident that the government continues to disproportionately restrict resource allocation for development which in turn is a binding constraint on its ability to deliver basic social service to the citizens”*.

#### *UN agencies combined humanitarian action with development support while responding to immediate needs of vulnerable groups.*

While the country continued to experience a growing humanitarian crisis, UN agencies delivered a total of US\$ 119.4 million and \$159.8 million in 2016 and 2017 respectively for recovery, resilience and peacebuilding support as development work continued in accessible areas.

With regards to **effectiveness**, the evaluation found that progress towards expected results varied across the outcomes, and highlighted six key findings.

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***The country lacks reliable data to measure progress at outcome level, but the UN made notable progress in its normative work.***

UN agencies had difficulty measuring ICF results at outcome level as noted in a UNESCO report “South Sudan still lacks reliable basic economic and social statistics, reflecting a legacy of decades of civil war and the challenges associated with state and institution building.” However, the UN contributed to analytical work in South Sudan, and most of the data that is available is from surveys done by UN agencies, including for example, studies to better understand resilience to shocks that impact food insecurity and malnutrition in South Sudan. The UN also made progress on its advocacy for development, resulting in the emerging consensus among development partners that resilience building is critical to provide sustainability and an exit strategy for humanitarian action; and also that engagement with government was unavoidable, and therefore some resources had to be allocated towards institutional capacity development for sustainability of interventions.

***The country’s constrained political and socio-economic environment limited the potential impact of the UN’s contribution towards building resilience***

In a Joint News Note in February 2018, the UN warned that “...more than 7 million people in South Sudan – almost two-thirds of the population – could become severely food insecure in the coming months without sustained humanitarian assistance and access”. However, the UN continued to provide support in accessible communities, resulting in improved community ability to cope with shocks, as measured by the resilience of coping strategy index (rCSI) and asset-based CSI in the targeted communities. UN agencies also provided normative support, including:

- 👉 Resilience system analysis for Greater Bahr el Ghazal;
- 👉 Development of two food security and nutrition monitoring systems;
- 👉 Four Integrated Food Security Phase classification (IPC) reports;
- 👉 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) assessment;
- 👉 Analysis on impact of conflict on the livestock sector;

***Lack of credible data constrained objective assessment of contribution to social service outcomes.***

Notable progress was made in maternal, newborn and child health; immunization; combating Malaria, Tuberculosis, (TB) and HIV; and sector-wide system strengthening, such as for example rehabilitation of health infrastructure and training of frontline health service providers. In addition the UN supported development of policies and guidelines to strengthen health delivery system, including, *inter alia*, (i) National Health Policy, (ii) Quality Assurance Framework for Health Sciences Institutes, (iii) Policy on adolescent and youth Sexual and Reproductive Health,

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(iv) System for forecasting and monitoring Reproductive Health commodities, and (v) review of Logistics Management Information System tools.

However, in 2017 the UN reported that “...the outcome area faced a number of challenges (in 2017) including a worsened humanitarian situation, insecurity, high turnover of staff and increased costs of delivering basic services. These challenges have significantly limited agencies’ capacity to plan and deliver services that focus on system building and strengthening”.

***Funding support for development programmes was impacted by donor perceptions that government lacks political will to implement the peace agreement.***

The UN strategy was to ‘support the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) to strengthen institutions, systems and processes to enhance good governance, peace and security and stronger and more resilient state-society relations to help reduce the risk of regression into active conflict, and to peacefully resolve political differences.’ However, lack of progress on the peace agreement led to strained relations between the government and its bilateral donors.

***The ICF design lacked a clear pathway towards the expected outcome for empowering women and youth.***

The UNCT did not allocate dedicated results towards outcome 5 and decided instead that the outcome would be mainstreamed across the other four outcomes. However, the Outcome Group experienced difficulties with reporting on progress since they did not have control over the activities that were undertaken under the other outcomes. This was later corrected in 2017, when the UNCT decided that all ICF projects that met the requirements for Gender Marker 3 and Youth Index 2 would be reported under Outcome 5, with attendant resources reflected under the outcome.

***Implementation of the UN’s core values and standards varied across the outcomes.***

***Human-rights based approaches.*** UN agencies implemented projects specifically addressing human rights issues, while at the same time, mainstreaming human rights approaches in other projects.

***Gender equality.*** Although the targeted quota for 30 percent women beneficiaries was largely achieved, some of the reports lacked disaggregated data.

***Sustainable environment.*** The ICF contained specific outputs for sustainable environmental management, including establishment and review of national policies, strategies and action plans to support sustainable management of natural resources and improve livelihoods.

***Results-based Management.*** Overall, the design, implementation and monitoring of the ICF reflected RBM principles with indicators, baseline data and clear targets. However, some of the baseline data was national, whereas end line data was available only for the targeted areas in

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which UN interventions were implemented. This presented evaluation challenges with regards to “before-after” comparison.

**Capacity development.** The limitation imposed by bilateral donors with regard to engagement with central government affected the level of capacity development that UN agencies could do. In addition, as noted in the 2017 annual report, ‘...key policies have been developed, but their implementation often remains on hold due to decreased government capacities’.

*There is high Inter-agency collaboration through the established coordination structures, which could be further extended to field level.*

ICF coordination structures were established with clear terms of relevance, and particularly notable, was the establishment of Outcome Groups with responsibility to lead joint planning, and reporting. There was high level of collaboration among UN agencies, and generally all key informants from the UN system acknowledged the need for working together, noting that there were 18 joint programmes under implementation or advanced planning as of end of the first quarter of 2018. There was however no formal and systematic coordination mechanisms established at field office level.

*The continuing conflict situation constrained UN capacity to mobilise planned resources for the ICF.*

The ICF had an initial planned budget of US\$877 million, of which \$336 million was available with a shortfall of \$541 million. Total expenditure for the two years ending December 2017 was \$279,119,134 indicating that no additional resources were mobilised since total expenditures were covered from available resources. Majority of the donors that were consulted confirmed that their respective governments’ policies was to focus on emergency humanitarian work rather than development programmes.

*Lack of adequate infrastructure combined with the conflict situation increased operational costs.*

The cost of moving people and goods is very high, with much of it almost always by air. The UN and other cooperation partners noted have had to do air drops to deliver emergency supplies to vulnerable groups in different parts of the country; while also the rising inflation pushed the cost of goods and services, to a point where the UN had to pay its implementing partners in US dollars in order to ensure stability in cost planning.

*As a strategic framework, the ICF was itself a platform for sustainable development.*

Given the continuing crisis context, the ICF integrated its development work with emergency humanitarian response, emphasizing on recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. This, by itself makes the ICF a platform towards sustainable development, and also in line with the UN’s ‘new way of working’.

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*Despite limited engagement with central government, the UN established measures to engender national ownership.*

To ensure national ownership of programme processes, the UN increased its engagement at state and community level. At community level, the UN was working with existing structures, including local and international NGOs, which provides an institutional basis for sustainability.

## **Good practices and lessons learned**

Some notable good practices that had positive impact on the ICF implementation were:

- Conflict sensitive analysis and planning;
- Integration of humanitarian and development work;
- Establishment of the Joint Policy Advisory team (JPAT) to provide an institutional mechanism for joint analysis and coordinated decision-making.

There were also a number of emerging key lessons that the UNCT would need to consider as they embark on the formulation of the successor United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF).

**Lesson 1.** In a context where the situation is highly unstable and unpredictable, risk informed cooperation frameworks provide flexibility for UN agencies to continue development assistance as well as providing humanitarian support to the most vulnerable groups.

**Lesson 2.** UN programmes face the risk of setbacks and shocks both at strategic and operational level, due to the conflict situation.

**Lesson 3.** UN interventions can be designed in a manner that leverages humanitarian resources for long term development programming.

**Lesson 4.** The conflict situation can spread to areas with relative peace/stability if basic services continue to deteriorate and government fails to respond.

**Lesson 5.** The absence of a joint UN M&E working group to coordinate joint M&E work for the ICF and UN agencies affects quality of the ICF design, with implications on monitoring and reporting.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The country is in a deep social, economic and political crisis, approaching levels of collapse and state failure; while also the peace process has stalled, no sign of any particular urgency by both sides to restore the momentum.

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The government's operational budgets are declining, while spending is increasingly tilted towards the security sector. Furthermore, revenue transfers to the states have declined, which was further compounded by the political decisions to increase the number of states from 10 to 32. All this combined, means the government has no capacity to provide public services.

While relations between traditional donors and the Government are strained, the proportion of the population in need of humanitarian assistance keeps increasing. This will continue to impact on the UN's ability to provide development assistance.

In light of the foregoing, the evaluators make the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 1.** The UN should focus on interventions that provide greater opportunities for impact through increased flexibility and enhanced collaboration between humanitarian and development programming.

**Recommendation 2.** The UNCT should consider development of measures that trigger increased or decreased engagement with government, especially with the central government to enhance its accountability and improve its relations with donors.

**Recommendation 3.** The UN should consider ways to build and strengthen stronger partnerships, including with civil society organisations, both local and international.

**Recommendation 4.** The UNCT should ensure that a functional M&E Working Group is established and provided with appropriate resources to enable it to provide adequate support at all levels of ICF processes, including in formulation and design, implementation, and reporting.

**Recommendation 5.** The UNCT should enhance its resilience building approach, including by building capacity of other non-state actors such as farmers' cooperatives. Given appropriate and adequate capacity, these community institutions have potential to provide a platform for delivery of other services.

**Recommendation 6.** The UNCT should consider increasing specific initiatives and programmes targeting the youth, including initiatives to empower the youth to participate in peacebuilding, economic activities and political governance.

**Recommendation 7.** The UNCT should consider strengthening coordination in the field, including by establishing field coordination offices.



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**Recommendation 8.** The UN should continue to provide a flexible framework that enables it to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable groups and communities in a humanitarian context while at the same time establishing a beachhead for transition to recovery and development programming. Achieving this will entail the following:

- a) Scaling up of interventions to more geographic localities and reaching more vulnerable communities, including developing ‘area based approaches’ to enable UN agencies to leverage on their respective comparative advantages.
- b) Enhancing engagement with state and non-state actors to build their capacity and strengthen peacebuilding, especially at subnational level.
- c) Strengthening collaboration between humanitarian and development actors, to establish a beachhead for recovery.
- d) Continue to frame the UN’s programming in line with Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development – **leave no one behind** – including use of appropriate M&E indicators.

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## C. ACRONYMS

ACF	Action Against Hunger
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARC	American Refugee Council
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD(s)	Focus Group Discussion(s)
GRSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan
HRBA	Human Right Based Approach
ICF	Interim Cooperation Framework
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP(s)	Implementing Partner(s)
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JPAT	Joint Policy Advisory Team
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoFP	Ministry of Finance and Planning
MSME(s)	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise(s)
NCAS	National Capacity Self-Assessment
NCRC	National Constitution Review Commission
NDS	National Development Strategy
NER	Net Enrolment Ratio
NPSS	National Prison Service of South Sudan
OCHA	(United Nations) Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PMT	Programme Management Team

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PoC(s)	Protection of Civilian(s)
RBM	Results Based Management
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
rCSI	Resilience Coping Strategy Index
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SPU	Special Protection Unit
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
UNAIDS	United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS
UNCF	United Nations Cooperation Framework
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNRC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
UNWOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WPDI	Whitaker Peace & Development Initiative

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The South Sudan Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) is the United Nations Country Team's (UNCT) overarching strategic programme framework covering the period 2016 - 2018. The ICF was formulated and signed in May 2015, initially for the two-year period ending December 2017, and later extended to December 2018.

The ICF 2016 – 2018 succeeded the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012 – 2016, which was the first joint UNCT-Government programme framework after the country's independence in 2011. Implementation of the UNDAF 2012 -2016 was characterised by continuous adjustments in response to the country's worsening political and economic context during the period 2011 to 2015. In August 2015, when a new Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed, the UNCT decided to develop a two-year interim programme framework to continue and adapt its development assistance during the transitional period of the ARCSS.

In accordance with United Nations Development Group (UNDG) guidelines, the UNCT commissioned a final evaluation of the ICF 2016 - 2018 to *'assess whether planned UNDAF(sic) results were achieved, whether they made a worthwhile and durable contribution to national development processes and delivered on the commitment to leave no one behind, whether this was done in a cost-efficient manner and whether results built on the United Nations' collective comparative advantage (rather than that of individual agencies) in a coherent manner'*<sup>1</sup>.

The evaluation was undertaken by an independent international consultant over a period of 40 working days during the period 19 March to 21 May 2018; with the support of a national consultant. This document is the evaluators' Report of the Final Evaluation of the South Sudan United Nations Interim Cooperation Framework 2016 - 2018. The report contains six chapters as detailed below.

- Chapter 1 introduces the report and background for the evaluation.
- Chapter 2 describes the evaluation purpose, objectives and methodology.
- Chapter 3 presents the programme's background, including the country's development context, and a description of the ICF 2016 – 2018.
- Chapter 4 contains the evaluation's findings, structured around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as defined by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> UNDG (2017); United Nations Development Assistance Framework Guidelines, page 31

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.uneval.org/document/guidance-documents>

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- Chapter 5 includes the emerging lessons and good practices for future programming.
  - Chapter 6 presents the evaluation conclusions and recommendations.

## **II. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY**

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess whether or not the ICF was an appropriate strategy for the UN during the transitional phase of the ARCSS, and the extent to which its intended outcomes were achieved in light of shifting contexts, including particularly the crisis in July 2016. The evaluation also identified relevant lessons learned, and makes specific recommendations to guide the formulation of the UNCF based on the current and emerging issues in South Sudan.

### **2.1. Evaluation Scope and Specific Objectives**

The evaluation covered the ICF implementation period from January 2016 to December 2017, including all its five ICF outcomes and related outputs. The specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the relevance of the ICF, and how its outcomes and outputs were adjusted to changing contexts, including the crisis in July 2016, both in planning and in implementation. It should consider to what extent the ICF responded to national priorities as articulated in the ARCSS.
- Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the ICF in terms of progress towards agreed outcomes and outputs and identify the factors that influenced achievement of results, including how the ICF interacted with humanitarian, peacebuilding and peacekeeping objectives during this period.
- Assess the potential for sustainable impact towards long term development goals during the evaluation period, given the challenging and fluid conflict context.
- Assess how effectively and efficiently the ICF worked as a framework for coordination, monitoring progress, accountability and mobilisation of resources, including through regular reporting, and the appropriateness of the organisation and coordination structures established to implement the ICF, including the outcome groups.
- Determine to what extent cross-cutting issues (human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management (RBM), capacity development) were systematically incorporated in the ICF design and reporting.
- Identify best practices and lessons learned from ICF implementation and provide concrete and actionable recommendations for the formulation of the successor United Nations Cooperation Framework (UNCF).
- Review and assess the implementation of the recommendations for the ICF proposed in the UNDAF evaluation of November 2015.

## 2.2. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation was based on the five criteria laid out in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance,<sup>3</sup> as defined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidelines.

The evaluation was based on analysis of secondary and primary data collected from various sources, including ICF annual reports, relevant UN agency files and reports; interviews with key informants, including management and programme staff of UN agencies and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), government counterparts at national, state and county level, civil society groups and community stakeholders.

The data collection tools included:

- a) Desk review of ICF programme files and reports. The list of documents reviewed is in Annex 1.
- b) Individual interviews with a total of 63 key informants, representing a cross section of stakeholders, including UN agencies, government officials, development partners and donors, civil society organisations (CSOs) and community based organisations (CBOs). The list of individuals interviewed is in Annex 2.
- c) Site visits were fielded to 8 projects for direct observation and group discussions with implementing partners (IPs) and community beneficiaries of the following projects:

Figure 1. Project site visited

	Project description	Outcome	IP	UN Agency	Location
1.	Technical, and Vocational Education Training Centre	2	WPDI	UNESCO	Juba
2.	Peace market	3		UNDP	Juba
3.	Vocational Skills Training (Prison)	3	NPSS	UNDP	Juba
4.	Nutrition Centre	2	MedAir	WFP/UNICEF	Aweil
5.	School feeding programme	2		WFP/UNICEF	Aweil
6.	Seed production	1		FAO	Aweil East
7.	Agriculture cooperative	1		FAO	Aweil East
8.	Cash for Assets and resilience	1	ACF	FAO/WFP	Aweil East
9.	Women's Centre	5	ARC	UNICEF	Aweil
10.	Police SPU	3 and 5	Police	UNDP	Aweil
11.	Improving local economy (non-oil revenue)	4	SRA	UNDP	Aweil

<sup>3</sup> The five evaluation criteria are: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact.

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- d) A presentation of preliminary findings was made to the UNCT and Programme Management Team (PMT) in order to validate the findings and conclusions of the evaluation prior to drafting. The final version of this report incorporates their comments.

### **2.3. Limitations**

It was not feasible to visit more states due to limited transport options for movement between states. This was however, mitigated through extensive desk and literature review, as well as intensive discussions at project sites in Aweil and Juba.

The second limitation was lack of outcome level data at national scale. This was mitigated through extensive literature research, including web-based publicly accessible literature.

## **III. PROGRAMME BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT**

This chapter describes the programme's background, including the country context of South Sudan, as well as a description of the ICF theory of change model, its results, monitoring and evaluation framework.

### **3.1. Country Context**

South Sudan has been engulfed in ongoing conflict since its independence in 2011, with the most violent outbreaks occurring in December 2013 and July 2016. These two outbreaks are significant because they had the characteristics of two distinct conflict parties, with government forces fighting against 'rebel' or opposition forces. However, the country has been experiencing ongoing conflict at various levels, with inter-communal conflict between various ethnic groups often seen as both a cause and consequence of the political conflict.

The present conflict in South Sudan dates back to the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan, which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and finally culminated with the referendum leading to the country's independence in July 2011. While the quest for independence had rallied the population around a common cause, there was never a common national identity, to bring together the country's many ethnic groups.

The UN Joint Policy Advisory Team in South Sudan reported in November 2017<sup>4</sup>, that *'the absence of national identity and weak institutions undermined the statebuilding project, and can be considered the main root causes leading towards the outbreak of civil war in 2013'*. Overall, weak

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<sup>4</sup> The UN Joint Policy Advisory Team in South Sudan (2017); [THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN](#)



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institutions mean a lack of agreement on commonly accepted rules and norms among different groups in South Sudan, and this weakness has in turn provided a basis for issues such as impunity, corruption and patronage systems<sup>5</sup>.

According to a study conducted by Search in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *'National and political trends are important, but they also interact with well-recognized local conflicts that shape instability across South Sudan. National events can exacerbate local cycles of grievance and revenge, resulting in explosive community reactions. Resource disputes trigger intense violence between ethnic groups, reducing community resilience to political manipulation and related violence'*<sup>6</sup>.

From 2013 to 2015, what had begun as a high-level conflict between leaders who belonged to different ethnic groups intensified the ethnic divisions, and the armed groups became increasingly and openly defined by ethnicity and links to local ethnic groups. In 2015, the international community pressured regional actors to withdraw their support for the opposing factions and rally behind a concerted peace effort, resulting in the Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS).

However, the ARCSS focused on the high-level conflict between the two factions, including the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), interim security arrangements, and the return of the Vice President but did not address the challenge of broader inclusiveness and national engagement in the peace process. *'This caused delays, a lack of general momentum and a growing sense of frustration, exclusion and fear of violence among other groups in the country, not least in the Equatorias and Western Bahr el Ghazal that had been less influenced by the conflict up to this point, but now became increasingly involved, including through manipulation by the warring factions'* (UN Joint Policy Advisory Team).

The July 2016 outbreak of violent conflict in Juba occurred just a few months after the establishment of the TGoNU in April.

### 3.2. Development Context

South Sudan continues to experience deep humanitarian and economic crises, with the situation approaching levels of collapse and state failure, including escalating humanitarian and protection needs. According to the World Bank, *'the country displays all the signs of a war-economy, near*

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<sup>5</sup> ibid

<sup>6</sup> Search for Common Ground (2016); **South Sudan Conflict Analysis Brief: Trends in Conflict Drivers, Triggers and Unifiers** - <https://www.sfcg.org/south-sudan/>

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*macroeconomic collapse with output contracting, risks of hyperinflation, a parallel exchange market spiraling, a significant fiscal deficit, and burgeoning debt distress*<sup>7</sup>.

The conflict has had a very negative impact on the population, especially women and children, which is marked by displacement, hunger and disease. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘nearly 4.3 million people – one in three South Sudanese – have been displaced, including more than 1.8 million who are internally displaced and about 2.5 million who are in neighbouring countries. About 700,000 people left South Sudan in 2017’<sup>8</sup>. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the South Sudanese refugee population was 1.77 million as of 31 March 2017, and was expected to increase to 2.13 million by end of 2017.<sup>9</sup>

Women and girls are disproportionately impacted and particularly vulnerable to the effects of the conflict. They continue to experience lack of safe spaces due to frequent cattle raids and other violence, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). Men are traditionally fighters and warriors, often going to the bush to defend their communities, leaving women with the increased burden of not only caring for children and elderly, but also having to flee with them when necessary. Female-headed households constitute an estimated 65% of the population in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) settlements and Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites.<sup>10</sup> The 2017 inaugural Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) report noted that ‘...nearly all available data on the SDGs paint a grim picture, and the main underlying factor is the ongoing armed conflict’<sup>11</sup>. This is further reflected in the following World Bank highlights (Figure 2).

One of the legacies of the country’s long civil war with Sudan was its inheritance of weak governance and administrative institutions and structures. South Sudan moved toward independence with extremely low human development and limited human capacity. According to a 2017 World Bank publication, 42.5 percent of public service personnel had attained early education, and only 29 percent reached secondary or post-secondary education.<sup>12</sup> In this context, efforts to foster a public sector focused on service delivery to citizens were constrained by weak capacity. In addition, public employment tended to be viewed as a social safety net, in which

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<sup>7</sup> World Bank (2017); Country Engagement Note, page 5

<sup>8</sup> OCHA (2018); 2017 South Sudan Humanitarian Response in Review

<sup>9</sup> UNHCR (2017); Revised Regional Refugee Response Plan 2017: Overview

<sup>10</sup> UN-Women (2014); Assessment of Gender Gaps in Humanitarian Action

<sup>11</sup> South Sudan Inaugural SDG Report, 2017


<sup>12</sup> World Bank (2017); South Sudan Governance Analysis, p 41 {For example, the National Audit Chamber (NAC) had about 100 staff on its payroll as of 2016, but only three had professional auditing qualifications}.

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government jobs were associated with the ‘peace dividend’ from the long civil war with Sudan. The World Bank report also notes that ‘...a single civil servant may be the main source of income for an extended family, and those in government feel significant pressure to deliver resources to their communities; while renewal of the civil service has been hindered by staff being unable to retire, as well as by hiring freezes for the civilian public service since 2012’.

As a consequence of these and other factors, South Sudan’s population has one of the highest poverty incidence in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the 2016 Human Development Report, 89.3 percent of the population are multi-dimensionally poor while an additional 8.5 percent live near multidimensional poverty. The breadth of deprivation (intensity) in South Sudan, which is the average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 61.7 percent. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which is the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor, adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations, is 0.551; compared to Benin and Lesotho who have MPIs of 0.343 and 0.227 respectively.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 2. South Sudan Recovery Needs Deficit<sup>14</sup>



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<sup>13</sup> UNDP (2016); Human Development for Everyone: Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human development Report, p 5

<sup>14</sup> World Bank (2017); Country Engagement Note, p 9

### 3.3. Programme Context (ICF 2016 – 2017)


Upon attaining its independence in 2011, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) developed the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) covering the period 2012 - 14. Although this was later extended to 2016, the SSDP became irrelevant due to the political and economic challenges that the country experienced during its first years of independence; initially as a result of the suspension of oil production in 2012 when Government lost 98 percent of its revenues, and later due to the onset of the war which started in December 2013.

On the other hand, the UN system organisations had also developed the UNDAF 2012-16 to support the Government's development agenda. However, the changing political and economic context during the period 2011 - 15 also made implementation of the UNDAF difficult and after a series of adaptations, it also became increasingly irrelevant.

The Government did not develop a new national framework when the SSDP expired in 2016. However, when the ARCSS was established in August 2015, it gave the UN the required national priorities for which to support and work towards in the absence of a national development framework.

The ICF was therefore developed and presented to Government purely as an interim framework for the UN; *'provides the basis for UN support for development in the transitional period, and will be replaced by a United Nations Development Assistance Framework, once a national development plan has been developed by the Transitional Government of National Unity'*.<sup>15</sup> The UNCT's focus and emphasis was on short-term transitional support for recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. The programme theory of change is illustrated in the following diagram.

Figure 3. ICF Theory of Change



Source: ICF, p 13

<sup>15</sup> Interim Cooperation Framework of the United Nations Country Team in South Sudan, p 5

### 3.4. ICF Results Framework

Figure 4. ICF Results and M&E Framework

Outcome 1. Enhancing the resilience of communities		
Indicator 1.1. Indicator 1.1: % of targeted communities using 11 coping strategies or below. Coping Strategy Index (CSI), disaggregated by sex of household head	Baseline (2014): (rCSI): 50% of targeted communities use more than 11 coping strategies Target (2017): 100 % of targeted communities reduce number of coping strategies to 11/56 or less	Planned budget: \$194 m
Indicator 1.2: Number of targeted communities have increased assets over the baseline	Baseline (2014): None with average of 2.4 functional assets Target (2017): 250 communities have assets over the baseline average of 2.4 functional assets	
Indicator 1.3: % households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS)	Baseline (2015): 44% of population in target areas have acceptable food consumption. Target (2017): 65% of target population have acceptable food consumption scores.	
Outcome 2. Strengthening social services for the most vulnerable		
Indicator 2.1: Proportion of births attended by skilled health professionals	Baseline (2013): 11% Target (2017): 25%	Planned budget: \$383 m
Indicator 2.2. Moderate acute malnutrition treatment recovery rate in children and pregnant and lactating women	Baseline (2014): 85% Target (2017): No less than 75%	
Indicator 2.3: % of children and adults enrolled in education (sex-disaggregated)	Baseline (2015): 35% Primary Net Enrollment Rate (30% girl, 39% boys); adults: 16% women, 40% men Target (2017): 40% Primary NER (35% girls, 45% boys); adults 20% women, 44% men	
Outcome 3. Strengthening peace and governance		
Indicator 3.1. # of targeted governance sector reforms implemented	Baseline: Constitution review process, legislative, military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace agreement Target: 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law institutions’ Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted	Planned budget: \$144 m
Indicator 3.2. % of respondents who report increased personal safety and security disaggregated by gender.	Baseline: (2015) 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) respondents with confidence in peace, safety and security Target: (2017) 50% (48% men and 52% women)	
Indicator 3.3. % of transitional governance mechanisms with CSO/media participation.	Baseline: (2015) 0 Target: (2017) 80%	
Outcome 4. Reinvigoration of the local economy		
Indicator 4.1. # of value chain enabling strategies in agriculture, livestock and fisheries	Baseline: (2015) 4 strategies Target: (2017) 4 additional strategies	Planned budget: \$156 m
Indicator 4.2. # of Cooperatives and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in place for production and marketing	Baseline: (2015) 70 Target: (2017) 60 new cooperatives and MSMEs formed	
Indicator 4.3. # of people benefitting from microfinance lending institutions	Baseline: (2013) 25, 000 clients Target: (2017) 30,000 clients	
Outcome 5. Improvement of the status of women and youth		
Indicator 5.1. % of women in parliament; % of women in cabinet and ministerial positions	Baseline: (2015) 26.5%; 10% Target: 30% and 15%	Budget: integrated in all other outcomes

Source: From ICF 2016 – 2017, pages 46 - 50

## IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter presents the evaluators' findings based on the evidence obtained from multiple sources and analysis of data.

### 4.1. Relevance of the ICF

***Finding 1. The government has no capacity to provide social services, and the UN has filled the gap by responding to the needs of the most vulnerable groups***

As noted in page 6 above, South Sudan has experienced multiple shocks, including the political decision to shut down oil production for 15 months from February 2012, which triggered a financial crisis and stressed its fragile and still nascent institutions. Inadequate and mostly rudimentary administrative infrastructure other than in established centers such as Juba, Wau, Yei and Malakal also compounded basic service delivery and access for majority of the population.

The impact of the conflict has been devastating on the population, as outlined in Figure 1 (page 6 above). Government capacity to deliver basic services has declined along with the quality of life for its population. A UNDP analysis of sectoral budget allocations noted that *"...in average terms, the total resources budgeted for allocation to the core development sectors viz. education, health and infrastructure, increased marginally from 3.1 percent in 2013/14 to 4.3 percent in 2014/15. When compared to the allocations made to the security sector, it is evident that the government continues to disproportionately restrict resource allocation for development which in turn is a binding constraint on its ability to deliver basic social service to the citizens"*<sup>16</sup>. For the 2017/18 financial year, the total government budget is SSP 43,691 billion<sup>17</sup> (estimated at US\$ 300 - 366 million by various news agencies).<sup>18</sup> An analysis of the budget allocations for selected development sectors illustrates the extent of the problem (see Box above). According to the Human Development Report 2016, South Sudan's Human Development Index (HDI) decreased by 2.5 percent from 0.429 to 0.418,

Sector	Allocation (SSP)	% of total
Education	1,862	4.26%
Health	1,033	2.36%
Infrastructure	459	1.05%
Natural Resources	809	1.85%
Rural Development		
Social and Humanitarian Affairs	168	0.38
Source: MoFP: Approved Budget Tables, p xviii		

<sup>16</sup> UNDP (2014); An analysis of Government Budgets in South Sudan from a human development perspective: Discussion Paper, p 6

<sup>17</sup> MoFP; Approved Budget Tables: Fiscal Year 2017/18, p xviii

<sup>18</sup> [www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news](http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news) ; <http://apanews.net/en/news/south-sudan-passes-366m-budget-for-20172018-fiscal-year>

between 2010 and 2015; while it's Gross National Income (GNI) per capita decreased by about 36.4 percent over the same period<sup>19</sup>.

According to a UNICEF analysis of the budget '*...Allocations to the security and public administration sectors amounted to nearly two-thirds of the budget in FY 2017/18, which marked a significant increase from the previous year when these combined allocations equaled half of the total budget. In contrast, allocations to the social sectors (education, health, and social and humanitarian affairs) consumed only five percent of the budget in the current fiscal year, which marked a decrease from 2016/17 when these sectors accounted for 6.7 percent of total budget allocations. This means that the government is investing 13 times more in security and public administration than in social services*'<sup>20</sup>.

The UNICEF brief also notes that South Sudan budget allocations to health and education are below global benchmarks - the 'Education for All' spending target is 20 percent of the national budget for education and the Abuja Declaration is 15 percent of the national budget for health<sup>21</sup>.

Against this background, the UNCT decided to develop a short-term interim framework focusing on resilience, recovery and peacebuilding in order to address the critical gaps arising from lack of government capacity to provide services.

The ICF was developed as a short-term interim framework to fulfil the requirements of an UNDAF, but taking into account the limitations of the country's conflict situation. It was aligned to the global Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, and responded to the needs of the most vulnerable groups as illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Alignment of ICF to needs of people and SDGs

ICF Outcome	SDG Goal	UNCT strategy and interventions
1. Enhancing the resilience of communities.	1. No poverty. 2. Zero hunger.	Support to strengthen the absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of communities confronted with shocks and stresses.
2. Strengthening social services for the most vulnerable.	3. Good health and well-being. 4. Quality education. 6. Clean water and sanitation. 7. Affordable and clean energy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Increase access by improving the coverage of essential services;</li><li>- Improve quality in service delivery;</li><li>- Promote equitable access to social services by focusing on the inclusion of vulnerable groups; and</li><li>- Address the root cause of poor delivery and use of services.</li></ul>

<sup>19</sup> UNDP (2016); Human Development Report 2016: Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human Development Report; South Sudan, p 2.

<sup>20</sup> UNICEF; national Budget Brief, p 7

<sup>21</sup> ibid

ICF Outcome	SDG Goal	UNCT strategy and interventions
	10. Reduced inequality.	
3. Strengthening peace and governance	16. Peace and Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthen institutions, systems and processes to enhance good governance, peace and security and stronger and more resilient state-society relations to help reduce the risk of regression into active conflict, and to peacefully resolve political differences;</li> <li>- foster transitional justice and accountability;</li> <li>- enhancing access to justice, and for judicial, legislative and institutional reforms, including ratification and operationalization of key human rights treaties.</li> </ul>
4. Reinvigorating the local economy	8. Decent work and economic growth. 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure. 12. Responsible consumption and production.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic diversification and recovery;</li> <li>- Employment and livelihoods; and</li> <li>- Sustainable management of natural resources.</li> </ul>
5. Improvement of the status of women and youth	5. Gender equality. Plus all above.	Cross cutting

Although the ICF only covered development assistance, UN agencies combined both humanitarian and development action, to provide most of the essential services in accessible areas. In Aweil, the UN was providing health care services, including ante-natal care, new-born immunisation, and treatment of acute malnutrition for under-five children as well as malaria prevention and treatment through the international NGO – Med Air.

Key informants at the Aweil State Ministry of Health (MoH) agreed that the government did not have capacity to provide health services and looked to the UN and other partners to provide service. The source noted that the Ministry was grossly understaffed, with only three of the nine directorates having Directors; and in most cases those Directors did not have staff under them.

***Finding 2. UN agencies combined humanitarian action with development support while responding to immediate needs of vulnerable groups***

The mandate of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) as outlined in the ARCSS, included, *inter alia*, the following priorities:<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> ARCSS, page 27



- Institute programs for relief, protection, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees, in coordination with the United Nations and other relief and humanitarian agencies;
- Offer special consideration to conflict-affected persons (children, orphans, women, widows, war wounded, etc.), in the provision of public service delivery, including access to health and education services and grant the host communities the same benefit, protection and humanitarian services.

UN agencies integrated emergency response into their programmes, particularly after the outbreak of conflict in July 2016. According to OCHA reports, *‘the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) allocated US\$ 81.3 million during 2016 towards 211 top priority projects under the humanitarian response plan, agreed on through rigorous collective prioritization. 51 per cent of the funds (\$41.3 million) went to UN agencies (including \$34.2 million for core pipelines and common services), while 37 per cent went to international NGOs (\$30 million) and 12 per cent to national NGOs (\$10 million).’*<sup>23</sup>

In 2017, total SSHF funding was US\$ 61.8 million, of which 45 percent (\$27.8 million) was allocated to UN agencies. As the foregoing illustrates, UN agencies were at the forefront of the humanitarian action, responding to the immediate needs of the most vulnerable groups. OCHA reports that the highest priority sectors in 2016 were in the social services sector (see box).<sup>25</sup>

Nutrition	17%
WASH	16%
Health	15%
ES/NFI <sup>24</sup>	12%
FSL*	10%
Protection	8%
Education	5%

The report also notes that a total of 58 projects were undertaken by respective UN agencies in 2016 (Figure 6). UN agencies also took the lead role in coordinating the humanitarian clusters

<b>Figure 6. SSHF 2016 Allocations by UN Agency</b>		
UN agency	# of projects	Allocation (US\$)
FAO	3	4,100,000.13
IOM	15	12,213,200.28
UNFPA	6	2,611,888.71
UNHCR	1	199,841.76
UNICEF	20	11,387,525.59
WFP	9	8,326,934.82
WHO	4	2,462,201.86
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>\$41,301,590.15</b>

that delivered the emergence relief; including for example; IOM UNHCR in camp coordination and management; UNICEF in Education, Nutrition, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), as well as Child Protection; WFP in telecommunications and logistics; WHO in health; UNHCR in protection; and FAO/WFP in food

security and livelihoods.

<sup>23</sup> OCHA; South Sudan Humanitarian Fund: 2016 Annual Report, p 5

<sup>24</sup> ES/NFI – Emergency Shelter/Non Food Items; FSL – Food Security and Livelihoods

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, OCHA 2016 Annual Report

While the country continued to experience a growing humanitarian crisis, UN agencies delivered a total of US\$ 119.4 million and \$159.8 million in 2016 and 2017 respectively for recovery, resilience and peacebuilding support under the ICF<sup>26</sup>. Development work in accessible communities included, for example, establishment of community-based seed production groups in former Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap States, training of Community Animal Health Workers and Village Extension Facilitators.



Output of Farmer's Cooperative Group in Omdurman, Aweil East

During the field visit to Aweil East, members of a smallholder farmers' cooperative group said that UN support had enabled them to increase productivity, and access markets, including supplying ground nuts to the national market, including to Abyei. One of the cooperative members said *"output and productivity increased because of the introduction of the ox-drawn plough. But now we are faced with two major challenges, the first is obtaining markets for our access yield, and the second is unavailability of spare parts for the ploughs."* These challenges also provide opportunities for other UN agencies to enhance impact, including for example, food processing, and small blacksmith industrial production of spare parts for youth.

#### 4.2. Implementation effectiveness and achievements of results

This section focuses on the UN's progress towards planned results at both outcome and output level, efficacy of its implementation and coordination arrangements, as well as adherence to its values, norms and standards.

***Finding 3. The country lacks reliable data to measure progress at outcome level, but the UN made notable progress in its normative work***

South Sudan has regressed in its overall development situation since 2010, as already noted above based on the HDI. The government also acknowledges this in the draft NDS, noting that "the nation has rolled back from the 'rebuild and reform' phase in 2012, to a 'crisis' phase in 2017 on the New Deal fragility spectrum".<sup>27</sup>

However, as noted in a UNESCO publication "South Sudan still lacks reliable basic economic and social statistics, reflecting a legacy of decades of civil war and the challenges associated with state

<sup>26</sup> ICF 2016 and 2017 Annual Reports

<sup>27</sup> Draft National Development Strategy 2018 – 2021, p5

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and institution building”<sup>28</sup>. Consequently, UN agencies had difficulty measuring ICF results at outcome level. In addition, some key informants noted that some of the outcomes were too broad and the number of indicators were not sufficient to measure contribution by all participating UN agencies. For example, Outcome 2 on social services had only three indicators measuring skilled births attendants, acute malnutrition, and enrolment in education; meaning that contributions made under WASH, maternal mortality or child mortality, among others, could not be reflected in results at outcome level<sup>29</sup>.

At the normative level, the UN has however contributed to analytical work in South Sudan, and most of the data that is available is from surveys done by UN agencies. This includes for example, studies to better understand resilience to shocks that impact food insecurity and malnutrition in South Sudan.<sup>30</sup> Various other studies and UN analytical publications will be referenced in subsequent sections below.

The UN also made progress on its advocacy for development. This should be considered from a context where relations between the government and its bilateral donors are strained. Bilateral donors do not see the government as being committed to implement the various peace agreements that it has signed. Most of the donors that were consulted also noted that government lacks transparency and accountability, and they were not confident that their resources would reach intended beneficiaries if channelled through government systems.

However, as an intergovernmental body itself, the UN and particularly the development agencies are required to work with, and in support of government priorities. The UN has therefore continued to do advocacy work for development. There is evidence that most stakeholders agree that resilience building is critical to provide sustainability and an exit strategy for humanitarian action. Most interviewees, including donors also agreed that engagement with government was unavoidable, and therefore some resources had to be allocated towards institutional capacity development for sustainability of interventions. One official of the bilateral donors noted that “even when our relations with the government are arm’s length, we are happy that the UN has kept the lines of communication open”.

## **Outcome 1. Enhancing the resilience of communities**

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<sup>28</sup> South Sudan Education Sector Analysis, 2016: Planning for Resilience, p 9

<sup>29</sup> UN staff argue that there are output-level indicators that complement these indicators. However, it should be noted that the contribution effects of RBM principles requires that outcomes are not merely an aggregation of outputs, but should reflect changes in development conditions that should have their own objectively measurable criteria.

<sup>30</sup> Resilience Context Analysis: Resilience to shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan

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***Finding 4. The country's constrained political and socio-economic environment limited the potential impact of the UN's contribution towards building resilience***

In order to strengthen resilience of the most vulnerable communities the ICF strategy was to provide:

- Resilience analysis and information systems and services at all levels;
- Establish multi-sectoral Resilience Platforms at sub-national level;
- Mitigate the impact of explosive shocks on vulnerable communities through mine action services;
- Create community assets to reduce the impact of shocks;
- Access to predictable income streams for vulnerable communities and households through productive safety nets

As noted earlier, the ICF was developed in a context of renewed optimism following the signing of the ARCSS peace agreement in August 2015. Consequently, the expectation was that it would be implemented nationally, as reflected by the planned budget of \$194 million over a two-year period. However, some parts of the country continued to be inaccessible as the conflict increasingly became localised. Consequently, the reported results at outcome level were not national in scope, but reflected results of UN efforts in accessible communities.

Available evidence indicates that UN agencies delivered their output level results, including notably:

- 👍 Resilience system analysis for Greater Bahr el Ghazal;
- 👍 Development of two food security and nutrition monitoring systems;
- 👍 Four Integrated Food Security Phase classification (IPC) reports;
- 👍 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) assessment;
- 👍 Analysis on impact of conflict on the livestock sector;
- 👍 Vaccination and/or treatment of 8.2 million heads of livestock, benefiting 178,600 households; and
- 👍 Destruction of 35,000 explosive hazards (anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, and unexploded ordnance).

In 2016, the UN also supported government to develop guidelines for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into national sustainable development plans; finalization of the draft National Disaster Risk Management Policy and support to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to kick-start the application of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. With UN support, the government also developed the National Adaptation Programme Action Plan (NAPA) to address vulnerabilities to climate change in the country.

However, in a Joint News Note in February 2018, the UN warned that “...more than 7 million people in South Sudan – almost two-thirds of the population – could become severely food insecure in the coming months without sustained humanitarian assistance and access”.<sup>31</sup> The Joint News Note further states that between February and April, 6.3 million people will be in IPC Phases 3, 4 and 5; with the number increasing to 7.1 million in the period May-July 2018.<sup>32</sup>

The above data illustrates the worsening humanitarian crisis, and that communities are failing to cope. However, in accessible communities where the UN was able to provide support, UN agencies reported some improvement. Vulnerable groups were better able to cope with shocks, as measured by the resilience of coping strategy index (rCSI) and asset-based CSI in the targeted communities. UN agencies also reported that the food consumption score was stable or improved marginally in target communities (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Progress on outcome 1 indicators

Outcome 1. Enhanced resilience of communities				
Indicator	Baseline (October 2015)	Target	Progress achieved (December 2017)	Evaluation Assessment*
<b>Indicator 1.1a.</b> rCSI, average household score based on use of 5 consumption-based coping strategies.	<b>1.1a.</b> 12.9	Reduced or stabilised	<b>1.1a.</b> 9.4 [Results may be due to different but more accurate method used to measure]	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Indicator 1.1b.</b> Assets-based CSI: based on use of 10 livelihood-related coping strategies	<b>1.1b.</b> 78%	Reduced or stabilised	<b>1.1b.</b> 38%	<b>Achieved</b>
<b>Indicator 1.2.</b> # of targeted Communities have increased Asset Scores (CAS) over the baseline	60% have average of 2.4 functional assets	Increase to 80%	2016: 4.4 2017 - No data	<b>No data</b>
<b>Indicator 1.3.</b> % household with acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS)	44% households (in target areas) have acceptable FCS	Increase to 65%	47%	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
Progress assessment: <span style="color: green;">■</span> Achieved; <span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Satisfactory; <span style="color: red;">■</span> Unsatisfactory; <span style="color: gray;">■</span> No data				

Farmers’ cooperatives from different Counties, including Marial Baai Farmer Cooperative Society and Manjok Farmer Cooperative Society said that the UN had introduced the short-season sorghum variety and provided them capacity through extension services, and as a result their productivity and output had more than doubled last season, and all their members were now food secure.

<sup>31</sup> Joint News Note: Sustained assistance and access critical to prevent hunger reaching its highest level ever - FAO, UNICEF and WFP, 26 February 2018.

<sup>32</sup> The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), defines Phase 3 as acute food and livelihoods crisis; Phase 4 is humanitarian emergency; and Phase 5 is famine/humanitarian catastrophe.

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However, it was noted that while the UN targeted the most vulnerable groups in these accessible communities, the other community members often also slide into vulnerability due to the harsh economic conditions in the country. For example, the World Bank reports shows that the economy contracted by 10.8 percent in 2016 and by about 11.2 percent in 2017; while the consumer price index (CPI) increased by 480 percent in late 2016, thereby putting many households in both urban and rural areas under extreme financial stress, and often unable to afford the minimum food basket.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the targeted vulnerable groups were developing a ‘dependency syndrome,’ and were not necessarily improving their status (see box). The IP also noted that while target beneficiaries participated in the ‘cash for assets’ component of the joint programme, it was very difficult to get them to participate in the capacity building component where no incentive was offered. There may be need to adjust the programme design in such a way that the desired impact is achieved.

According to one IP in Aweil East, “*there was no difference in the conditions of those that had received targeted support through the cash for assets intervention compared to those who did not. Now they just wait knowing that in May the UN would bring more cash for assets*”

Observations from the field also indicate that there are opportunities to enhance resilience building through strengthened collaboration with humanitarian action. For example, one implementing partner (IPs) in Aweil noted that, the UN was supporting a nutrition programme for under-five children as part of emergency response. However, some of the beneficiaries who were receiving the food sachets were selling them to get income for their other needs. The IPs observed that this was a clear indication of lack of livelihood opportunities among the beneficiary communities, which provides an opportunity for the UN to expand its portfolio and provide support for livelihoods, thereby further enhancing the impact of the interventions.

## **Outcome 2. Strengthened social services for vulnerable groups**

### ***Finding 5. Lack of credible data constrained objective assessment of contribution to social service outcomes***

The ICF outcome 2 to strengthen social services prioritised health, education, nutrition, WASH, as well as ensuring a protective environment for children and social protection.<sup>34</sup> The UN initially focused on efforts to develop systems and build long-term capacities for delivery of social

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<sup>33</sup> World Bank. Country Engagement Note, p 6

<sup>34</sup> ICF 2017 – 2018, p 25

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services, but this was affected by the outbreak in 2016, which worsened the country's humanitarian situation, including insecurity and high turnover of staff.

In the first half of 2016, notable progress was achieved in maternal, newborn and child health, immunization, combating Malaria, Tuberculosis, (TB) and HIV and sector-wide system strengthening, such as for example rehabilitation of health infrastructure and training of frontline health service providers. UN supported development of policies and guidelines to strengthen health delivery system, including, *inter alia*, (i) National Health Policy, (ii) Quality Assurance Framework for Health Sciences Institutes, (iii) Policy on adolescent and youth Sexual and Reproductive Health, (iv) System for forecasting and monitoring Reproductive Health commodities, and (v) review of Logistics Management Information System tools.

In 2017, the UN also contributed to the development of a General Education Strategic plan (2017-2022) with a priority to address the enrolment of out of school children, quality of teachers and increase the access to vocational education<sup>35</sup>.

However, due to unavailability of data, the contribution of these outputs to the expected outcomes remains unknown. In 2017 the UN reported that *"...the outcome area faced a number of challenges in 2017 including a worsened humanitarian situation, insecurity,*

**UN staff member responds to question on impact**  
"...we have not been able to do any studies given the current situation; so we don't know the impact. The data that is there is output level"

*high turnover of staff and increased costs of delivering basic services. These challenges have significantly limited agencies' capacity to plan and deliver services that focus on system building and strengthening".*

Furthermore, baseline data had been collected in 2015, reflecting the general deterioration in the social development situation. However, end line data was not available due to lack of effective national data and information systems, coupled with the UN's inability to undertake surveys at a national scale due to limited access to conflict-affected areas. As a mitigation measure, UN agencies focused their reporting based on available data in the targeted intervention areas (Figure 8). However, objective programme performance assessment demands that the baseline data should be consistent with the end line data, both in terms of sampling framework as well as collection methods.

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<sup>35</sup> ICF Annual Report 2017, p 4



Figure 8. Progress on outcome 2 indicators

Outcome 2. Strengthened social services for the most vulnerable				
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved (December 2017)	Evaluation Assessment*
<b>Indicator 2.1.</b> Proportion of births attended by skilled health professionals	11% (2013)	UNICEF - 25% UNHCR – 88%	<b>Targeted areas:</b> UNICEF – 28% UNHCR – 88%	<b>Inconsistency between the baseline data (national data) and end line data (targeted areas).</b>
<b>Indicator 2.2.</b> % of children and adults enrolled in education (sex disaggregated).	<b>Baseline (2015):</b> 35% Primary NER (30% girls, 39% boys); adults: 16% women, 40% men	40% Primary NER (35% girls, 45% boys); adults 20% women, 44% men	<b>Targeted areas:</b>  103% (41% girls, 59% boys)	
<b>Indicator 2.3.</b> Moderate acute malnutrition treatment recovery rate in children and pregnant and lactating women.	WFP: 85% <sup>2014</sup> UNHCR: 85.6% <sup>2016</sup>	No less than 75%*	<b>Targeted areas:</b> WFP: 85%; UNHCR: 82.7%	
Progress assessment: <span>■ Achieved;</span> <span>■ Satisfactory;</span> <span>■ Unsatisfactory;</span> <span>■ No data</span>				

\* If the treatment recovery rate was already 85% why would the target be lower?

Although results could not be verified at the outcome level, there was evidence of improved progress at output level. For example, the UN supported Udaba School in Aweil, by constructing standard classroom blocks, WASH facilities, including water harvesting and separate toilets for boys and girls, as well as kitchen facilities. Based on these standards, the school qualified for school feeding support, which, according to school authorities had increased enrolment from 280 to 794, as well as zero dropout rate for both boys and girls.

During consultations with the school authorities, the evaluation noted that there also existed opportunities to further enhance impact through establishment of a school vegetable garden, which not only improves the diet, but also expands the curriculum. The school also lacks appropriate dining hall facilities, which combined, provide entry points for relevant UN agencies to enhance impact of the intervention.

**Finding 6. Funding support for development programmes was impacted by donor perceptions that government lacks political will to implement the peace agreement**

### **Outcome 3. Strengthened peace and governance**

The UN strategy for outcome 3 was to ‘support for (sic) the Transitional Government of National Unity to strengthen institutions, systems and processes to enhance good governance, peace and security and stronger and more resilient state-society relations to help reduce the risk of



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*regression into active conflict, and to peacefully resolve political differences*<sup>36</sup>. The UN planned to contribute to this outcome by delivering under the following five areas:

- Support to Political Governance processes;
- Support to Public Administration;
- Support Community Security and Reconciliation;
- Support to Access to Justice and Rule of Law;
- Support to CSOs/Media.

Majority of the planned interventions were undertaken and produced notable output-level results, including *inter alia*, (i) the Guide for the National Dialogue Process in South Sudan and (ii) enactment into law of the Firearms Act. The effect of these outputs did not achieve the desired outcomes for establishing lasting peace and improved security.

Other notable outputs include, capacity building of the women's parliamentary caucus on gender sensitive legislation; civic education to support political governance processes; deployment and twinning of South Sudanese civil servants with counterparts from IGAD member states; and capacity building of local peace committees. However, as noted by the UNCT in November 2017, *"...in the last few years, and especially after the crisis in Juba in July 2016, fighting has spread to all parts of the country, and is no longer isolated in Upper Nile and Unity along a frontline' An increasing number of different armed groups and informal militias are participating in the fighting, and local power holders exploit opportunities to mobilise combatants and extract whatever resources they can. Central control by top leaders of the government and the IO faction has weakened, and the local structures of the state have weakened or have in many places practically disappeared"*.<sup>37</sup>

According to ICF progress reports, progress towards outcome 3 was limited, although UN agencies delivered a number of their planned outputs (Figure 9). According to the 2017 Annual Report, "the share of individuals with confidence on peace and security was 47 percent, down from 53 percent in 2015. The report also notes that "while CSOs are effectively participating in transitional governance mechanisms, the weakening of the peace agreement dented their genuine involvement and participation. Politicisation, lack of capacity and fragmentation in the CSO/media sector also further undermined their influence, collective voice and utility".<sup>38</sup>





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<sup>36</sup> ICF 2016 – 2017, p 27

<sup>37</sup> UN Joint Policy Advisory Team, (Nov 2017); The Conflict in South Sudan, p 7

<sup>38</sup> 2017 ICF Annual report, p 4

Figure 9. Progress on outcome 3 indicators

Outcome 3. Strengthened peace and governance				
Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Target	Progress achieved (December 2017)	Evaluation Assessment*
<b>Indicator 3.1.</b> No. of targeted governance sector reforms implemented.	Constitution review, legislative, military and civil service reforms	16 civil service institutions reformed; 3 rule of law institutions' Acts reviewed; Permanent constitution drafted.	<b>Off track</b> {The reconstitution of the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) is pending}	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Indicator 3.2.</b> No. of respondents who report increased personal safety and security disaggregated by gender.	Total - 28.1% [Male - 27.1%; Female - 29.5%]	Total - 50% [ Male - 48%; Female - 52%]	Total - 30% feel secure in their communities {No disaggregated data}	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Indicator 3.3.</b> % of transitional governance mechanisms with CSO and media participation.	0	80%	Data unavailable. [Planned activities were on track; including setting up of community radios, and establishment of peace journalism network]	<b>Satisfactory</b>
Progress assessment:  Achieved;  Satisfactory;  Unsatisfactory;  No data				

Key informants noted that the design and implementation of Outcome 3 was heavily dependent on progress of the implementation of the ARCSS, with the key milestones for the transition being support for permanent constitution and elections. It is therefore noteworthy that while the UN may deliver its outputs, actual results at outcome level depend on the political will of the government and other national actors to implement and achieve sustainable peace. The lack of progress on the peace agreement has also led to strained relations between the government and its bilateral donors. According to some of the donors that were interviewed, *'the government has not demonstrated sufficient political will to implement the peace agreement, and consequently we (sic) are also working under strict instructions from our government not to support directly the Government of South Sudan'*.

#### **Outcome 4. Reinvigoration of the local economy**

The UN strategy was to lay the foundations for inclusive economic growth through focused interventions in: (a) economic diversification and recovery, (b) employment creation and livelihoods, and (c) sustainable management of natural resources.

Majority of stakeholders that were interviewed felt that the country had very slim prospects for growth due largely to global headwinds and the country's own fragile situation. The African

Development Bank (AfDB) notes for example, that “...the combination of the sharp drop in oil prices (from \$110 per barrel in 2014 to roughly \$50 in 2017) and the reduction in oil production following the outbreak of the ongoing civil war sharply reduced the growth rate. Real GDP contracted 5.3% in 2015 and 13.1% in 2016, and it is projected to decline 6.1% in 2017”.<sup>39</sup>

The AfDB also notes that due to the country’s over-dependence on crude oil exports, slight changes in oil production, prices and demand can quickly translate into massive economic shocks. The prolonged civil war (also) left the country with an extremely poor and underdeveloped infrastructure and limited human capita critical for promoting sustainable economic growth and development. The country (also) has one of the most constrained business and investment climates in the world.

It is against this overall context that the assessment for inclusive local economic growth was considered as partially on track by the UN agencies that were contributing to the outcome. In addition, as most of the UN’s interventions were regarded as developmental, ‘limited donor support was a constraint at the beginning of 2016, and the July 2016 crisis further compounded the impact on the UN’s programmes and operations’<sup>40</sup>.

Notwithstanding, the UN delivered a number of key output level results, most notably:

- Strengthening capacity of existing cooperatives and creation of over 60 new cooperatives’
- Access to microfinance and lending services by over 1,000 women, in an environment where there is a general contraption of financial services,
- Finalisation of the National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) for management of natural resources,
- Development and publishing of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan’ and
- Study on the State of the Environment (SoE).

Figure 10. Progress on outcome 4 indicators

Outcome 4. Reinvigorating the local economy				
Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Target	Progress achieved (December 2017)	Evaluation Assessment*
<b>Indicator 4.1.</b> No. of value chain enabling strategies in agriculture, livestock and fisheries.	4 strategies	4 additional strategies	No ‘new’ enabling strategies were developed	Satisfactory
<b>Indicator 4.2.</b> No. of Cooperatives and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in place for production and marketing.	70	60 new cooperatives and MSMEs formed	60 new cooperatives and MSMEs formed	Satisfactory

<sup>39</sup> [www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan-economic-outlook/](http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan-economic-outlook/)

<sup>40</sup> ICF 2016 Annual Report, p 19

<b>Indicator 4.3.</b> No. of people benefitting from microfinance lending institutions.	25,000 clients	30,000 clients	1,000	Unsatisfactory
Progress assessment: <span style="color: green;">■</span> Achieved; <span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Satisfactory; <span style="color: red;">■</span> Unsatisfactory; <span style="color: grey;">■</span> No data				


## Outcome 5. Improvement of the status of women and youth

Based on review of the ICF document, the UNCT strategy was ‘to mainstream gender and youth issues in all four outcomes, with *‘additional actions to address five specific priority challenges<sup>41</sup> to the improvement of the status of women and youth with the overall objective to empower them to enhance their well being, socio-economic status, and capacity to engage in the peacebuilding process’.*

### Finding 7. The ICF design lacked a clear pathway towards the expected outcome 5 results

In line with the principles of results-based management (RBM), the results chain should show clearly **what** the intended results are (outputs/outcomes) as well as **how** they will be achieved (inputs/activities). As illustrated in Figure 11 below, the results chain starts with the allocation of resources that will be used to undertake the interventions that will produce desired results.

Figure 11. RBM results chain



Source. Adopted from: UNDG Guidelines – Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook, p 55





The UNCT did not allocate dedicated results towards outcome 5 and decided instead that the outcome would be mainstreamed across the other four outcomes. However, in 2016, according to key informants, the Outcome Group experienced difficulties with reporting on progress since they did not have control over the activities that were undertaken under the other outcomes.

<sup>41</sup> The five challenges were identified as: (i) marginalisation in leadership and participation in decision-making, (ii) livelihood and economic insecurity, (iii) maternal mortality and reproductive health, (iv) sexual and gender-based violence, and (v) tracking and documenting progress on the commitment to gender equality and empowerment of women and youth (ICF, p 37).

According to key informants, the difficult with reporting on mainstreaming arises when interventions are designed to contribute towards objectives other than women or youth empowerment. For example, the evaluators observed interventions in Aweil and Juba where market stalls were constructed to provide facilities for vendors, majority of who are women. In Juba, the market stalls were targeting IDPs and host communities as part of the peacebuilding effort. However, in both Aweil and Juba, the market stalls were not functional, albeit for different reasons.<sup>42</sup> In such situations, there is potential for misleading reporting because the Outcome Group may report on the establishment of the stalls as progress towards women's empowerment results, but not be aware that the stalls are not operational.

In 2017, the UNCT decided that all ICF projects that met the requirements for Gender Marker 3 and Youth Index 2<sup>43</sup> would be reported under Outcome 5, and also that any such resources would be reflected under the outcome. Following on this change, the Outcome Group was able to directly monitor and report on progress towards outcome indicators.

Figure 12. Progress on outcome 5 indicators

<b>Outcome 5. Improvement of the status of women and youth</b>				
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Baseline (2015)</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Progress achieved (December 2017)</b>	<b>Evaluation Assessment*</b>
<b>Indicator 5.1.</b> % of women in parliament; % of women in cabinet ministerial positions	26.5% and 10% respectively	30% and 15%	Parliament – 26.3% Cabinet – 16%	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Indicator 5.2.</b> No. of youth employment friendly labour laws, regulations, policies and programmes to create favourable environment for job creation	1 [draft labour law]	Total – 3	0	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Indicator 5.3.</b> No. of discriminatory legislations, laws and traditions reformed/formulated/adopted	1 legislation – transitional constitution	Total – 4 [1-law; 1- legislation; 2 traditional laws]	Strategic Plan to end Child Marriage (2017 – 2030)  Women's Bloc position paper on constitution presented	<b>Satisfactory</b>
Progress assessment:  Achieved;  Satisfactory;  Unsatisfactory;  No data				

<sup>42</sup> In Juba, beneficiaries said the problem was lack of access road to the market; while in Aweil, beneficiaries felt that they had not been consulted in the selection of the site, which they did not consider appropriate for business

<sup>43</sup> These are projects designed directly for empowerment of women and/or youth (not just gender equality).

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Based on key informant interviews however, UN agencies delivered notable outputs for women's empowerment but there were few interventions that directly targeted youth<sup>44</sup>. In Aweil, the evaluators visited the Special Protection Unit as well as a Women's Center where established for victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Some of the donors noted that empowering women and girls is central to their assistance policy as a means towards achievement of other development goals and urged the UNCT to be more forthright in its vision towards women's empowerment.

On the whole therefore, there should be greater clarity, such that if the strategy is to mainstream gender as a crosscutting issue, then there shouldn't be a need for a separate outcome; but if there is a separate outcome with specific indicators, then targeted interventions should be planned and resourced towards their achievement.

### **Crosscutting issues: Human Rights, Gender Equality, Environment and RBM**

The ICF design was sensitive to the UN's core values and standards, and at the time of formulation, the UNCT noted:

*"...the UNCT will apply UN core standards in the implementation of the ICF. This means mainstreaming the programming principles of human rights based approach, gender equality and environmental sustainability and committing to capacity development and results-based management in order to maximize the impact of the UN's engagement. It should be noted that these principles will need to be adapted to the unique and difficult context of South Sudan today. Mainstreaming these programming principles could allow dialogue around sensitive issues. At the same time, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy will be applied systematically in UNCT programming<sup>45</sup>.*

### **Finding 8. Implementation of the UN's core values and standards varied across the outcomes**

#### **Human-rights based approaches**

With respect to human-rights based approaches, the UN's approach was inclusive. UN agencies implemented projects specifically addressing human rights issues, while at the same time,

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<sup>44</sup> Analysis of consolidated spreadsheet for joint programmes shows that two out of total 19 joint programmes directly targeted youth: Beyond Bentiu, and Supporting Youth in South Sudan.

<sup>45</sup> ICF, p 41-42

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mainstreaming human rights approaches in other projects. A notable example is the Bentiu Youth Reintegration joint programme whose objectives were to strengthen mediation and reconciliation mechanisms between IDPs, returnees and host communities.

### ***Gender equality***

The UNCT decided that gender equality was going to be mainstreamed across all the ICF outcomes, and in line with that approach, did not allocate resources specifically towards outcome 5 for the empowerment of women and youth. However, as already illustrated in Figure 11 above, this may not have been the most ideal approach. Key informants also noted that the UN had been successful in mainstreaming gender equality, but less so with respect to youth empowerment. However, the evaluators noted that the targeted quota for 30 percent women beneficiaries was largely achieved, although some of the reports lacked disaggregated data.

### ***Sustainable environment***

The ICF contained specific outputs for sustainable environmental management, including establishment and review of national policies, strategies and actions plans to support sustainable management of natural resources and improve livelihoods. Various agricultural cooperative societies were targeted with respect to improving their productivity through environment-friendly farming practices.

### ***Results-based Management***

Overall, the design, implementation and monitoring of the ICF reflected RBM principles with indicators, baseline data and clear targets; although some inconsistencies were noted with respect to formulation of indicators (page 23).

### ***Capacity development***

The limitation imposed by bilateral donors with regard to engagement with central government affected the level of capacity development that UN agencies could do. In addition, as noted in the 2017 annual report, *‘...key policies have been developed, but their implementation often remains on hold due to decreased government capacities’*. However, there were a number of capacity development interventions undertaken, including, (i) the IGAD initiative for training of civil service personnel, (ii) implementation of resilience analysis systems and completion of Resilience Index measurement and Analysis exercises; and (iii) capacity development for local institutions at community level, such as for example training of trainers for technical, vocational education training (TVET).

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### 4.3. Implementation Efficiency

*Finding 9. There is high Inter-agency collaboration through the established coordination structures, which could be further extended to field level*

ICF coordination structures were established with clear terms of relevance. Particularly notable, was the establishment of Outcome Groups with responsibility to lead joint planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting on interventions that contribute to their respective outcomes.

Based on available evidence, the Outcome Groups have been coordinating joint planning as well as quarterly and annual progress reports. However, while the annual work plans have specific measurable indicators, some of the progress reports have tended to report mainly on completion of activities rather than progress towards the output indicators. Some key informants also noted that some of the Outcome Groups were often late in providing inputs, which was largely attributed to internal capacity in some of the UN agencies.<sup>46</sup>

Overall however, the UNCT implemented the recommendations of the 2015 UNDAF evaluation, including strengthening capacity in the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO), to support key functions such as strategic planning and policy advisory capacity, M&E, and communications. At the time of this evaluation, the positions for Strategic Planning Advisor, Coordination Officer, Communications Officer, Operations Officer and Special Assistant were filled, while the M&E position was vacant and undergoing recruitment process. The UNCT also established a Joint Policy Advisory Team (JPAT) to strengthen joint policy analysis across the UN system. All key informants consulted said that the JPAT provided strategic inputs to support UNCT decision-making.

There was also a high level of collaboration among UN agencies, and generally all key informants from the UN system acknowledged the need for working together. According to available information, there were 18 joint programmes<sup>47</sup> under implementation or advanced planning as of end of the first quarter of 2018. At the field level, the evaluator's also observed information sharing and collaboration among UN agencies. There was however no formal and systematic coordination mechanisms established at field office level. In the evaluators' opinion, given the

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<sup>46</sup> Majority of key informants said that UN agencies faced challenges due to staff turnover as well as six-week rest and recreation cycle. They suggested that UN agencies should appoint alternate members to the Outcome Groups, although some of the smaller specialised agencies may not have such capacity.

<sup>47</sup> Although assessment of joint programme implementation was beyond the scope of the evaluation, key informants noted that some of them were not effectively implemented



challenges to do with communication and travel in South Sudan, there is need for establishing Field Coordination Offices in order to enhance inter-agency collaboration.

***Finding 10. The continuing conflict situation constrained UN capacity to mobilise planned resources for the ICF***

The ICF had an initial planned budget of US\$877 million, of which \$336 million was available with a shortfall of \$541 million.<sup>48</sup> As already alluded to, the ICF was developed in a period of heightened optimism, leading the UNCT to state *“With the conclusion of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in August 2015, there is a new roadmap for progress and new opportunities to strengthen efforts towards peace and development.”*<sup>49</sup>

However, as events continued to unfold leading to the July 2016 outbreak in Juba, the optimism dissipated and relations between the government and bilateral donors deteriorated. Majority of the donors that were consulted confirmed that their respective governments’ policies was to focus on emergency humanitarian work rather than development programmes. Furthermore, even when funding development programmes, they were under instruction not to fund the central government of South Sudan. Based on

	Expenditure (US\$)		Total (US\$)
	2016	2017	
Outcome 1.	38,185,792	40,990,000	79,175,792
Outcome 2	40,246,332	45,576,368	85,822,700
Outcome 3	24,067,177	32,274,430	56,341,607
Outcome 4	16,864,332	13,228,141	30,092,473
Outcome 5	--	27,686,563	27,686,563
<b>Total</b>	<b>119,363,632</b>	<b>159,755,502</b>	<b>279,119,134</b>

available data, total expenditure for the two years ending December 2017 was \$279,119,134 (see box). The data in the box above indicates that (a) the UN did not raise any additional resources for the funding gap since total expenditures were covered from available resources; and (b) UN delivery over the two years to December 2017 was 83% of available resources.

The above data also reflects the difficulty of access to some parts of the country because of the conflict situation. According to some key informants, after the July 2016 outbreak, it took up to 3 months before UN agencies were able to get back to full capacity. It is also noteworthy that reported financial data for 2016 shows aggregated delivery rate of 70% from total expenditures of \$119,363,632 (2016 Annual Report, p4). The 2017 report shows both planned budget (\$236,021,219) and expenditures (\$159,755,502); giving a delivery rate of 67.7% as of end of April 2017. According to the 2017 annual report, *‘the overall workplan budget was reduced from 2016 to 2017 to reflect the more difficult environment in a realistic way, while actual delivery increased,*

<sup>48</sup> ICF Programme document, p 51

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. ICF p 6

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resulting in an increased delivery rate from only 49% in 2016 to 68% in 2017' (ICF Annual Report 2017, p1). This is a reflection of the combined effects of increasing hardship in the operating environment, as well as a reflection on UN capacity to deliver increased resources due to increasing demands for emergency response.

**Finding 11. Lack of adequate infrastructure combined with the conflict situation increased operational costs**

The cost of moving people and goods is very high, with much of it almost always by air. The following extract from a 2011 World Bank report puts it in perspective:

*"The road sector in South Sudan is one of the worst in Africa, and performs well below African low-income, middle-income, and resource-rich country benchmarks in all respects. The problem is twofold. The country's economy is constrained by the sheer absence of roads and by the fact that any existing roads are of very poor quality. Less than 2 percent of the primary network is paved, and no paved roads are in good condition. Less than a third of the unpaved roads are in good condition, and during the rainy season, which lasts half the year, the unpaved roads are impassable."*<sup>50</sup>

The high cost of transport has had a profound impact on the cost of UN delivery in South Sudan. Key informants noted that they have had to do air drops to deliver emergency supplies to vulnerable groups in different parts of the country. High inflation has also pushed the cost of goods and services, and the UN has had to contract its implementing partners in US dollars in order to ensure stability in cost planning.

#### **4.4. Sustainability of programme processes and results**

Sustainability entails planning and monitoring the programme's potential to continue after the end of initial funding as well as its capacity to self-replicate and upscale to more target beneficiaries.

**Finding 12. As a strategic framework, the ICF was itself a platform for sustainable development**

As has been alluded to throughout this report, the situation in South Sudan is one of continued conflict and crisis. Given this context, the ICF integrated its development work with emergency humanitarian response, emphasizing on recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. According to the emerging 'new way of working', *"...the approach is not a 'hand-over' from humanitarian to*

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<sup>50</sup> World Bank (2011); South Sudan Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective, p 15

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*development actors. Rather it acknowledges that in protracted situations, humanitarian and development actors need to work side-by-side and collaborate. Where context allows without undermining humanitarian principles, the New Way of Working sets a path for contributing to shared outcomes of reducing humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability through a range of well-aligned short-, medium- and longer-term contributions by humanitarian and development actors”.<sup>51</sup>*

One notable example is the joint programme for Aweil Recovery and Stabilization, which at the time of the evaluation was also being planned for Yambio. Based on documents reviewed, the objective of the joint programme is to, ‘enhance community resilience to livelihoods and food security shocks, and revitalize the local economy; the programme will help unleash the productive forces of the local communities, women and youth by catalytic activities which incentivize production, exchange and trade supported by market forces, improved outreach, quality, and equity of basic social services for the vulnerable population, promote peace and community cohesion and governance especially at the community level’.

In this connection therefore, the ICF is by and large a platform towards sustainable development. In particular, UN work under outcomes 1 and 4, notably by strengthening capacity of smallholder farmer, cooperatives, and SMEs in key value chains establishes an exit strategy for humanitarian action, while also providing a basis for recovery by protecting existing capacities. UN senior management and programme staff also noted the need for closer coordination between the two outcomes, and possibly combining them into one priority area in the next cooperation framework.

At individual project level however, the evaluators observed some interventions that faced sustainability challenges. For example, the peace market project in Juba was developed to provide facilities for IDPs and host communities, but beneficiaries said that the location did not have good business opportunity due to lack of access roads and lack of capital. Similarly for the market in Aweil, beneficiaries had not taken to the location as they did not consider it ideal for business.

***Finding 13. Despite limited engagement with central government, the UN established measures to engender national ownership***

As government-donor relations deteriorated following the July 2016 outbreak, it became increasingly difficult for the UN to engage with central government, particularly with respect to programme implementation and institutional capacity building. However, to ensure national

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<sup>51</sup> New Way of Working, p 7

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ownership of programme processes, the UN increased its engagement at state and community level.

In Aweil East for example, the evaluators observed that the State Ministry of Agriculture had full ownership of the programme, and was fully engaged in the planning and implementation of activities. The increase in number of States, initially from 10 to 28 and later to 32 states presented an additional challenge for the UN. In the first place, there was no clarity as to who to engage as national counterpart, and secondly, some of the newly established states do not have any infrastructure, let alone personnel. In addition, the state governors are pointed by central government, and key informants noted that every time there was a change in state administration, the entire state civil administration would also be overhauled, thereby affecting institutional memory and capacity.

At community level, sustainability potential is mixed. The UN works with existing structures, including local and international NGOs, which provides an institutional basis for sustainability. UN agencies were also working through common IPs, as was the case with the Nutrition joint programme in Aweil where MedAir was the IP for all the UN agencies involved.

Despite the souring of relations between the government and its bilateral partners, UN agencies continued to engage the central government in some of their activities. For example, the UN continues to work with the Ministry of Justice in training of judges and law officers in the areas of legal aid and access to justice. Other key line ministries such as Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare among others are also consulted and engaged in programme planning. However, the government faced a huge capacity deficit, both in terms of skills as well as resources (see page 10 above), and consequently their involvement was limited.

The situation was even worse at state level. For example in Aweil, the UN supported the State Revenue Authority in developing capacity for non-oil revenue. However, during the field visit, the state officials noted that they did not have adequate and appropriate office equipment such as computers, access to internet as well as other office supplies such as stationery to effectively discharge their mandate.

## **V. LESSONS LEARNED**

This chapter contains a review of the programme in order to draw out any good practices and lessons learnt that may inform the programme's implementation during the remainder of its life cycle as well as future programming.

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## **5.1. Good Practices**

### **5.1.1. Conflict sensitive analysis and planning**

One of the notable good practices, particularly given the country context in South Sudan was the extent of conflict sensitive analysis that was undertaken by the UN to inform the formulation and design of the ICF. This conflict sensitivity informed the decision to formulate an interim two-year framework, a decision which has been proven appropriate with benefit of hindsight. Most of the key informants that were interviewed agreed that South Sudan's situation was very fluid and required a flexible framework that is capable of being adapted to changing contexts.

### **5.1.2. Integration of humanitarian and development work**

In a context where government has no capacity to provide social services the situation in South Sudan has generally been viewed by development partners as not conducive for development work. The UN was able to respond to the humanitarian crisis while at the same time providing a window for recovery by focusing its interventions on recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. The UN was able to balance its humanitarian and development mandate through the collaboration and coordination of UN agencies, thereby giving life-saving support to vulnerable groups.

### **5.1.3. Joint Policy Advisory Team**

Given the fluid conflict and crisis situation in the country, the requirement for policy analysis and risk management cannot be over emphasised. The UN decision to establish the JPAT provided an institutional mechanism for joint analysis and coordinated decision-making. For example, in November 2017, the JPAT produced a comprehensive analysis of the conflict in South Sudan, which provided perspectives of the various conflict dimensions as seen from the vantage points of respective UN agencies' mandates.

## **5.2. Lessons Learned**

**Lesson 1.** One of the key lessons from the ongoing crisis situation in South Sudan is that; in a context where the situation is highly unstable and unpredictable, risk informed cooperation frameworks provide flexibility for UN agencies to continue development assistance as well as providing humanitarian support to the most vulnerable groups.

**Lesson 2.** UN programmes face the risk of setbacks and shocks both at strategic and operational level, due to the conflict situation. At strategic level, the impact of the souring of government/donor relations impacted negatively on the scope of UN programming due to decreasing funding; while at operational level, transaction costs are fuelled by need to balance

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between speed of delivery (emergency response) against building national systems (long term capacity building).

**Lesson 3.** UN interventions can be designed in a manner that leverages humanitarian resources for long term development programming. The UN has been able to deliver life-saving support to the most vulnerable groups while at the same time delivering development work, including support to recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. These interventions required the coordinated effort of multiple UN agencies working together towards common outcomes. The key lesson for the UN is aptly described by the adage: *‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’*.

**Lesson 4.** The conflict situation can spread to areas with relative peace/stability if basic services continue to deteriorate and government fails to respond. During the period from 2013 before the new outbreak in 2016, the Equatorias were generally peaceful and regarded as regions of stability, when movement between Juba and Torit for example, could be done by vehicle. However, following the outbreak in 2016, the security situation in the three equatorial regions has continued to deteriorate, and as at the time of the evaluation, the UN was no longer able to travel between Juba and Torit by road.

**Lesson 5.** The absence of a joint UN M&E working group to coordinate joint M&E work for the ICF and UN agencies affects quality of the ICF design, with implications on monitoring and reporting. As noted earlier, there were some inconsistencies with regards to the formulation of indicators. For example, a review of the ICF consolidated work plan shows that there were three levels of indicators – for outcomes, outputs and activities. However, indicators are only needed for results, of which activities are not.

## **VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In this chapter, the authors provide an independent interpretation of the evidence provided in the foregoing analysis, including their response and recommendations based on the evaluation questions agreed in the terms of reference.

### **6.1. Conclusions**

The country is in a deep social, economic and political crisis, approaching levels of collapse and state failure. The peace process has stalled, and there does not appear to be any particular urgency by both sides to restore the momentum.

At the time of its independence, South Sudan started its state-building trajectory with substantial levels of revenue from its oil resources. However, due to continuing conflict, as well as austerity measures after the oil shutdown in 2012, operational budgets became scarce and spending increasingly concentrated towards security. Revenue transfers to the states declined, and were

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further reduced by political decisions to increase the number of states from 10 to 32 as at the time of this evaluation. Consequently the government has no capacity to provide public services. The situation is worse at subnational level where the majority of the population lives. This gap has increasingly been filled by development partners, including the UN and non-governmental organisations.

Relations between traditional donors and the Government are strained, with donors focused on humanitarian assistance and demanding to see more commitment to peace as a condition to provide long term development support. Majority of non-state actors, such as international NGOs have access to resources, but these are increasingly earmarked for humanitarian emergency relief, which keeps increasing as the situation continues to deteriorate.

The conflict is becoming increasingly localised, as armed groups are increasingly and openly defined by ethnicity and links to local ethnic groups. More and more people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with the humanitarian appeal increasing to US\$ 1.7 billion from \$1.1 billion in 2017. The destruction of social capital is massive, and there is widespread human rights abuse and atrocities by both sides.

However, there appears to be a new momentum for peace through the **IGAD High-Level Revitalization Forum** which so far has resulted in the signing of Cessation of Hostilities agreement in December 2017. In addition, the government is developing a three-year National Development Strategy, expected to be ready by June 2018, which further demonstrates an increased political willingness to bring an end to the conflict and move towards development.

## **6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In light of the foregoing analysis, the evaluators make the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 1.** The UN should focus on interventions that provide greater opportunities for impact through increased flexibility and enhanced collaboration between humanitarian and development programming. As there is consensus among all key stakeholders, including UN agencies and cooperation partners that humanitarian action alone is not sustainable, the UNCT should consider developing one flagship programme on resilience. The flagship programme should therefore have a common budgetary and management framework in order to enhance coherence and better coordination.

**Recommendation 2.** UN programming becomes difficult in a situation where relations between the government and donors are not cordial. The UNCT should consider development of measures

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that trigger increased or decreased engagement with government, especially with the central government to enhance its accountability and improve its relations with donors.

**Recommendation 3.** The UN should consider ways to build and strengthen stronger partnerships, including with civil society organisations, both local and international. The government budget for financial year 2018/19 shows clearly that government has no capacity to provide social services. Combined with the increasing number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, the proportion of the population at risk of further vulnerability and marginalization is increasing; and in line with its principle of ‘leaving no one behind’ the UN should consider ways to expand its impact and leverage on limited resources through increased partnerships with non-state actors, including the private sector and NGOs.

**Recommendation 4.** The UNCT should ensure that a functional M&E Working Group is established and provided with appropriate resources to enable it to provide adequate support at all levels of ICF processes, including in formulation and design, implementation, and reporting.

**Recommendation 5.** The UNCT should enhance its resilience building approach, including by building capacity of other non-state actors such as farmers’ cooperatives. Given appropriate and adequate capacity, these community institutions have potential to provide a platform for delivery of other services.

**Recommendation 6.** As the youth are a key factor in the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, the UNCT should consider increasing specific initiatives and programmes targeting the youth. Such initiatives may include empowering the youth to participate in peace building, economic activities and political governance.

**Recommendation 7.** Movement in South Sudan is difficult and very costly as many of the states are accessible only by air. In addition, the complex nature of the challenges facing the most vulnerable groups also requires collaboration among UN agencies. The UNCT should therefore consider strengthening coordination in the field, including by establishing field coordination offices.

**Recommendation 8.** There does not seem to be any substantive change in context since the ICF period, other than the potential introduction of the National Development Strategy as well as the increased momentum of the HLRF. In that regard, the UN should continue to provide a flexible framework that enables the UN to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable groups and communities in a humanitarian context while at the same time establishing a beachhead for transition to recovery and development programming. Achieving this will entail the following:



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- e) Scaling up of interventions to more geographic localities and reaching more vulnerable communities, including developing 'area based approaches' to enable UN agencies to leverage on their respective comparative advantages.
  - f) Enhancing engagement with state and non-state actors to build their capacity and strengthen peacebuilding, especially at subnational level.
  - g) Strengthening collaboration between humanitarian and development actors, to establish a beachhead for recovery.
  - h) Continue to frame the UN's programming in line with Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development – **leave no one behind** – including use of appropriate M&E indicators.

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## LIST OF ANNEXES

### Annex 1. Documents Reviewed

1. South Sudan National Development Strategy July 2018 – June 2021 (Draft).
2. South Sudan 2017 Inaugural SDG Report (Draft).
3. UNHCR; South Sudan 2017 Revised Regional Refugee Response Plan: Overview.
4. World Bank; Country Engagement Note for the Republic of South Sudan, 2018 – 19.
5. UNDP; Beyond Conflict: Building a strong future for South Sudan.
6. UNDP; An analysis of Government Budgets in South Sudan from a Human Development Perspective: Discussion Paper.
7. UNCT; Interim Cooperation Framework, 2016 – 2017.
8. Search for Common Ground; South Sudan Conflict Analysis Brief.
9. OCHA; New Way of Working.
10. IGAD; Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.
11. UNCT; Joint News Note, February 2018.
12. ICF Progress Report, January – September 2017.
13. ICF Annual Progress Report, 2016.
14. ICF Annual Progress Report, 2017.
15. UNDP; Human Development Report 2016.
16. UNICEF; Conflict Analysis Summary: Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy in Conflict-Affected Contexts Programme.
17. UN Joint Policy Advisory Team in South Sudan: The Conflict in South Sudan.
18. ICF Annual Work Plan, 2017.
19. ICF Annual Work Plan, 2018.

## Annex 2. Individual Interviewed

#	Name	Title	Agency
<b>UN Agencies</b>			
1.	Lealem Berhanu Dinku	Senior Programme Specialist	UNDP
2.	Christian Lotz	Head of Office/Strategic Advisor	RCO
3.	Hyun Hee Ban	Chief, Social Policy, Planning, M&E	UNICEF
4.	Mahimbo Mdoe	Representative	UNICEF
5.	Felix Dzvurimi	Senior Programme Officer	FAO
6.	Jesse Wood	Deputy Country Director	WFP
7.	Awol Endrias	Education Programme Specialist	UNESCO
8.	Fredrick Mugisha	Economic Advisor	UNDP
9.	Theo Addey	Policy Specialist	UNDP
10.	Sardar Umar	Representative	UNESCO
11.	Adnan Khan	Representative/Country Director	WFP
12.	Ram Kishore Prasad Singh	Chief Technical Advisor	UNIDO
13.	Kamil Kamuldeen	Country Director	UNDP
14.	Sofia Mukasa Monico	Country Director	UNAIDS
15.	Lansana Wonneh	Deputy Representative	UN-Women
16.	Daniel Kir	Senior Programme Officer	UNDP
17.	Dr. Wilfred Ochan	Deputy Representative	UNFPA
18.	Betty Araba	Communications/Partnerships Advisor	UNAIDS
19.	Izora Mutya Maskun	Head of Operations	IOM
20.	Johann Siffointe	Representative	UNHCR
21.	Dr Thay Awana	Senior Advisor on Conflict	UNDP
22.	Benjamin Lokoya	Education Officer	UNICEF (Aweil)
23.	Dr. Garang Kur	Health Officer	UNICEF (Aweil)
24.	Abdel Rassoul	WASH Officer	UNICEF (Aweil)
25.	Dominic Anyanga	Programme Manager	UNDP (Aweil)
26.	Martha Abari	Field Support Officer	UNDP (Aweil)
27.	Lita Jackson	Area Coordinator	FAO (Aweil)
<b>Government officials</b>			
28.	Hon. John Amhar Akok	State Minister, Agriculture	Aweil State
29.	Moses Mabior	Director, Planning/Aid Coordination	MoFP
30.	Dr Simon malong	Director General, MoH	Aweil State
31.	William Ngor	Commissioner, SRA	Aweil State
32.	James Deng	Director, Revenue Collection	Aweil State
33.	Upieu Ojonkor	Board Chair, SRA	Aweil State
34.	Philip Mareng Bol	Director, Ministry of Agriculture	Aweil East State
35.	Luka Manut Jel	Deputy Director, Agriculture	Aweil East State
36.	Deng Ajing Dau	SPU Director	Aweil State

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**Cooperation partners**

37.	Stefano Ellero	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation
38.	Lorents Finanger	Counsellor, Head of Cooperation	Norwegian Embassy
39.	Becks Buckingham	Head of Office	British Embassy
40.	Catherine Baga	Programme Officer	Swedish Embassy
41.	Alan Hamson		Canadian Embassy
42.	Alexandra Hilal Guhr	Head of Development Cooperation	German Embassy
43.	Teun Mandema	First Secretary	Netherlands Embassy
44.	Sandra de Jongh	Second Secretary	Netherlands Embassy

**Implementing partners and beneficiaries**

45.	Suzy Gulliver	Admin Officer	WPDI
46.	Dagu Davis	Project Officer	WPDI
47.	Brig. Antony Oliver Lege	Dep Director, Vocational Training	NPSS
48.	Rose Omi Mustafa	Beneficiary (PaCC project)	Juba
49.	Joan Nicola	Beneficiary, (PaCC project)	Juba
50.	Umara John	Beneficiary, (PaCC project)	Juba
51.	Momo Taban Nathan	Boma Chairpaerson	Juba
52.	Albino Ujieth Nyiwel	Head Teacher	Udaba school
53.	John Majak Deng	Nutrition Officer	MedAir
54.	Helen Brannam	Project Manager	MedAir
55.	Angui Deng Wek	Chairperson, Cooperative Society	Mangok County
56.	Angelina Adhieu	Secretary, Cooperative Society	Mangok County
57.	Elizabeth Ajok	GBV Project Manager	ARC
58.	Peter Garang Wol	GBV response Officer	ARC
59.	Michael Garang	GBV Prevention Officer	ARC
60.	Zubaya Jojo	Programme Manager	ACF
61.	Simon Dut	Project Officer	ACF
62.	Akot Aliewu	Chair, Omdurman Cooperative	Aweil East State
63.	John Wol	Secretary, Omdurman Cooperative	Aweil East State

## Annex 3. Performance-based Results Framework

### Outcome 1.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved Based on indicators	
			2016	2017
<b>Indicator 1.1.</b> % of targeted communities using 11 coping strategies or coping strategy index CSI disaggregated by sex of household head	12.89 (Oct 2015) rCSI 50% of targeted communities to 11/56 or less	average household rCSI is reduced or stabilized	19.39	9.4
<b>1.1 b:</b> Assets-based CSI: based upon use of 10 livelihood-related coping strategies	78%	percentage of households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies reduced		38%
<b>Indicator 1.2</b> # of targeted Communities have increased Asset Scores (CAS) over the baseline	60% Communities have average of 2.4 functional assets (Oct 2015)	80% of communities have CAS over baseline value	4.4	data was not collected
<b>Indicator 1.3:</b> % household with acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS)	44% population in target areas have acceptable food consumption scores (Oct 2015)	65% of target population have acceptable food consumption scores.	30%	47
<b>Indicator 1.1.1.</b> # of resilience analysis information systems established	0	1	No system established	No system established
<b>Indicator 1.1.2.</b> # of multi-sectoral Resilience Platforms established at sub-national level	0	6		No data
<b>Indicator 1.1.3:</b> Number of reported explosive hazards (AP, AT and UXO) destroyed	20,975 (2016)	15,000 (2017)	20,975	35,376
<b>Indicator 1.1.4:</b> Number of assets built, restored, or maintained by targeted households and communities, by type and unit of measure	TBD	TBD	88%	93% 90%
<b>Indicator 1.1.5:</b> Number of predictable, productive safety nets projects reaching vulnerable communities, by type of project	0	1		1500

<sup>1</sup> Interim Cooperation Framework 2016 Annual Report p 6-8-10

## Outcome 2.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved Based on indicators	
			2016	2017
<b>Indicator 2.1.</b> Proportion of births attended by skilled health professionals.	11% (2013); UNHCR (88%, 2016)	25% (2017); UNHCR (90%)		UNICEF: 28% (19,472); UNHCR 755
<b>Indicator 2.2.</b> % of children and adults enrolled in education (sex-disaggregated).	Baseline (2015): 35% Primary Net Enrolment Rate (30% girl, 39% boys); adults: 16% women, 40% men	(2017): 40% Primary NER (35% girls, 45% boys); adults 20% women, 44% men	50.4%	103%
<b>Indicator 2.3.</b> Moderate acute malnutrition treatment recovery rate in children and pregnant and lactating women	Baseline (2014): 85% UNHCR: 85.6% (2016)	Target (2017): No less than 75%	79.3%	WFP: 85%; UNHCR: 82.7%
<b>Indicator 2.1.1.</b> % of pregnant women attending at least 4 antenatal care visits	Baseline (2010): 17%; UNHCR (75%, 2016)	Target (2017): 20%; UNHCR (>75%)	11%	UNICEF: 59% UNHCR: 77%
<b>Indicator 2.1.2:</b> Pupil-Classroom Ratio (PCR)	Baseline (2017): nationally (w/o GUN data): 84.6, GUN region 194;	Target (2018): nationally (w/o GUN data): 85, GUN region 194.	90	
<b>Indicator 2.1.3:</b> Coverage of Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programs Under 5 PLW	baseline (2017): 75%; baseline ( UNHCR) 90% baseline (2017): 85%, Baseline ( UNHCR): 90%	target (2018): 62% target ( UNHCR) >90% target (2018): 53%, Target ( UNHCR) >90%		82.7%
<b>Indicator 2.1.3:</b> % of children with SAM admitted among the total number of estimated caseload	Baseline (2015): 60%, Baseline ( UNHCR)90% Baseline (2017):70%	Target (2018): 70%, Target ( UNHCR) >90% Target (2018): 75% (UNICEF)		89.7%
<b>Indicator 2.1.4 :</b> % of people with access to an improved drinking water source in target areas	Baseline (2015): 59%	Target (2017): 65%		50%
<b>Indicator 2.1.5 :</b> # of children reached with birth notification services in target area	Baseline (2016): 279,225 (cumulative);	Target (2017): 100,000 new notifications (cumulative 379,225)		No DATA
<b>Indicator 2.2.1:</b> Pupil-Classroom Ratio (PCR)	Baseline (2015): nationally (w/o GUN data): 84.6, GUN region 194;	Target (2017): nationally (w/o GUN data): 85, GUN region 194.	90	No data
<b>Output 2.3. Nutrition : Children, pregnant and lactating women, people living with chronic illnesses and the elderly have increased access to and utilization of prevention and treatment of malnutrition</b>				
<b>Indicator 2.3.1:</b> Coverage of Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programs	baseline (2015): 77.5%;	target (2016): 75% target (2016): 85%		82.70%

Under 5PLW				
<b>Indicator 2.3.1:</b> % of children with SAM admitted among the total number of <b>estimated caseload</b>	Baseline (2015): 60%	Target (2016): 70%		UNICEF: 99.9% (206,993) UNHCR: 89.70% SAM recovery rate
<b>Indicator 2.4.1:</b> % of people with access to an improved drinking water source in target areas	Baseline (2015): 59%	Target (2017): 65%		50%
<b>Indicator 2.5.1</b> # of children reached with birth notification services in target area	Baseline (2016): 279,225 (cumulative);	Target (2017): 100,000 new notifications (cumulative 379,225)		

<sup>2</sup> Interim Cooperation Framework 2016 Annual Report p 10-12-15

### Outcome 3.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved Based on indicators	
			2016	2017
<b>Indicator 3.1.</b> # of targeted governance and security reforms are implemented	Baseline (2015): The constitution review process, legislative, military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace agreement	Target (2017): 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law institutions' Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted.		<b>Off track</b> NCRC was still not re-constituted
<b>Indicator 3.2.</b> % of respondents who report increased personal safety and security disaggregated by sex and age.	Baseline:(2015): 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) respondents with confidence in peace, safety and security	Target (2017): 50% (48% men and 52% women)		Total -30% feel secure in their communities (No disaggregated data)
<b>Indicator 3.3.</b> % of transitional governance mechanisms with CSO/media participation.	Baseline (2015): 0	Target (2017): 80%		Planned activities on track; community radios, and of peace journalism network
<b>( No Indicators)</b>				
<b>Indicator 3.2.1:</b> Number of public sector personnel trained (disaggregated by sex and age).	TBD	TBD		No data
<b>Indicator 3.2.2:</b> Number of public sector structures and systems supported	TBD	TBD		No data
<b>Indicator 3.3.1:</b> % reduction in inter communal violence	TBD	TBD		No data
<b>Output 4: Support to Access to Justice and Rule of Law</b>				
<b>Indicator 3.4.1:</b> Number of people trained in the formal justice	TBD	TBD		No data

systems (disaggregated by sex and age)				
<b>Indicator 3.4.1:</b> Number of women and men accessing the formal justice systems	TBD	TBD		No data
<b>Indicator 3.5.1</b> Number of CSO /Media organizations supported	TBD	T BD		

#### Outcome 4.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved Based on indicators	
			2016	2017
<b>Indicator 4.1.</b> # of value chain enabling strategies in agriculture, livestock and fisheries	4 strategies	4 additional strategies		4
<b>Indicator 4.2.</b> # of Cooperatives and Micro Small and Medium sized Enterprises in place for production and marketing of produce	70	60 new cooperatives and MSMEs formed	50	60
<b>Indicator 4.3.</b> # of people benefiting from micro-finance/lending initiatives	25, 000 clients	30, 000 clients (50% women and 50% men)		1,000
<b>Indicator 4.1.1.</b> Number of Women selling WFP through Cooperatives Societies participating in P4P	1939 (2015)	2000		4400
<b>Indicator 4.1.2:</b> Number of persons of concern receiving kits and inputs for agriculture/fisheries/livestock activities	31000	40000		43,753
<b>Indicator 4.2.1:</b> Number of young and women enterprises leaders supported to access relevant vocational trainings and business skills in the food industry	0	26 enterprises (150 individuals)		1000
<b>Indicator 4.3.1:</b> Publication of National Environmental management documents	0	3		No clear info

#### Outcome 5.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Progress achieved Based on indicators	
			2016	2017
<b>Indicator 5.1.</b> % of women in parliament; % of women in cabinet and ministerial positions	(2015): 26.5% and 10%	(2017): 30% and 15%	20%	
<b>Indicator 5.2.</b> # of youth employment friendly labour laws, regulations, policies and programmes to create favorable environment for job creation	1 new labour law has been drafted and submitted to stakeholders for consultation	Target (2017): 3		progress not made in influencing youth friendly policies
<b>Indicator 5.3.</b> # of discriminatory legislations, laws and traditions reformed/formulated/adopted	Baseline (2015): 1 legislation Transitional constitution	Target (2017): 4 (1-law, 1-legislation and 2 traditional laws)		



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## **Annex 4. Evaluation Terms of Reference**

### **1. Background**

The 2016-2018 South Sudan Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) is the United Nations Country Team's (UNCT) strategic programme framework. The ICF was launched in January 2016, as it had become increasingly clear that a new strategic framework was needed to replace the 2012-16 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), due to the conflict that had erupted in late 2013.

The 2012-16 UNDAF had been developed at the time of independence in 2011, and went through a series of adaptations to a shifting context in South Sudan in the years between 2011 and 2015. This period saw deteriorating conditions for implementation of the UNDAF due to economic crisis and the outbreak of conflict in 2013

Even with the latest round of adjustments in 2014 in response to the conflict, the UNDAF lost most of its relevance with more challenging partnerships and instability in many parts of the country. Furthermore, as the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) expired in 2016, there was effectively no national development plan to align to. On the other hand, an Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was established in August 2015, and provided a new momentum for short-term transitional support for recovery, resilience and peacebuilding.

In the absence of a national development framework and given the fluid and volatile situation in South Sudan, the UNCT developed the ICF to continue its development assistance during the transitional period of the ARCSS, initially only for 2016 and 17, and then extended to 2018 as ARCSS implementation slowed down. The ICF prioritizes five outcome areas as (1) more resilient communities, (2) strengthened social services for the vulnerable (3) peace and governance strengthened (4) reinvigoration of the local economy and (5) cross-cutting: the status of women and youth improved. These outcomes reflect the need to concentrate on immediate, short-term efforts to recover from the conflict, protect those that have been hardest hit, and strengthen the ability of the population to deal with the continued instability and the crisis.

The ICF was prepared through a consultative and participatory process of the UNCT through which strategic priorities have been developed together with an outcome level results and resource framework in accordance with UNDG guidelines. Five Outcome Working Groups were established along the lines of the outcome areas each with two co-conveners and participants from interested and relevant UN agencies that prepared respective outcome area reports. In July 2017, the first joint results and financial report on UN activities in South Sudan covering 2016

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was issued. This marked an important milestone in stepping up collective strategic planning and accountability, as no similar reports had ever been produced for the former UNDAF.

In the second quarter of 2017, the government initiated work on a new National Development Strategy, and new political initiatives have given cautious hope that a renewed momentum in the peace process might be possible, including through the High-Level Revitalization Forum and the National Dialogue. On this background, the UNCT is now moving towards its next Cooperation Framework 2019-20. A strategic prioritization exercise was conducted in November 2017 and came up the key priorities and the outcome structure of the new framework. The next step will be a series of consultations with Government, donors and civil society before drafting of the UNCF is undertaken in February and March 2018.

As part of the UNCF roadmap, and in accordance with undg guidelines and policies, an independent evaluation of the ICF will also be conducted in the first quarter of 2018 to inform the design of the UNCF, to ensure that it is based on lessons learned and best practices from ICF implementation.

The UN Resident Coordinator's Office (UNRCO) will therefore engage an international consultant to conduct the ICF 2016-2018 evaluation in cooperation with a national consultant.

## **2. Purpose**

The purpose of the ICF evaluation is to assess the relevance of the ICF as a strategy for the UN during the transitional phase of the ARCSS with a strong emphasis on recovery, resilience and peacebuilding. It should explore how effectively and efficiently the UNCT responded to the shifting contexts during the ICF period, including how it adjusted to the crisis in July 2016, and how it supported the achievement of national goals during this transitional period.

The exercise will assess challenges encountered and provide lessons learned, as well as concrete recommendations to guide the formulation of the UNCF, and ensure that the new framework responds well to current and emerging issues in South Sudan.

## **3. Objectives**

- i. Assess the relevance of the ICF, and how its outcomes and outputs were adjusted to changing contexts, including the crisis in July 2016, both in planning and in implementation. It should consider to what extent the ICF responded to national priorities as articulated i.a. in the ARCSS.

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- ii. Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the ICF in terms of progress towards agreed outcomes and outputs and identify the factors that influenced achievement of results, including how the ICF interacted with humanitarian, peacebuilding and peacekeeping objectives during this period.
  - iii. Assess the potential for sustainable impact towards long term development goals during the evaluation period, given the challenging and fluid conflict context.
  - iv. Assess how effectively and efficiently the ICF worked as a framework for coordination, monitoring progress, accountability and mobilisation of resources, including through regular reporting, and the appropriateness of the organisation and coordination structures established to implement the ICF, including the outcome groups.
  - v. Determine to what extent cross-cutting issues (human rights- based approach, gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management, capacity development) were systematically incorporated in the ICF design and reporting.
  - vi. Identify best practices and lessons learned from ICF implementation and provide concrete and actionable recommendations for the formulation of the UNCF.
  - vii. Review and assess the implementation of the recommendations for the ICF proposed in the UNDAF evaluation of November 2015.

#### **4. Scope**

The evaluation will cover only the period from 2016 and 2017, which represents the first two years out of the expected total of three years of ICF implementation. It will consider 2017 annual reporting to be produced in early 2018. It will cover national implementation of all the five outcome areas of the ICF and its associated goals and objectives.

#### **5. Methodology**

The evaluation will be independent and guided by the UNDG guidelines for UNDAF Evaluations and in accordance with UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards of Evaluation and Ethical Standards as well as OECD/DAC evaluation principles and guidelines, and be fully compliant with the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports.

The evaluation should utilize a mixed method approach. Data collection methods and process shall consider all programming and other cross-cutting issues as appropriate. The analysis must be evidence based and build on available data sources, statistics and other primary sources. Innovative solutions to data collection and solutions that are adapted to the difficult circumstances and access restrictions should be considered.

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A part of the evaluation work can take place as desk-work outside South Sudan, some interviews can be conducted through phone, skype or video conferences, while some work will require travel to Juba, and locations in South Sudan outside Juba.

Methods of data collection can include but not necessarily be limited to:

- i. Document review, focusing on ICF annual work plans and reports, UN agencies annual reports, reviews and evaluation reports, strategy papers, national plans and policies, as well as available data and statistics by UNCT members and from other sources, including the UN perception survey from 2016;
- ii. Interviews with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor representatives, UNCT members, and implementing partners;
- iii. Discussions with ICF beneficiaries;
- iv. Questionnaire based stakeholder survey.

A 1-2 page outline of the proposed evaluation methodology will be required as part of the selection and contracting process for the evaluation and can be further negotiated with the successful consultant, after which it will serve as the basis for organization of data collection and the evaluation work. On the basis of the desk review, the consultant team will submit an inception report with a detailed plan for data collection that reflects the conditions in South Sudan.

The data collection methodology will depend on availability of existing evidence, including statistics and administrative data, and secondary sources such as evaluations and reviews by UNCT members, logistical constraints (travel costs, timing, etc.), and other considerations such as access to and availability of relevant stakeholder and beneficiary groups given that many parts of South Sudan are experiencing active conflict.

The evaluation process must build on gender sensitivity and gender specific data, as well as other UN programming principles, including capacity development, environmental sustainability, Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) and Result-Based Management (RBM).

The evaluation methodology must include a strong approach to Quality Assurance and a dedicated QA mechanism.

## **6. Management and organization**

The evaluation will be conducted by a consultant team overseen by the UNCT with support of the PMT and a dedicated Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) that will be constituted for this

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purpose by the PMT. The RCO will conduct the contracting of the consultant team that will report to the head of the RCO. National partners will be consulted on the process and the outcomes of the evaluation.

It is envisaged that the evaluation team will consist of one international consultant (team leader) supported by a national consultant. The national consultant will be recruited with the participation of the international consultant, once identified.

The RCO will provide background material and contact information of institutions and individuals that the consultants are expected to engage with in the course of the evaluation, organize any workshops required as part of the evaluation process, and provide office space and local transport in Juba, and arrange air travel to destinations outside Juba. Organization of other work, including interviews, will be the responsibility of the consultant team. Transportation to and from international destinations will also be the responsibility of the consultant team.

As part of the required Quality Assurance, external experts, including the UNDG-R Peer Support Group may be called upon to advise and review outputs.

The evaluation will be conducted over a period of 6 weeks, and should be ready in time for the conclusion of the drafting of the UNCF work in March 2018. It is envisaged that the international consultant will spend a total of 40 working days on the task.

## 7. Deliverables

- i. **Inception report:** The Evaluation Team will collect data using the proposed methodologies, such as surveys, questionnaires, desk review, observation, interviews and focus group discussions. The Evaluation Team will develop a full methodology and survey instruments and a draft Evaluation Plan as part of the Inception Report, which will include a stakeholder mapping, the final list of evaluation questions, the evaluation matrix, the overall evaluation design and methodology, a detailed description of the data collection plan for the field phase, and a description of the roles and responsibilities of the individual team members. The inception report will be reviewed and discussed by the ERG.
- ii. **A PowerPoint presentation** highlighting the main components of the inception report, reflecting the comments provided by the ERG and key stakeholders, to be presented to the PMT and the UNCT.
- iii. **Draft ICF Evaluation Report:** The Evaluation Team will write a draft ICF evaluation report and proposed action points for implementation of evaluation recommendations. The ERG and other reviewers for QA purposes will provide a first round of comments, including potentially

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though a workshop type event. The revised draft report shall thereafter be submitted to the UNCT by the RC for discussion and a final set of comments.

- iv. **A PowerPoint presentation** to share and explain findings and recommendations.
- v. **Final ICF Evaluation Report:** The final report will follow the two rounds of commenting on the draft evaluation report. It will include a set of clear, forward-looking and actionable recommendations logically linked to the findings and conclusions, and identify lessons learnt to improve the strategies, implementation mechanism, and management of the next UNCF.

## **8. Requirements**

The following requirements apply to the international consultant:

### ***Competencies***

- Excellent knowledge of the UN system and UN joint country programming processes
- Strong knowledge and experience with national development frameworks in conflict and post-conflict situations, including Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and UN Peacebuilding;
- Specialised technical knowledge, evaluation principles, methodologies and approaches;
- Excellent communication, management and interpersonal skills, teamwork and adept at working with people of diverse cultural and social backgrounds;
- An understanding of and ability to abide by the core values of the United Nations

### ***Experience***

- At least 10 years of experience and proven track record;
- Proven expertise with CCA/UNDAF processes, evaluations and reviews, including in post conflict settings, and also including an understanding of UN's relevant Programming Guidelines on Gender Equality, HRBA, Capacity Development, Environmental Sustainability and RBM;
- Excellent report writing skills, analytical skills as well as good computer skills;
- Experience in working with teams and team processes.

### ***Education and language***

- Master's degree or equivalent in Economics, Development Studies, Peace Studies, Social Studies, International Relations or other related field.

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- UN SSAFE certification will be an advantage. If consultants are not SSAFE certified, an additional three consultant days will be required for this training in Juba before travel outside Juba can be undertaken.
  - Proven excellent command in written and spoken English.

## **9. Information to be submitted with the proposal and selection criteria**

### ***Documents to be included when submitting the proposals***

- Brief explanation (300 words) why the consultant is best suited for the work;
- 1-2 page description of proposed methodology, including for use of 40 work days at home, in Juba and outside Juba, data collection and quality assurance;
- Proposed timing of work and availability of consultant;
- Financial proposal;
- Personal CV and P11 form. P11 form can be downloaded from this website:  
[http://www.sas.undp.org/Documents/P11\\_Personal\\_history\\_form.doc](http://www.sas.undp.org/Documents/P11_Personal_history_form.doc)

### ***Financial Proposal***

The financial proposal shall specify a total and all-inclusive lump sum amount. The financial proposal must include a breakdown of this lump sum amount (including all travel, insurance, visa, per diems, and number of all anticipated consultant working days by consultant).

### ***Evaluation of proposals***

The award of the contract will be made to the team leader or consultant team whose offer has been evaluated and determined as having received the highest combined score of the technical and financial scores.

- Technical Criteria weight; 70%
- Financial Criteria weight; 30%

Only candidates obtaining a minimum of 70 points out of 100 points at the technical evaluation will be considered for the financial evaluation.

If the contract is awarded to an individual team leader, contracts for other team members may be advertised subsequently.